Roo Code through 3.54.0 contains a command approval bypass vulnerability in parseCommandLine() that allows attackers to auto-approve arbitrary shell commands by placing a command substitution in command position. Attackers using indirect prompt injection can submit commands like $(echo touch /tmp/x) that pass the echo allowlist check, causing the shell to execute the output without user approval.

Roo Code through 3.54.0 contains a command approval bypass vulnerability in parseCommandLine() that discards command substitutions placed next to or ? glob characters. Attackers using indirect prompt injection can craft commands like echo $(...) that match allowlisted prefixes, executing denied commands without user approval when auto-approval is enabled.

Roo Code through 3.54.0 contains a command approval bypass vulnerability that allows attackers to auto-approve denied shell commands by abusing quote-masking regex in parseCommandLine(). Attackers can use indirect prompt injection with escaped or single-quoted double quotes to hide command separators behind allowlisted prefixes like echo, executing commands without user approval.

Roo Code through 3.54.0 contains a command approval bypass vulnerability that allows attackers to run denied shell commands because parseCommandLine() treats ${ command; } substitutions as parameter expansions. Attackers using indirect prompt injection can embed denied commands inside an allowlisted command like echo to execute them without user approval on bash 5.3+ or ksh93.

Roo Code through 3.54.0 contains a command approval bypass vulnerability in getCommandDecision() that allows attackers to auto-approve denied shell commands by prefixing them with a bare >& redirect. Attackers using indirect prompt injection can make the allowlist match a redirect target like echo while the shell runs the denied command on the developer machine.

Roo Code through 3.54.0 contains a command injection vulnerability in the auto-approve execute feature that allows attackers to bypass allowlist/denylist enforcement by nesting command substitutions inside parameter expansion defaults. The command parser in parse-command.ts replaces parameter expansions with opaque placeholders before extracting command substitutions, causing the containsDangerousSubstitution guard to miss nested payloads, which are then auto-approved based on the outer allowlisted command prefix and executed by the shell via execa, enabling arbitrary command execution.

Roo Code's command auto-approval module contains a critical OS command injection vulnerability that renders its whitelist security mechanism completely ineffective. The system relies on fragile regular expressions to parse command structures; while it attempts to intercept dangerous operations, it fails to account for standard Shell command substitution Roo Code (specifically$(...)and backticks ...). An attacker can construct a command such as git log --grep="$(maliciouscommand)", forcing Syntx to misidentify it as a safe git operation and automatically approve it. The underlying Shell prioritizes the execution of the malicious code injected within the arguments, resulting in Remote Code Execution without any user interaction.

Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent that lives in users' editors. Prior to version 3.26.7, Due to an error in validation it was possible for Roo to automatically execute commands that did not match the allow list prefixes. This issue has been patched in version 3.26.7.

Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent that lives in users' editors. Versions 3.25.23 and below contain a default list of allowed commands that do not need manual approval if auto-approve is enabled, and npm install is included in that list. Because npm install executes lifecycle scripts, if a repository’s package.json file contains a malicious postinstall script, it would be executed automatically without user approval. This means that enabling auto-approved commands and opening a malicious repo could result in arbitrary code execution. This is fixed in version 3.26.0.

Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent that lives in users' editors. Versions 3.25.23 and below contain a vulnerability where .rooignore protections could be bypassed using symlinks. This allows an attacker with write access to the workspace to trick the extension into reading files that were intended to be excluded. As a result, sensitive files such as .env or configuration files could be exposed. An attacker able to modify files within the workspace could gain unauthorized access to sensitive information by bypassing .rooignore rules. This could include secrets, configuration details, or other excluded project data. This is fixed in version 3.26.0.

Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent that lives in users' editors. Versions 3.25.23 and below contain a vulnerability where certain VS Code workspace configuration files (.code-workspace) are not protected in the same way as the .vscode folder. If the agent was configured to auto-approve file writes, an attacker able to influence prompts (for example via prompt injection) could cause malicious workspace settings or tasks to be written. These tasks could then be executed automatically when the workspace is reopened, resulting in arbitrary code execution. This issue is fixed in version 3.26.0.

Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent that lives in users' editors. In versions 3.26.6 and below, a Github workflow used unsanitized pull request metadata in a privileged context, allowing an attacker to craft malicious input and achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the Actions runner. The workflow runs with broad permissions and access to repository secrets. It is possible for an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the runner, push or modify code in the repository, access secrets, and create malicious releases or packages, resulting in a complete compromise of the repository and its associated services. This is fixed in version 3.26.7.

Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent that lives in users' editors. In versions prior to 3.25.5, Roo-Code fails to properly handle process substitution and single ampersand characters in the command parsing logic for auto-execute commands. If a user has enabled auto-approved execution for a command such as ls, an attacker who can submit crafted prompts to the agent may inject arbitrary commands to be executed alongside the intended command. Exploitation requires attacker access to submit prompts and for the user to have enabled auto-approved command execution, which is disabled by default. This vulnerability could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code. The issue is fixed in version 3.25.5.

Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent. Prior to 3.22.6, if the victim had "Write" auto-approved, an attacker with the ability to submit prompts to the agent could write to VS Code settings files and trigger code execution. There were multiple ways to achieve that. One example is with the php.validate.executablePath setting which lets you set the path for the php executable for syntax validation. The attacker could have written the path to an arbitrary command there and then created a php file to trigger it. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.22.6.

Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent. The project-specific MCP configuration for the Roo Code agent is stored in the .roo/mcp.json file within the VS Code workspace. Because the MCP configuration format allows for execution of arbitrary commands, prior to version 3.20.3, it would have been possible for an attacker with access to craft a prompt to ask the agent to write a malicious command to the MCP configuration file. If the user had opted-in to auto-approving file writes within the project, this would have led to arbitrary command execution. This issue is of moderate severity, since it requires the attacker to already be able to submit prompts to the agent (for instance through a prompt injection attack), for the user to have MCP enabled (on by default), and for the user to have enabled auto-approved file writes (off by default). Version 3.20.3 fixes the issue by adding an additional layer of opt-in configuration for auto-approving writing to Roo's configuration files, including all files within the .roo/ folder.

Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent. Prior to version 3.20.3, there was an issue where the Roo Code agent's searchfiles tool did not respect the setting to disable reads outside of the VS Code workspace. This means that an attacker who was able to inject a prompt into the agent could potentially read a sensitive file and then write the information to a JSON schema. Users have the option to disable schema fetching in VS Code, but the feature is enabled by default. For users with this feature enabled, writing to the schema would trigger a network request without the user having a chance to deny. This issue is of moderate severity, since it requires the attacker to already be able to submit prompts to the agent. Version 3.20.3 fixed the issue where searchfiles did not respect the setting to limit it to the workspace. This reduces the scope of the damage if an attacker is able to take control of the agent through prompt injection or another vector.