See how powerdns compares to other vendors in security performance
Today we have released PowerDNS Authoritative Server 4.9.17, 5.0.7, 5.1.4, Recursor 5.2.13, 5.3.10, 5.4.5, and dnsdist 1.9.16, 2.0.8, 2.1.1.
These releases provide fixes for PowerDNS Security Advisory
2026-11 for PowerDNS Authoritative Server, Recursor and dnsdist: A crafted DNS packet can cause increased memory and CPU consumption
The CVE associated with this advisory is of severity High.
CVE-2026-52682: A crafted DNS packet can cause increased memory and CPU consumption
Please refer to the changelogs for Authoritative Server ([1]4.9.17, [2]5.0.7, [3]5.1.4), Recursor ([4]5.2.13, [5]5.3.10 and [6]5.4.5) and dnsdist ([7]1.9.16, [8]2.0.8, [9]2.1.1) and the full [10]security advisory for additional details.
Please send us all feedback and issues you might have via the [11]mailing list, or in case of a bug, via [12]GitHub.
The tarballs for Authoritative Server ([13]4.9.17, [14]5.0.7, [15]5.1.4 with signature files [16]4.9.17, [17]5.0.7, [18]5.1.4), Recursor ([19]5.2.13, [20]5.3.10, [21]5.4.5 with signature files [22]5.2.13, [23]5.3.10, [24]5.4.5) and dnsdist ([25]1.9.16, [26]2.0.8, [27]2.1.1 with signature files [28]1.9.16, [29]2.0.8, [30]2.1.1) are available from our download [31]server and packages for several distributions are available from our [32]repository.
Recently we made changes to our Open Source End of Life policy. Older release trains are now supported for one year after the following major release. Consult the EOL [33]policy for more details.
We are grateful to the PowerDNS community for the reporting of bugs, issues, feature requests, and especially to the submitters of fixes and implementations of features.
References
1. https://docs.powerdns.com/authoritative/changelog/4.9.html#change-4.9.17 2. https://docs.powerdns.com/authoritative/changelog/5.0.html#change-5.0.7 3. https://docs.powerdns.com/authoritative/changelog/5.1.html#change-5.1.4 4. https://doc.powerdns.com/recursor/changelog/5.2.html#change-5.2.13 5. https://doc.powerdns.com/recursor/changelog/5.3.html#change-5.3.10 6. https://doc.powerdns.com/recursor/changelog/5.4.html#change-5.4.5 7. https://www.dnsdist.org/changelog.html#change-1.9.16 8. https://www.dnsdist.org/changelog.html#change-2.0.8 9. https://www.dnsdist.org/changelog.html#change-2.1.1 10. https://doc.powerdns.com/recursor/security-advisories/powerdns-advisory-2026-11.html 11. https://mailman.powerdns.com/mailman/listinfo/pdns-users 12. https://github.com/PowerDNS/pdns/issues/new/choose 13. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-4.9.17.tar.bz2 14. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-5.0.7.tar.bz2 15. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-5.1.4.tar.bz2 16. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-4.9.17.tar.bz2.sig 17. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-5.0.7.tar.bz2.sig 18. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-5.1.4.tar.bz2.sig 19. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.2.13.tar.bz2 20. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.3.10.tar.xz 21. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.4.5.tar.xz 22. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.2.13.tar.bz2.sig 23. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.3.10.tar.xz.sig 24. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.4.5.tar.xz.sig 25. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/dnsdist-1.9.16.tar.bz2 26. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/dnsdist-2.0.8.tar.xz 27. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/dnsdist-2.1.1.tar.xz 28. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/dnsdist-1.9.16.tar.bz2.sig 29. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/dnsdist-2.0.8.tar.xz.sig 30. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/dnsdist-2.1.1.tar.xz.sig 31. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/ 32. https://repo.powerdns.com/ 33. https://docs.powerdns.com/recursor/appendices/EOL.html
--
kind regards, Otto Moerbeek Developer PowerDNS
Phone: +49 2761 75252 00 Fax: +49 2761 75252 30 Email: otto.moerbeek () powerdns com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Open-Xchange AG, Hohenzollernring 72, 50672 Cologne, District Court Cologne HRB 95366 Managing Board: Andreas Gauger, Dirk Valbert Chairman of the Board: Dr. Paul-Josef Patt
PowerDNS.com B.V., Koninginnegracht 5, 2514 AA Den Haag, The Netherlands Managing Director: Robert Brandt -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
An attacker might be able to trigger a use-after-free by sending crafted DNS queries to a DNSdist using the DNSQuestion:getEDNSOptions method in custom Lua code. In some cases DNSQuestion:getEDNSOptions might refer to a version of the DNS packet that has been modified, thus triggering a use-after-free and potentially a crash resulting in denial of service.
