Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. Versions prior to 6.1.1.0 are subject to a remote code execution vulnerability. System commands can be run remotely via the subprocessexecute function without processing the inputs received from the user in the /app/options.py file. Attackers need not be authenticated to exploit this vulnerability. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Roxy-wi is an open source web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. A vulnerability in Roxy-wi allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to code execution by sending a specially crafted HTTP request to /app/options.py file. This affects Roxy-wi versions before 6.1.1.0. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.

Roxy-wi is an open source web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. A vulnerability in Roxy-wi allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to bypass authentication and access admin functionality by sending a specially crafted HTTP request. This affects Roxywi versions before 6.1.1.0. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this issue.

Roxy-WI is a Web interface for managing HAProxy, Nginx and Keepalived servers. Prior to version 6.1.1.0, the system command can be run remotely via the subprocessexecute function without processing the inputs received from the user in the /app/options.py file. Version 6.1.1.0 contains a patch for this issue.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, POST /waf/<service>/<serverip>/rule/<ruleid>/save accepts a configfilename form field that is passed straight through to configmod.masterslaveuploadandrestart(...) as the destination path. The validation chain (replaceconfigpathtocorrect → checkisconf) only requires the path to contain a hard-coded service substring (nginx/haproxy/apache2/httpd/keepalived) and the substring conf or cfg, and to not contain ... The encoded-slash substitution 92 → / is applied before the substring check, so the attacker can build any absolute path anywhere on the LB filesystem as long as it satisfies those substring constraints. The body of the WAF rule (config form field) is written verbatim to that path. By choosing a filename like 92etc92cron.d92nginxcfgevil (resolving to /etc/cron.d/nginxcfgevil), an attacker drops a cron entry on the load balancer with attacker-controlled content. Cron parses the file on its next scan, executing the embedded job as root — full RCE on every load balancer the caller's group manages. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the HAProxy section-save endpoints (POST /api/service/haproxy/<serverid>/section/<sectiontype> and the PUT / global / defaults variants) accept a JSON option field that is not validated, not escaped, and is rendered verbatim into the generated HAProxy configuration via the section.j2, global.j2, and defaults.j2 Ansible templates. Because Roxy-WI then pushes the generated config to the load balancer and runs systemctl reload haproxy, an authenticated user with role ≤ 3 (user) can inject arbitrary HAProxy directives into the config that runs on every load balancer their group manages — including option external-check + external-check command /bin/bash -c '…', which gives remote code execution on the load balancer as the haproxy user on every health-check tick. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the install blueprint declares only bp.beforerequest → @jwtrequired() (app/routes/install/routes.py:36-39). The individual endpoints installexporter, installwaf, installgeoip, checkgeoip, getexporterversion, and gettaskstatus are not wrapped in pageforadmin and do not call roxywicommon.isuserhasaccesstoitsgroup(serverip) or checkisserveringroup(serverip). Only the GET index page (installmonitoring) gates on roxywiauth.pageforadmin(level=2). Because the missing decorators omit both role and group checks, any logged-in user — including the default guest role 4 — can install/reconfigure exporters, WAF, and GeoIP databases on every server in the Roxy-WI database, regardless of tenant ownership. The Ansible playbooks run with the per-server SSH credential stored in Roxy-WI, which the credentials' rightful owner (a different tenant) has provisioned with sudo rights for the management workflow. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Roxy-WI through 5.2.2.0 allows SQL Injection via checklogin. An unauthenticated attacker can extract a valid uuid to bypass authentication.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, PUT /smon/check (app/routes/smon/routes.py:117-138) gates only on roxywicommon.checkusergroupforflask() — which validates that the caller has some group, not that the target checkid belongs to it. The downstream SQL update functions updatesmon, updatesmonHttp, updatesmonTcp, updatesmonPing, updatesmonDns (app/modules/db/smon.py:515-562) all execute WHERE smonid = ? with no usergroup filter. The DELETE path is correctly filtered (app/modules/db/smon.py:319-327 does WHERE id = ? AND usergroup = ?), demonstrating that the maintainers know the right pattern but did not apply it on UPDATE. Therefore any authenticated user can iterate over smonid values and silently rewrite any other tenant's HTTP / TCP / Ping / DNS monitoring check. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

A vulnerability was found in Roxy-WI up to 8.1.3. It has been declared as critical. Affected by this vulnerability is the function actionservice of the file app/modules/roxywi/roxy.py. The manipulation of the argument action/service leads to os command injection. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. Upgrading to version 8.1.4 is able to address this issue. The identifier of the patch is 32313928eb9ce906887b8a30bf7b9a3d5c0de1be. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. Versions prior to 8.2.6.4 have a SQL injection vulnerability in the haproxysectionsave function in app/routes/config/routes.py. The serverip parameter, sourced from the URL path, is passed unsanitized through multiple function calls and ultimately interpolated into a SQL query string using Python string formatting, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands. Version 8.2.6.4 fixes the issue.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. Prior to version 8.2.6.4, the haproxysectionsave interface presents a vulnerability that could lead to remote code execution due to path traversal and writing into scheduled tasks. Version 8.2.6.4 fixes the issue.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. An OS Command Injection vulnerability allows any authenticated user on the application to execute arbitrary code on the web application server via port scanning functionality. User-supplied input is used without validation when constructing and executing an OS command. User supplied JSON POST data is parsed and if "id" JSON key does not exist, JSON value supplied via "ip" JSON key is assigned to the "ip" variable. Later on, "ip" variable which can be controlled by the attacker is used when constructing the cmd and cmd1 strings without any extra validation. Then, servermod.subprocessexecute function is called on both cmd1 and cmd2. When the definition of the servermod.subprocessexecute() function is analyzed, it can be seen that subprocess.Popen() is called on the input parameter with shell=True which results in OS Command Injection. This issue has not yet been patched. Users are advised to contact the Roxy-WI to coordinate a fix.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. Prior to version 8.2.6.3, a command injection vulnerability exists in the /config/compare/<service>/<serverip>/show endpoint, allowed authenticated users to execute arbitrary system commands on the app host. The vulnerability exists in app/modules/config/config.py on line 362, where user input is directly formatted in the template string that is eventually executed. Version 8.2.6.3 fixes the issue.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, POST /config/versions/<service>/<serverip>/<configver>/save interpolates the URL-path configver parameter directly into a config-version path that ends up at os.system(f"dos2unix -q {cfg}"). configver is not run through EscapedString (Pydantic doesn't validate path segments declared as str) and the surrounding .. block is the broken tuple-membership patch from GHSA-vapt-004. An authenticated user with role <= 3 ("user") therefore reaches a bin/sh -c command-injection sink. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Roxy-WI through 5.2.2.0 allows command injection via /app/funct.py and /api/apifunct.py.

