Impact CVE-2021-3007: Backport of ZendHttpResponseStream, added certain type checking as a way to prevent exploitation. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-3007

This vulnerability is caused by the unsecured deserialization of an object. In versions higher than Zend Framework 3.0.0, the attacker abuses the Zend3 feature that loads classes from objects in order to upload and execute malicious code in the server. The code can be uploaded using the “callback” parameter, which in this case inserts a malicious code instead of the “callbackOptions” array.

Patches Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to? v20.0.9 v19.4.13

OpenMage Magento LTS before 20.18.2 and 21.0.0-beta1 before 21.0.0-beta3 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the admin and storefront OAuth confirm and confirmSimple actions, which accept GET requests without form-key validation. Attackers holding OAuth consumer credentials can lure a logged-in administrator or customer to a crafted confirm URL that authorizes the attacker's request token, then exchange it at /oauth/token for a persistent REST API access token bound to the victim.

OpenMage magento-lts before 20.18.2 and 21.0.0-beta pre-releases before 21.0.0-beta3 generate customer email-confirmation keys with md5(uniqid()) and customer and administrator password-reset tokens with the non-cryptographic uniqHash(). Unauthenticated attackers can brute-force the roughly 20-bit confirmation key via the unrate-limited confirmAction endpoint to log in as pending customers, or predict administrator reset tokens after recovering generator state.

Impact This vulnerability allows an administrator unauthorized access to restricted resources.

We fixed a vulnerability in the MySQL adapter to prevent SQL injection attacks. This is a backport of CVE-2021-21024 https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/magento/apsb21-08.html.

Patches Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to? v20.0.9 v19.4.13

OpenMage magento-lts before 20.18.2 and 21.0.0-beta1 before 21.0.0-beta3 serves RSS feeds with a text/html content type and does not escape feed entry data, leading to stored cross-site scripting. An unauthenticated guest can submit a product review with script in the nickname, title or text that executes when an administrator opens the pending-reviews feed, enabling admin account takeover.

Impact A layout block was able to bypass the block blacklist to execute remote code.

Magento Long Term Support (LTS) is an unofficial, community-driven project provides an alternative to the Magento Community Edition e-commerce platform with a high level of backward compatibility. Prior to version 20.17.0, the product custom option file upload in OpenMage LTS uses an incomplete blocklist (forbiddenextensions = php,exe) to prevent dangerous file uploads. This blocklist can be trivially bypassed by using alternative PHP-executable extensions such as .phtml, .phar, .php3, .php4, .php5, .php7, and .pht. Files are stored in the publicly accessible media/customoptions/quote/ directory, which lacks server-side execution restrictions for some configurations, enabling Remote Code Execution if this directory is not explicitly denied script execution. Version 20.17.0 patches the issue.

OpenMage magento-lts before 20.18.2 and 21.x before 21.0.0-beta3 validates OAuth 1.0a oauthcallback URLs with a string-prefix check and falls back to accepting any well-formed URL. Attackers holding a leaked consumer key and secret can supply host-suffix, userinfo, or arbitrary callback URLs to capture an approving administrator's or customer's request token and verifier, then obtain an access token with the victim's API privileges.

OpenMage is a community-driven alternative to Magento CE. In OpenMage before versions 19.4.10 and 20.0.5, there is a vulnerability which enables remote code execution. In affected versions an administrator with permission to import/export data and to create widget instances was able to inject an executable file on the server. The latest OpenMage Versions up from 19.4.9 and 20.0.5 have this Issue solved

OpenMage is a community-driven alternative to Magento CE. In OpenMage before versions 19.4.10 and 20.0.5, an administrator with permission to import/export data and to edit cms pages was able to inject an executable file on the server via layout xml. The latest OpenMage Versions up from 19.4.9 and 20.0.5 have this Issue solved

OpenMage is a community-driven alternative to Magento CE. In OpenMage before versions 19.4.10 and 20.0.6, there is a vulnerability which enables remote code execution. In affected versions an administrator with permission to update product data to be able to store an executable file on the server and load it via layout xml. The latest OpenMage Versions up from 19.4.10 and 20.0.6 have this issue solved.