An attacker might be able to inject HTML content into the internal web dashboard by sending crafted DNS queries to a DNSdist instance where domain-based dynamic rules have been enabled via either DynBlockRulesGroup:setSuffixMatchRule or DynBlockRulesGroup:setSuffixMatchRuleFFI.
When the internal webserver is enabled (default is disabled), an attacker might be able to trick an administrator logged to the dashboard into visiting a malicious website and extract information about the running configuration from the dashboard. The root cause of the issue is a misconfiguration of the Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) policy.
An attacker might be able to trigger an out-of-bounds read by sending a crafted DNS response packet, when custom Lua code uses newDNSPacketOverlay to parse DNS packets. The out-of-bounds read might trigger a crash, leading to a denial of service, or access unrelated memory, leading to potential information disclosure.
An attacker might be able to trigger an out-of-bounds write by sending crafted DNS responses to a DNSdist using the DNSQuestion:changeName or DNSResponse:changeName methods in custom Lua code. In some cases the rewritten packet might become larger than the initial response and even exceed 65535 bytes, potentially leading to a crash resulting in denial of service.
When the earlyacldrop (earlyACLDrop in Lua) option is disabled (default is enabled) on a DNS over HTTPs frontend using the nghttp2 provider, the ACL check is skipped, allowing all clients to send DoH queries regardless of the configured ACL.
An attacker might be able to trick DNSdist into allocating too much memory while processing DNS over QUIC or DNS over HTTP/3 payloads, resulting in a denial of service. In setups with a large quantity of memory available this usually results in an exception and the QUIC connection is properly closed, but in some cases the system might enter an out-of-memory state instead and terminate the process.
It has been brought to our attention that the CVE number of the second issue is wrong. It should be CVE-2026-52686.
Regards, Otto On 22/07/2026 13:54 CEST Otto Moerbeek <otto.moerbeek () powerdns com> wrote:
Today we have released PowerDNS Recursor 5.2.12, 5.3.9 and 5.4.4.
These releases provide fixes for PowerDNS Security Advisory
2026-10 for PowerDNS Recursor: Multiple issues
There are two CVEs associated with this advisory, one with severity High and one with severity Low.
CVE-2026-52688: RRSIGs with too few labels can lead to bypass of DNSSEC wildcard validation CVE-2026-62686: Wildcard CNAME proof validation bypass
Please refer to the changelogs ([1]5.2.12, [2]5.3.9 and [3]5.4.4) and the full [4]security advisory for additional details.
Please send us all feedback and issues you might have via the [5]mailing list, or in case of a bug, via [6]GitHub.
The tarballs ([7]5.2.12, [8]5.3.9, [9]5.4.4) (with signature files [10]5.2.12, [11]5.3.9, [12]5.4.4) are available from our download [13]server and packages for several distributions are available from our [14]repository.
Recently we made changes to our Open Source End of Life policy. Older release trains are now supported for one year after the following major release. Consult the EOL [15]policy for more details.
We are grateful to the PowerDNS community for the reporting of bugs, issues, feature requests, and especially to the submitters of fixes and implementations of features.
