A vulnerability was found in Rubyzip before 1.3.0, a crafted ZIP file can bypass application checks on ZIP entry sizes because data about the uncompressed size can be spoofed. This allows attackers to cause a denial of service (disk consumption).

Reference: https://github.com/rubyzip/rubyzip/pull/403

A vulnerability has been found in the way developers have implemented the archive extraction of files. An arbitrary file write vulnerability, that can be achieved using a specially crafted zip archive (affects other archives as well, bzip2, tar,xz, war, cpio, 7z), that holds path traversal filenames. So when the filename gets concatenated to the target extraction directory, the final path ends up outside of the target folder. Of course if an executable or a configuration file is overwritten with a file containing malicious code, the problem can turn into an arbitrary code execution issue quite easily. This affects multiple libraries that lacks of a high level APIs that provide the archive extraction functionality.

References: https://snyk.io/research/zip-slip-vulnerability

The Zip::File component in the rubyzip gem before 1.2.1 for Ruby has a directory traversal vulnerability. If a site allows uploading of .zip files, an attacker can upload a malicious file that uses ../ pathname substrings to write arbitrary files to the filesystem.