LibVNCClient is a library for easy implementation of a VNC client. In 0.9.15 and earlier, LibVNCClient's Tight encoding decoder uses fixed-size 2048-pixel scratch buffers for the Gradient filter, but it does not reject Tight rectangles whose width is larger than 2048 pixels. A malicious VNC server can send a crafted FramebufferUpdate rectangle using Tight encoding with NoZlib | ExplicitFilter and the Gradient filter. When a LibVNCClient-based client connects, the client processes the server-controlled rectangle width and writes beyond fixed-size Gradient buffers. This vulnerability is fixed with commit 5b270544b85233668b98161323297d418a8f5fd1.

LibVNCClient is a library for easy implementation of a VNC client. In versions 0.9.12 through 0.9.15, a malicious (or man-in-the-middle) VNC server can force a connecting libvncclient to write attacker-controlled data past the end of its framebuffer. This is an out-of-bounds heap write with attacker-controlled length, contents, and offset. It needs no authentication (the attacker is the server), works in a default build with default settings, and fires from a single FramebufferUpdate the moment the victim connects. It crashes any client unconditionally (denial of service); we also demonstrated it overwriting an application callback pointer and redirecting execution to attacker-chosen code (code execution) under the default configuration. Commit 540332be3e0acc566fa64da6f1b4680c72c724dd patches the issue.