References
1. https://doc.powerdns.com/recursor/changelog/5.2.html#change-5.2.12 2. https://doc.powerdns.com/recursor/changelog/5.3.html#change-5.3.9 3. https://doc.powerdns.com/recursor/changelog/5.4.html#change-5.4.4 4. https://doc.powerdns.com/recursor/security-advisories/powerdns-advisory-2026-10.html 5. https://mailman.powerdns.com/mailman/listinfo/pdns-users 6. https://github.com/PowerDNS/pdns/issues/new/choose 7. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.2.12.tar.bz2 8. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.3.9.tar.xz 9. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.4.4.tar.xz 10. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.2.12.tar.bz2.sig 11. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.3.9.tar.xz.sig 12. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.4.4.tar.xz.sig 13. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/ 14. https://repo.powerdns.com/ 15. https://docs.powerdns.com/recursor/appendices/EOL.html --
kind regards, Otto Moerbeek Developer PowerDNS
Phone: +49 2761 75252 00 Fax: +49 2761 75252 30 Email: otto.moerbeek () powerdns com
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Open-Xchange AG, Hohenzollernring 72, 50672 Cologne, District Court Cologne HRB 95366 Managing Board: Andreas Gauger, Dirk Valbert Chairman of the Board: Dr. Paul-Josef Patt
PowerDNS.com B.V., Koninginnegracht 5, 2514 AA Den Haag, The Netherlands Managing Director: Robert Brandt -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incorrect Behaviour of Views with TCP PROXY Requests
Insufficient Validation of Member Zone Data May Cause Catalog Zone Transfer to Fail
Concurrency and locking defects in GSS-TSIG
Insufficient Validation of Autoprimary SOA Queries
Insufficient Validation of Names During AXFR
Today we have released PowerDNS Recursor 5.2.12, 5.3.9 and 5.4.4.
These releases provide fixes for PowerDNS Security Advisory
2026-10 for PowerDNS Recursor: Multiple issues
There are two CVEs associated with this advisory, one with severity High and one with severity Low.
CVE-2026-52688: RRSIGs with too few labels can lead to bypass of DNSSEC wildcard validation CVE-2026-62686: Wildcard CNAME proof validation bypass
Please refer to the changelogs ([1]5.2.12, [2]5.3.9 and [3]5.4.4) and the full [4]security advisory for additional details.
Please send us all feedback and issues you might have via the [5]mailing list, or in case of a bug, via [6]GitHub.
The tarballs ([7]5.2.12, [8]5.3.9, [9]5.4.4) (with signature files [10]5.2.12, [11]5.3.9, [12]5.4.4) are available from our download [13]server and packages for several distributions are available from our [14]repository.
Recently we made changes to our Open Source End of Life policy. Older release trains are now supported for one year after the following major release. Consult the EOL [15]policy for more details.
We are grateful to the PowerDNS community for the reporting of bugs, issues, feature requests, and especially to the submitters of fixes and implementations of features.
References
1. https://doc.powerdns.com/recursor/changelog/5.2.html#change-5.2.12 2. https://doc.powerdns.com/recursor/changelog/5.3.html#change-5.3.9 3. https://doc.powerdns.com/recursor/changelog/5.4.html#change-5.4.4 4. https://doc.powerdns.com/recursor/security-advisories/powerdns-advisory-2026-10.html 5. https://mailman.powerdns.com/mailman/listinfo/pdns-users 6. https://github.com/PowerDNS/pdns/issues/new/choose 7. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.2.12.tar.bz2 8. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.3.9.tar.xz 9. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.4.4.tar.xz 10. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.2.12.tar.bz2.sig 11. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.3.9.tar.xz.sig 12. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.4.4.tar.xz.sig 13. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/ 14. https://repo.powerdns.com/ 15. https://docs.powerdns.com/recursor/appendices/EOL.html
Today we have released PowerDNS Recursor 5.2.11, 5.3.8 and 5.4.3.
These releases provide fixes for PowerDNS Security Advisory
2026-08 for PowerDNS Recursor: Multiple issues
There are several CVEs associated with this advisory, the first with severity High (but only applicable to specific configurations), the rest of severity Medium.
CVE-2026-33612: ZoneToCache can poison the cache CVE-2026-40012: Information about ECS zero scoped answers might leak to clients that use a specific ECS CVE-2026-42005: Unbounded resource consumption in internal webserver CVE-2026-42390: ZONEMD validation can be bypassed CVE-2026-42389: Reject more queries with invalid header values CVE-2026-42388: Missing input validation for catalog zones CVE-2026-42387: Insufficient input validation in ZoneToCache CVE-2026-52690: Spoofed answers can mark an authoritative non-EDNS capable
Please refer to the changelogs ([1]5.2.11, [2]5.3.8 and [3]5.4.3) and the full [4]security advisory for additional details.
Please send us all feedback and issues you might have via the [5]mailing list, or in case of a bug, via [6]GitHub.
The tarballs ([7]5.2.11, [8]5.3.8, [9]5.4.3) (with signature files [10]5.2.11, [11]5.3.8, [12]5.4.3) are available from our download [13]server and packages for several distributions are available from our [14]repository.
