Magistrala's Rules Engine allows authenticated users to create rules with embedded Go or Lua scripts executed server-side when IoT messages arrive. The Lua script engine (re/lua.go) performs no input validation at all and preloads dangerous libraries: db (arbitrary database access), ioutil (file I/O), an HTTP client (SSRF), and filepath (traversal).

Magistrala before 1.0.0 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the timescale-reader and postgres-reader HTTP API services that allows authenticated attackers to inject arbitrary SQL by supplying a malicious format query parameter that is interpolated directly into the FROM clause without parameterization or identifier quoting. Attackers with a self-registered account can substitute arbitrary subqueries to achieve cross-tenant database reads, extract pgshadow password hashes, read and write arbitrary files, and execute arbitrary code as the postgres OS user by loading attacker-supplied shared objects, with all injected SQL executing at superuser privilege due to the default PostgreSQL role configuration.

Magistrala (formerly Mainflux)'s message-readers API reads a value from the HTTP query string (readers/api/http/transport.go) with no validation and interpolates it directly into raw SQL queries via fmt.Sprintf in both the PostgreSQL reader (readers/postgres/messages.go: ) and the TimescaleDB reader (readers/timescale/messages.go, same pattern), enabling SQL injection by any authenticated user able to query channel messages.