OpenMage magento-lts before 20.18.2 and 21.0.0-beta1 before 21.0.0-beta3 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability because admin pages render Dataflow profile link variables, tax rate titles, OAuth consumer names, and PayPal certificate filenames without escaping. An administrator restricted to one affected area can store script that runs when another administrator, including a full administrator, opens the page, reading the form key and performing actions with that administrator's privileges.

OpenMage magento-lts before 20.2.0 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability because the TinyMCE WYSIWYG editor fails to filter scripts in specially crafted HTML tags. Attackers can inject an img element with a malicious onmouseover attribute to execute scripts in the browsers of users viewing the rendered content.

Magento Long Term Support (LTS) is an unofficial, community-driven project provides an alternative to the Magento Community Edition e-commerce platform with a high level of backward compatibility. Prior to version 20.17.0, PHP functions such as getimagesize(), fileexists(), and isreadable() can trigger deserialization when processing phar:// stream wrapper paths. OpenMage LTS uses these functions with potentially controllable file paths during image validation and media handling. An attacker who can upload a malicious phar file (disguised as an image) and trigger one of these functions with a phar:// path can achieve arbitrary code execution. Version 20.17.0 patches the issue.

OpenMage LTS before versions 19.4.6 and 20.0.2 allows attackers to circumvent the fromkey protection in the Admin Interface and increases the attack surface for Cross Site Request Forgery attacks. This issue is related to Adobe's CVE-2020-9690. It is patched in versions 19.4.6 and 20.0.2.

Impact This vulnerability allows an admin user to generate soap credentials that can be used to trigger RCE via PHP Object Injection through product attributes and a product.

Patches The latest OpenMage Versions up from 19.4.7 and 20.0.3 have this Issue solved

Credits Credit to Luke Rodgers for reporting

Impact This vulnerability allows to circumvent the formkey protection in the Admin Interface and increases the attack surface for Cross Site Request Forgery attacks

Patches The latest OpenMage Versions up from 19.4.6 and 20.0.2 have this Issue solved

References Related to Adobes CVE-2020-9690 ( https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/magento/apsb20-47.html ) fixed in Magento2 https://github.com/magento/magento2/commit/52d72b8010c9cecb5b8e3d98ec5edc1ddcc65fb4 as part of 2.4.0/2.3.5-p2

Impact

Guest orders may be viewed without authentication using a "guest-view" cookie which contains the order's "protectcode". This code is 6 hexadecimal characters which is arguably not enough to prevent a brute-force attack. Exposing each order would require a separate brute force attack.

Patches

None.

Workarounds

Implementing rate-limiting at the web server would help mitigate the issue. In particular, a very strict rate limit (e.g. 1 per minute per IP) for the specific route (sales/guest/view/) would effectively mitigate the issue.

References

Email from Frank Rochlitzer (f.rochlitzer@b3-it.de) to security@openmage.org:

Summary

The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) found the following flaw in OpenMage through a commissioned pen test: The web application was found to accept certain requests even without prior strong authentication if the person making the request has data that is non-public but also not secret, such as easily easily guessed transaction numbers or names. Attacking entities could possibly exploit this to retrieve sensitive information using this easier-to-obtain data and by trying random numbers.

Details

Customers who place an order without an account can subsequently retrieve the order data or invoice data by specifying individual information. Technically, the access is realized by specifying the cookie guest-view. The value of the cookie is Base64 encoded and contains a random value and the order number. The random value consists of six characters, where these are taken from the alphabet [0-9a-f]. In the best case, i.e. when using a cryptographically secure random number generator, this corresponds to an entropy of 24 bits. Furthermore, the order numbers are assigned incrementally, so that the number range can be narrowed down or an upper limit determined by placing an order. Specifically, this results in the risk that an attacking entity can iterate over all possible values of the cookie's random value. If successful, the billing address, shipping address, payment details and the ordered items can be viewed. The attack only works for orders made as a guest.