Recently we made changes to our Open Source End of Life policy. Older release trains are now supported for one year after the following major release. Consult the EOL [15]policy for more details.
We are grateful to the PowerDNS community for the reporting of bugs, issues, feature requests, and especially to the submitters of fixes and implementations of features.
References
1. https://doc.powerdns.com/recursor/changelog/5.2.html#change-5.2.11 2. https://doc.powerdns.com/recursor/changelog/5.3.html#change-5.3.8 3. https://doc.powerdns.com/recursor/changelog/5.4.html#change-5.4.3 4. https://doc.powerdns.com/recursor/security-advisories/powerdns-advisory-2026-08.html 5. https://mailman.powerdns.com/mailman/listinfo/pdns-users 6. https://github.com/PowerDNS/pdns/issues/new/choose 7. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.2.11.tar.bz2 8. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.3.8.tar.xz 9. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.4.3.tar.xz 10. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.2.11.tar.bz2.sig 11. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.3.8.tar.xz.sig 12. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-recursor-5.4.3.tar.xz.sig 13. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/ 14. https://repo.powerdns.com/ 15. https://docs.powerdns.com/recursor/appendices/EOL.html
Today, we are releasing three new versions of the PowerDNS Authoritative Server. These 4.9.16, 5.0.6 and 5.1.2 versions provide fixes for the following PowerDNS Security Advisory: [1]PowerDNS Security Advisory 2026-07: Insufficient input validation of internal web server
Please make sure to read the [2]Upgrade Notes before upgrading.
The tarballs ([3]4.9.16, [4]5.0.6), [5]5.1.2) and their signatures ([6]4.9.16, [7]5.0.6), [8]5.1.2) are available at [9]downloads.powerdns.com. Packages for various distributions are available from [10]repo.powerdns.com.
Please send us all feedback and issues you might have via the [11]mailing list, or in case of a bug, via [12]GitHub.
References 2. https://doc.powerdns.com/authoritative/upgrading.html 3. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-4.9.16.tar.bz2 4. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-5.0.6.tar.bz2 5. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-5.1.2.tar.bz2 6. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-4.9.16.tar.bz2.sig 7. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-5.0.6.tar.bz2.sig 8. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-5.1.2.tar.bz2.sig 9. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/ 10. https://repo.powerdns.com/ 11. https://mailman.powerdns.com/mailman/listinfo/pdns-users 12. https://github.com/PowerDNS/pdns/issues/new/choose
On 5/22/26 00:31, ROI AI wrote: I understand the costs, but simply hanging all the dirty laundry out is counter productive. Working a change in public without going into sensitive details is reasonable, but pushing vuln reports to public is careless.
[...]
As a further data point backing up this theory: We’re seeing duplicate reports of the same issue found by multiple independent groups that use LLMs, within the embargo period.
-- Jacob From: Jacob Bachmeyer <jcb62281 () gmail com> To: <oss-security () lists openwall com> Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 21:02:51 -0700 Subject: Re: [oss-security] Coordinated Disclosure in the LLM Age
On 5/21/26 01:51, ROI AI wrote: Also the entire nonsense about making the found issues public - this is absurd and just exacerbates the asymmetry problem.
By keeping the reports private, the OSS teams can deal with the issues more on their timeline.
By making them public, they add timeline pressure and enable attackers.
Why are you making it harder on yourself? It is the opposite of what you want to do. security issues private rather seriously---and that itself has costs. any benefit when the issue was found using a tool to search for issues, due to the risk of someone else using the same tool and finding the same issue. If that other person is another whitehat, you get a duplicate report. If that other person is a blackhat, you get an in-the-wild exploit while you were carefully maintaining an embargo. [...]
