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Severity
5.7
XSS
AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Reposilite is lightweight and easy-to-use repository management software dedicated to Maven-based artifacts in the JVM ecosystem. From 3.5.16 until 3.6.0, as stated by the advisory, the Maven directory-index page interpolates the request URI without HTML escaping in its title, heading, base URL, and parent-directory link. The advisory says the content-embedded ctx.uri() is percent-encoded, preventing tag injection, but that a single quote passes through and breaks the quoted Parent-Directory link; it also says Location.of strips single quotes, so the reachability of the described quote-based trigger remains unresolved. The listing shares the Admin UI origin and does not set the sandbox Content-Security-Policy used for artifact and Javadoc responses, so the reported script execution could access a user's local-storage token. A manager token could enable full instance compromise. The advisory reports version 3.6.0 as fixed.

First published (updated )
Severity
8.6
Path Traversal
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L

Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original description Reposilite is an open source, lightweight and easy-to-use repository manager for Maven based artifacts in JVM ecosystem. Reposilite v3.5.10 is affected by an Arbitrary File Read vulnerability via path traversal while serving expanded javadoc files. Reposilite has addressed this issue in version 3.5.12. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability. This issue was discovered and reported by the GitHub Security lab and is also tracked as GHSL-2024-074.

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Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
Path Traversal
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Summary Reposilite v3.5.10 is affected by an Arbitrary File Upload vulnerability via path traversal in expanding of Javadoc archives.

Details Reposilite provides support for JavaDocs files, which are archives that contain documentation for artifacts. Specifically, JavadocEndpoints.kt controller allows to expand the javadoc archive into the server's file system and return its content. The problem is in the way how the archives are expanded, specifically how the new filename is created:

JavadocContainerService.kt#L127-L136

kotlin jarFile.entries().asSequence().forEach { file -> if (file.isDirectory) { return@forEach }

val path = Paths.get(javadocUnpackPath.toString() + "/" + file.name)

path.parent?.also { parent -> Files.createDirectories(parent) } jarFile.getInputStream(file).copyToAndClose(path.outputStream()) }.asSuccess<Unit, ErrorResponse>()

The file.name taken from the archive can contain path traversal characters, such as '/../../../anything.txt', so the resulting extraction path can be outside the target directory.

Impact

If the archive is taken from an untrusted source, such as Maven Central or JitPack for example, an attacker can craft a special archive to overwrite any local file on Reposilite instance. This could lead to remote code execution, for example by placing a new plugin into the '$workspace$/plugins' directory. Alternatively, an attacker can overwrite the content of any other package.

Note that the attacker can use its own malicious package from Maven Central to overwrite any other package on Reposilite.

Steps to reproduce

1. Create a malicious javadoc archive that contains filenames with path traversal characters: bash zip test-1.0-javadoc.jar ../../../../../../../../tmp/evil.txt index.html Make sure that ../../../../../../../../tmp/evil.txt and index.html files exist on the system where you create this archive.

2. Publish this archive to the repository which Reposilite is mirroring, such as Maven Central or JitPack. For the test purposes, I used my own server that imitates the upstream maven repository: http://artsploit.com/maven/com/artsploit/reposilite-zipslip/1.0/reposilite-zipslip-1.0-javadoc.jar

3. Start Reposilite with 'releases' repository mirroring to 'http://artsploit.com/maven/'

4. Now, if the attacker send the request to http://localhost:8080/javadoc/releases/com/artsploit/reposilite-zipslip/1.0, the aforementioned archive will be obtained from the http://artsploit.com/maven/com/artsploit/reposilite-zipslip/1.0/reposilite-zipslip-1.0-javadoc.jar address and its 'evil.txt' file will be expanded to '$workspace$/tmp/evil.txt'. Note that to perform this action, an attacker does not need to provide any credentials, as fetching from the mirrored repository does not require authentication.

6. Confirm that '$workspace$/tmp/evil.txt' is created on the server where Reposilite is running.

Remediation

Normalize (remove all occurrences of /../) the file.name variable before concatenating it with javadocUnpackPath. E.g.:

kotlin val path = Paths.get(javadocUnpackPath.toString() + "/" + Paths.get(file.name).normalize().toString())

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Source: GitHub
First published (updated )

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