PoC

The request/response pair shows the retrieval of an order. It should be noted in particular, that the cookie is not bound to a session. The response has been formatted for formatted for readability.

Request: 1 GET /magento19/index.php/default/sales/guest/view/ HTTP/1.1 2 Host: localhost.local 3 Cookie: guest-view=MzYyYzI4OjEwMDAwMDQzMQ%3D%3D; 4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x8664; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0 5 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,/;q=0.8 6 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 8 Referer: https://localhost.local/magento19/index.php/default/egovscheckout/multipage/successview/ 9 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 10 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document 11 Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate 12 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin 13 Sec-Fetch-User: ?1 14 Te: trailers 15 Connection: close

Response:

1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK 2 Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2022 14:06:13 GMT 3 Server: Apache 4 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains 5 X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4.6 6 Set-Cookie: omfrontend=id7v84a05u8mm1j32t2kj5rbjl; expires=Tue, 13-Dec-2022 15:06:13 GMT; Max-Age=3600; path=/magento19/; domain=localhost.local; secure; HttpOnly 7 Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT 8 Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate 9 Pragma: no-cache 10 Set-Cookie: omfrontend=deleted; expires=Thu, 01-Jan-1970 00:00:01 GMT; Max-Age=0; path=/magento19/; domain=localhost.local; secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=None 11 Set-Cookie: omfrontend=o42vttknheaj0sr3q0381jipdp; expires=Tue, 13-Dec-2022 15:06:13 GMT; Max-Age=3600; path=/magento19/; domain=localhost.local; secure; HttpOnly 12 Set-Cookie: guest-view=MzYyYzI4OjEwMDAwMDQzMQ%3D%3D; expires=Tue, 13-Dec-2022 14:16:13 GMT; Max-Age=600; path=/; domain=localhost.local; secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=None 13 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN 14 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff 15 X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block 16 Referrer-Policy: same-origin 17 Feature-Policy: geolocation 'self'; vibrate 'none' 18 Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self';script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafeeval'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; 19 Connection: close 20 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 21 Content-Length: 47876 22 23 <!DOCTYPE html> 24 <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="de" lang="de"> 25 […] 26 <div class="page-title"> 27 <h1>Bestellung #100000431 - Ausstehende Überweisung</h1> 28 </div> 29 […] 30 <h2 class="feature-headline">Versandadresse</h2> 31 <div class="feature-content"> 32 <address> 33 Herr Vorname Nachname<br> 34 Straße<br> 35 Dresden, Brandenburg, 01067<br> 36 Deutschland<br> 37 </address> 38 </div> 39 […] 40 <h2 class="feature-headline">Rechnungsadresse</h2> 41 <div class="feature-content"> 42 <address> 43 [color]Herr Vorname Nachname<br> 44 Straße<br> 45 Dresden, Brandenburg, 01067<br> 46 Deutschland<br>[/color] 47 </address> 48 </div> 49 […] 50 <h2 class="feature-headline">Zahlungsart</h2> 51 <div class="feature-content"> 52 <div class="block-content"> 53 Vorkasse<br> 54 <div id="bankpaymentaccountinfo" style="font-style: italic;">Bankverbindung</div> 55 <table class="data-table fieldset"> 56 […] 57 <h2 class="sub-title"> 58 <span>Kassenzeichen: WS1712000349</span> 59 </h2> 60 <h2 class="sub-title">Bestellte Artikel</h2> 61 […] 62 <td class="order-item-product"> 63 <h3 class="product-name ellipsis-multi-line">Testprodukt Kreditkarte</h3> 64 […] 65 <span class="price">100,23 €</span> 66 […] 67 </html>