From: ROI AI < mailto:sales () roiai ca > To: "oss-security"< mailto:oss-security () lists openwall com > Date: Wed, 20 May 2026 22:26:21 -0700 Subject: Re: [oss-security] Coordinated Disclosure in the LLM Age
People are shooting the messengers here. The fact is - we are going through a generational security event due to the advancement of LLMs. amount of "AI" slop that has buried maintainers of major packages. Have you forgotten already that curl had to cancel their bug bounty due to excessive "AI" slop submissions? It is also both trivial and extremely effective to use Agentic analysis to filter security reports. be incapable of precise analysis. I understand talking your own book, but there are serious externalities here and I cannot let this go unanswered. genuine issue? Now the issue does not get fixed... "AI" hallucinations? Remember that the same hallucination-prone model might be doing the analysis as made the bogus report. How, exactly, is a model supposed to recognize its own hallucinations? As for 'duplicates', people are claiming this when I have seen little evidence. I reported a dozen or so to one major project and no one has yet claimed invalid or duplicate. manages inserting them into a bug tracker. I am inclined to trust their experience over your hand-waving dismissal. in many projects, sent straight to the bit bucket, especially if found to be invalid. You should not expect a response informing you that your report is invalid, as most maintainers have likely stopped bothering to send those. Moreover, if 'duplicates' are found, then that is a good signal for prioritization. issue may be "low-hanging fruit" and therefore already quasi-public. In other words, duplicate reports could be a signal to dump the embargo and move faster to fix the issue. (Remember that working under embargo has costs? Those costs can extend the time to patch.) Let's stop talking about how the vulns are found and start fixing them with urgency. (< mailto:sales () roiai ca >) and realize that I am probably debating a slop machine tasked with promoting a product. I will send this anyway, for the benefit of my fellow humans who will read this discussion and who might---just might---recognize your marketing efforts as the slop they are. ROI AI -- Jacob From: Alan Coopersmith < mailto: mailto:alan.coopersmith () oracle com > To: < mailto: mailto:oss-security () lists openwall com > Date: Wed, 20 May 2026 10:52:37 -0700 Subject: Re: [oss-security] Coordinated Disclosure in the LLM Age
On 4/28/26 07:58, Jeremy Stanley wrote: I'm sorely tempted, both due to the increased volume and the risk of premature disclosure, to just assume that any vulnerability reported as a result of research using an LLM is trivially discoverable by others, and give up trying to pretend there's any point to working it under embargo. Other maintainers under similar floods seem to agree:
Linux kernel: - https://lkml.org/lkml/2026/5/17/896 - https://docs.kernel.org/process/security-bugs.html
DNS servers (BIND, Unbound, PowerDNS): - https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/56/contributions/1233/ - https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/56/contributions/1233/attachments/1180/2539/presentation.pdf Confidential communication. No warranties or commitments unless in a signed agreement. If received in error, notify sender and delete. Unauthorized use prohibited.
Also the entire nonsense about making the found issues public - this is absurd and just exacerbates the asymmetry problem.
By keeping the reports private, the OSS teams can deal with the issues more on their timeline.
By making them public, they add timeline pressure and enable attackers.
Why are you making it harder on yourself? It is the opposite of what you want to do.
If it's giving CVE credit to people who've taken the time and tokens to report these issues that concerns you, than just bundle the issues in one CVE.
ROI AI
From: ROI AI <sales () roiai ca> To: "oss-security"<oss-security () lists openwall com> Date: Wed, 20 May 2026 22:26:21 -0700 Subject: Re: [oss-security] Coordinated Disclosure in the LLM Age
People are shooting the messengers here. The fact is - we are going through a generational security event due to the advancement of LLMs.
It is also both trivial and extremely effective to use Agentic analysis to filter security reports.
As for 'duplicates', people are claiming this when I have seen little evidence. I reported a dozen or so to one major project and no one has yet claimed invalid or duplicate.
Moreover, if 'duplicates' are found, then that is a good signal for prioritization.
Let's stop talking about how the vulns are found and start fixing them with urgency.
ROI AI
From: Alan Coopersmith < mailto:alan.coopersmith () oracle com > To: < mailto:oss-security () lists openwall com > Date: Wed, 20 May 2026 10:52:37 -0700 Subject: Re: [oss-security] Coordinated Disclosure in the LLM Age
On 4/28/26 07:58, Jeremy Stanley wrote: I'm sorely tempted, both due to the increased volume and the risk of premature disclosure, to just assume that any vulnerability reported as a result of research using an LLM is trivially discoverable by others, and give up trying to pretend there's any point to working it under embargo. Other maintainers under similar floods seem to agree: Linux kernel: - https://lkml.org/lkml/2026/5/17/896 - https://docs.kernel.org/process/security-bugs.html DNS servers (BIND, Unbound, PowerDNS): - https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/56/contributions/1233/ - https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/56/contributions/1233/attachments/1180/2539/presentation.pdf -- -Alan Coopersmith- mailto:alan.coopersmith () oracle com Oracle Solaris Engineering - https://blogs.oracle.com/solaris Confidential communication. No warranties or commitments unless in a signed agreement. If received in error, notify sender and delete. Unauthorized use prohibited.
