A security vulnerability has been detected in OctoPrint 1.0.0/1.1.0. Affected is an unknown function of the component Flask Secret Key Handler. Such manipulation leads to use of hard-coded cryptographic key . The attack may be performed from remote. Upgrading to version 1.11.1 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is b4699825d6ab92d5451e5b1e3a06dfb81f86e777. The affected component should be upgraded.

A weakness has been identified in OctoPrint 1.0.0. This impacts the function getSettings of the file src/octoprint/server/ajax/settings.py of the component API Key Handler. This manipulation causes information disclosure. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. Upgrading to version 1.1.0-rc1 will fix this issue. Patch name: eccc9d6fbde0c46cdd6e255fd5ce9a30077ba954. You should upgrade the affected component. Affected is a 2013 release where access control was not yet implemented and the endpoint was part of first-run setup). The API key has been admin-gated since 1.2.0 and GET /api/settings is protected by Permissions.SETTINGSREAD plus reauthentication in all current releases.

Rejected reason: REJECT DO NOT USE THIS CANDIDATE NUMBER. ConsultIDs: none. Reason: This candidate was withdrawn by its CNA. Further investigation showed that it was not a security issue. Notes: In the versions that have this feature, they are an admin-gated, admin-defined, by-design shell-command feature that is not an exploitable injection.

Rejected reason: REJECT DO NOT USE THIS CANDIDATE NUMBER. ConsultIDs: none. Reason: This candidate was withdrawn by its CNA. Further investigation showed that it was not a security issue. Notes: The exact code first shipped in 1.6.0, does not exist in the cited 1.0.0, and in every version where it exists the claimed missing protection is already implemented.

Impact

OctoPrint versions up to and including 1.11.5 are affected by a (theoretical) timing attack vulnerability that allows API key extraction over the network.

Due to using character based comparison that short-circuits on the first mismatched character during API key validation, rather than a cryptographical method with static runtime regardless of the point of mismatch, an attacker with network based access to an affected OctoPrint could extract API keys valid on the instance by measuring the response times of the denied access responses and guess an API key character by character.

Patches

The vulnerability will be patched in version 1.11.6.

Workaround

The likelihood of this attack actually working is highly dependent on the network's latency, noise and similar parameters. An actual proof of concept was not achieved so far. Still, as always administrators are advised to not expose their OctoPrint instance on hostile networks, especially not on the public Internet!

Credits

This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed to OctoPrint by Knox Liu.

Impact

OctoPrint versions up until and including 1.11.2 contain a vulnerability that allows an authenticated attacker to upload a file under a specially crafted filename that will allow arbitrary command execution if said filename becomes included in a command defined in a system event handler and said event gets triggered.

If no event handlers executing system commands with uploaded filenames as parameters have been configured, this vulnerability does not have an impact.

Patches

The vulnerability will be patched in version 1.11.3.

Workaround

Until the patch has been applied, OctoPrint administrators who have event handlers configured that include any kind of filename based placeholders (i.e. {filename}, {filepath}, {filename}, {path}, etc -- refer to the events documentation for a full list) should disable those by setting their enabled property to False or unchecking the "Enabled" checkbox in the GUI based Event Manager.

Alternatively, OctoPrint administrators should set feature.enforceReallyUniversalFilenames to true in config.yaml and restart OctoPrint, then vet the existing uploads and make sure to delete any suspicious looking files (e.g. those that contain a ; in their name followed by a command).

As always, OctoPrint administrators are advised to not expose OctoPrint on hostile networks like the public internet, and to vet who has access to their instance.

Credits

This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed to OctoPrint by @prabhatverma47.

Impact

OctoPrint versions up until and including 1.9.3 contain a vulnerability that allows malicious admins to change the password of other admin accounts, including their own, without having to repeat their password.

An attacker who managed to hijack an admin account might use this to lock out actual admins from their OctoPrint instance.

Patches

The vulnerability will be patched in version 1.10.0.

Workarounds

OctoPrint administrators are strongly advised to thoroughly vet who has admin access to their installation.

Credits

This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed to OctoPrint by Timothy "TK" Ruppert.