Roxy-WI through 5.2.2.0 allows authenticated SQL injection via selectservers.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, agentaction (app/routes/smon/agentroutes.py:166-179) has decorators @bp.post('/agent/action/<action>') and @jwtrequired() only — no role check, no group ownership check on the serverip form field. Any authenticated user, including role 4 (guest), can start, stop, or restart the roxy-wi-smon-agent systemd unit on any server they can name. Roxy-WI executes the systemd action over its own SSH credentials (passwordless sudo), so the action runs as root on the target. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, there is an authentication bypass vulnerability via 'api' substring in URL + unauthenticated /api/gpt. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, EscapedString (app/modules/roxywi/classmodels.py:16-30) is the centralised Pydantic validator used on dozens of fields including SSH credential name, username, description, etc. Its if/elif/elif/else flow returns the metacharacter-stripped value without also enforcing the .. block. An attacker who appends a single ;, &, |, $, or backtick to a .. payload routes the value through the strip arm, where .. survives unblocked and the result is not shlex.quote()'d either. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, ommit d4d10006 ("Expand validation to block .. in configfilename and configver for improved security") added a line in app/modules/config/config.py:462. This is tuple-membership, not substring containment — '..' in (a, b, c) evaluates to True only if any of a, b, c is equal to the literal string '..'. For any realistic path-traversal payload (../../etc/passwd, ..\\..\\etc\\passwd, etc.) the check returns False and the patch silently lets the payload through. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions up to and including 8.2.8.2, when LDAP authentication is enabled, Roxy-WI constructs an LDAP search filter by directly concatenating the user-supplied login username into the filter string without escaping LDAP special characters. An unauthenticated attacker can inject LDAP filter metacharacters into the username field to manipulate the search query, cause the directory to return an unintended user entry, and bypass authentication entirely — gaining access to the application without knowing any valid password. As of time of publication, no known patches are available.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. Prior to version 8.2.6.4, the oldconfig parameter in the haproxysectionsave interface has an arbitrary file read vulnerability. Version 8.2.6.4 fixes the issue.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. Prior to 8.2.8.2, command injection vulnerability exists in the log viewing functionality that allows authenticated users to execute arbitrary system commands. The vulnerability is in app/modules/roxywi/logs.py line 87, where the grep parameter is used twice - once sanitized and once raw. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.2.8.2.

Roxy-WI is a Web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. Versions prior to 6.3.5.0 have a limited path traversal vulnerability. An SSH key can be saved into an unintended location, for example the /tmp folder using a payload ../../../../../tmp/test111dev. This issue has been fixed in version 6.3.5.0.

Roxy-WI is a Web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. Versions prior to 6.3.5.0 have a directory traversal vulnerability that allows the inclusion of server-side files. This issue is fixed in version 6.3.5.0.

Roxy-WI is a Web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache, and Keepalived servers. Versions prior to 6.3.6.0 don't correctly neutralize dir/../filename sequences, such as /etc/nginx/../passwd, allowing an actor to gain information about a server. Version 6.3.6.0 has a patch for this issue.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. Prior to version 8.2.6.4, the /config/ < service > /find-in-config endpoint in Roxy-WI fails to sanitize the user-supplied words parameter before embedding it into a shell command string that is subsequently executed on a remote managed server via SSH. An authenticated attacker can inject arbitrary shell metacharacters to break out of the intended grep command context and execute arbitrary OS commands with sudo privileges on the target server, resulting in full Remote Code Execution (RCE). Version 8.2.6.4 patches the issue.

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the /smon/agent/{version,uptime,status,checks}/<serverip> family of routes takes the URL path component verbatim into requests.get(f'http://{serverip}:{agentport}/...'). The path component is constrained only by Flask's default URL converter, which permits any value (including IPv4 literals like 169.254.169.254, RFC1918 ranges, and 127.0.0.1). At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.

hap-wi/roxy-wi is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. A Path Traversal vulnerability was found in the current version of Roxy-WI (6.3.9.0 at the moment of writing this report). The vulnerability can be exploited via an HTTP request to /app/options.py and the configfilename parameter. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker with user level privileges to obtain the content of arbitrary files on the file server within the scope of what the server process has access to. The root-cause of the vulnerability lies in the getconfig function of the /app/modules/config/config.py file, which only checks for relative path traversal, but still allows to read files from absolute locations passed via the configfilename parameter.