On 4/28/26 07:58, Jeremy Stanley wrote: Other maintainers under similar floods seem to agree:
Linux kernel: - https://lkml.org/lkml/2026/5/17/896 - https://docs.kernel.org/process/security-bugs.html
DNS servers (BIND, Unbound, PowerDNS): - https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/56/contributions/1233/ - https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/56/contributions/1233/attachments/1180/2539/presentation.pdf
-- -Alan Coopersmith- alan.coopersmith () oracle com Oracle Solaris Engineering - https://blogs.oracle.com/solaris
Today, we are releasing two new versions of the PowerDNS Authoritative Server. These 4.9.15 and 5.0.5 versions provide fixes for the following PowerDNS Security Advisory: [1]PowerDNS Security Advisory 2026-06: Multiple Issues
The security issues being fixed with these releases are low or medium-severity, and most of them involve specific backends and/or configurations. They are: CVE-2026-41999 (only concerns 5.0.x) When using views, queries sent using TCP Proxy Protocol will select the view according to the address of the proxy, rather than the address of the initial query. This can lead to wrong data being returned. CVE-2026-42000 Missing escaping of special characters (such as $ or @) in DNS names received during an AXFR operation can lead to an incorrect (non-parseable) Bind backend configuration to be written, causing this backend to fail until manual operation is performed to fix the configuration. CVE-2026-42001 Missing sanity checks of the answer to the initial SOA query, when running in autosecondary mode and receiving a notification for an not-yet-known domain may cause the server to crash. CVE-2026-42002 Multiple concurrency and locking defects in the GSS-TSIG code can lead to memory corruption due to accidental data structure sharing, which can in turn lead to a program crash. Moreover, the lack of bounds on the number of in-flight GSS-TSIG contexts can lead to unbounded memory consumption in case of an excessive number of requests at a given time. A limit of 1000 contexts is now enforced, and can be modified with the “gss-max-contexts” parameter in server configuration. CVE-2026-42396 Missing proper escaping of double-quote characters when computing labels will cause AXFR of a catalog zone with a member whose producer group option contains such a character to fail.
Please make sure to read the [2]Upgrade Notes before upgrading.
The tarballs ([3]4.9.15, [4]5.0.5) and their signatures ([5]4.9.15, [6]5.0.5) are available at [7]downloads.powerdns.com. Packages for various distributions are available from [8]repo.powerdns.com.
Please send us all feedback and issues you might have via the [9]mailing list, or in case of a bug, via [10]GitHub.
References 2. https://doc.powerdns.com/authoritative/upgrading.html 3. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-4.9.15.tar.bz2 4. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-5.0.5.tar.bz2 5. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-4.9.15.tar.bz2.sig 6. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/pdns-5.0.5.tar.bz2.sig 7. https://downloads.powerdns.com/releases/ 8. https://repo.powerdns.com/ 9. https://mailman.powerdns.com/mailman/listinfo/pdns-users 10. https://github.com/PowerDNS/pdns/issues/new/choose
An operator allowed to use the REST API can cause the Authoritative server to produce invalid HTTPS or SVCB record data, which can in turn cause LMDB database corruption, if using the LMDB backend.
An attacker can send a web request that causes unlimited memory allocation in the internal web server, leading to a denial of service. The internal web server is disabled by default.
An attacker can send a web request that causes unlimited memory allocation in the internal web server, leading to a denial of service. The internal web server is disabled by default.
By publishing and querying a crafted zone an attacker can cause allocation of large entries in the negative and aggressive NSEC(3) caches.
Having many concurrent transfers of the same RPZ can lead to inconsistent RPZ data, use after free and/or a crash of the recursor. Normally concurrent transfers of the same RPZ zone can only occur with a malfunctioning RPZ provider.
An attacker can send a web request that causes unlimited memory allocation in the internal web server, leading to a denial of service. The internal web server is disabled by default.
A zone transition from NSEC to NSEC3 might trigger an internal inconsistency and cause a denial of service.
An attacker can send replies that result in a null pointer dereference, caused by a missing consistency check and leading to a denial of service. Cookies are disabled by default.
An RPZ sent by a malicious authoritative server can result in a null pointer dereference, caused by a missing consistency check and leading to a denial of service.