Nango before 0.71.3 contains an sql injection vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary SQL by supplying a crafted task group key to the orchestrator API. Attackers can send a malicious group.key to POST /v1/immediate, which TaskEventsHandler.notify() interpolates into a Postgres NOTIFY statement, running stacked queries against the scheduler database.

Nango before 0.71.3 contains an sql injection vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary SQL by supplying a crafted task group key to the orchestrator API. Attackers can send a malicious group.key to POST /v1/immediate, which TaskEventsHandler.notify() interpolates into a Postgres NOTIFY statement, running stacked queries against the scheduler database.

Nango is an open-source platform for connecting agents and products to third-party APIs. Prior to 0.70.9, on accounts with RBAC enabled through a plan with hasrbac=true, two private flow-read routes, GET /api/v1/integrations/:providerConfigKey/flows and GET /api/v1/flow/:flowName, apply webAuth but omit can({ action: 'read', resource: 'flow', scopedBy: envScope }). A same-team user with the developmentfullaccess role can therefore request env=prod and read production integration flow metadata or named flow configuration despite being denied by guarded production routes. Both controllers use res.locals.environment from the authenticated account, so the issue bypasses the production role boundary but does not cross tenant boundaries. This issue is fixed in version 0.70.9 and managed-1.5.11-0.70.8-aae30d044d7e229807d51a3957c212f3fb689e1a