Impact

Information disclosure. Read as well as write access to sensitive information of persons or accounts and the execution of actions on their behalf must always be secured by strong authentication. This can be ensured, for example, by enforcing strong passwords or MFA. For temporary accesses to sensitive information, temporary passwords or authentication tokens or comparable data that an attacking entity cannot easily guess or determine should be used. Random values should have sufficient entropy so that searching the number space is impractical for attacking entities. Furthermore, such queries should be limited by rate limiting. The exact attack effort cannot be determined, since this requires the proportion of the proportion of orders that were placed without an account and since the performance of the performance of the production system is likely to differ from that of the test system. In a test run, 1000 requests could be made within 36 seconds. Part of the execution is shown in the screenshot. The complete search of the number space for the random value would take 6 days 23 hours 46 minutes. Accordingly, the expected value is about 3.5 days. If every third order is executed without an account, the effort must be multiplied by a factor of 3.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

Frank Rochlitzer (github: theroch)

Impact Infinite loop in malicious code filter in certain conditions.

Workarounds

None

OpenMage magento-lts before 20.18.2 and 21.0.0-beta1 before 21.0.0-beta3 contains an insufficient session expiration vulnerability because MageApiModelSession::renewBySessId() never checks apiuser.isactive and REST OAuth authorization never checks whether the admin user is active. Attackers holding an existing SOAP/XML-RPC session or OAuth access token retain API access after deactivation or API key rotation, reading and modifying customer, order and catalog data.

Impact Layout XML enabled admin users to execute arbitrary commands via block methods.

Impact Due to missing sanitation in data flow it was possible for admin users to upload arbitrary executable files to the server.

Impact Magento admin users with access to the customer media could execute code on the server.

Impact Custom Layout enabled admin users to execute arbitrary commands via block methods.

Impact An administrator with the permissions to upload files via DataFlow and to create products was able to execute arbitrary code via the convert profile.

OpenMage Magento-LTS before 20.18.2 and 21.0.0-beta1 before 21.0.0-beta3 contains an authorization bypass in the /rss/order/status feed because its URL key is unsigned Base64-encoded JSON of the order, increment, and customer ids. Unauthenticated attackers can forge keys from enumerated sequential ids to read other customers' names, items, prices, totals, and status comments when order-status RSS is enabled.

OpenMage magento-lts before 20.18.2 and 21.0.0-beta1 before 21.0.0-beta3 lets restricted administrators read decrypted configuration secrets because the store.getConfig email template directive's encrypted-path check missed config.xml-declared paths, case variants of the getConfig method name, and parent paths. Administrators with Transactional Emails access can preview a crafted template to expose PayPal, payment gateway, and carrier credentials.

OpenMage magento-lts before 20.19.0 and 21.0.0-beta1 before 21.0.0-beta3 contains a race condition in shopping cart price rule usage limits, because MageSalesRuleModelValidator checks coupon limits without locking and the usage counters are later incremented non-atomically. Unauthenticated attackers, including guest shoppers, can submit concurrent checkouts to redeem a limited coupon more times than its cap allows.

OpenMage magento-lts before 20.18.2 and 21.0.0-beta1 before 21.0.0-beta3 accepts the free (No Payment Information Required) payment method on orders with a non-zero total because the zero-total check runs only when payment data is imported. An API user with cart permissions can select free via cartpayment.method while the total is zero, raise it with cartcoupon.remove, and submit cart.order to place an unpaid full-price order.

Impact

The admin url can be discovered without prior knowledge of it's location by exploiting the X-Original-Url header on some configurations.

Patches

The bug comes from the Zend library and is patche by unsetting the header in the bootstrap process.

Workarounds

Unset the X-Original-Url header in the web server configuration.

References

The activation of these headers is coming from the ZendController module. It appears this has been known to some degree since 2016 - https://peterocallaghan.co.uk/2016/12/magento-poisoning-cache/ (dead link now..)

Credit

Anees Hyder ( @anees0xdev ) via HackerOne https://hackerone.com/anees0xdev/hacktivity