Cargo incorrectly handled symlinks inside of crate tarballs downloaded from third-party registries, allowing a malicious crate to override the source code of another crate from the same registry. The severity of the vulnerability is medium for users of third-party registries. Users of crates.io are not affected, as crates.io forbids uploading crates containing any symlink.

Cargo between 1.68 and 1.96 incorrectly normalized the URLs of third-party registries using the sparse index protocol. If a hosting provider allowed multiple registries to be hosted with arbitrary names within the same domain, an attacker able to publish crates in a registry could obtain the credentials of others users of the same registry. The severity of the vulnerability is low, due to the extremely niche requirements needed to achieve the attack.

Summary

In the archive extraction routine of affected versions of the zip crate, symbolic links earlier in the archive are allowed to be used for later files in the archive without validation of the final canonicalized path, allowing maliciously crafted archives to overwrite arbitrary files in the file system when extracted.

Details

This is a variant of the zip-slip vulnerability, we can make the extraction logic step outside of the target directory by creating a symlink to the parent directory and then extracting further files through that symlink.

The documentation of the [::zip::read::ZipArchive::extract] method is in my opinion implying this should not happen:

"Paths are sanitized with ZipFile::enclosedname." ... [::zip::read::FileOptions::enclosedname] ... is resistant to path-based exploits ... can’t resolve to a path outside the current directory.

Most archive software either decline to extract symlinks that traverse out of the directory or defer creation of symlinks after all files have been created to prevent unexpected behavior when later entries depend on earlier symbolic link entries.

PoC

https://gist.github.com/eternal-flame-AD/bf71ef4f6828e741eb12ce7fd47b7b85

Impact

Users who extract untrusted archive files using the following high-level API method may be affected and critical files on the system may be overwritten with arbitrary file permissions, which can potentially lead to code execution.

- zip::unstable::stream::ZipStreamReader::extract - zip::read::ZipArchive::extract

A command inject vulnerability allows an attacker to perform command injection on Windows applications that indirectly depend on the CreateProcess function when the specific conditions are satisfied.

Rust is a programming language. The Rust Security Response WG was notified that the Rust standard library prior to version 1.77.2 did not properly escape arguments when invoking batch files (with the bat and cmd extensions) on Windows using the Command. An attacker able to control the arguments passed to the spawned process could execute arbitrary shell commands by bypassing the escaping. The severity of this vulnerability is critical for those who invoke batch files on Windows with untrusted arguments. No other platform or use is affected.

The Command::arg and Command::args APIs state in their documentation that the arguments will be passed to the spawned process as-is, regardless of the content of the arguments, and will not be evaluated by a shell. This means it should be safe to pass untrusted input as an argument.

On Windows, the implementation of this is more complex than other platforms, because the Windows API only provides a single string containing all the arguments to the spawned process, and it's up to the spawned process to split them. Most programs use the standard C run-time argv, which in practice results in a mostly consistent way arguments are splitted.

One exception though is cmd.exe (used among other things to execute batch files), which has its own argument splitting logic. That forces the standard library to implement custom escaping for arguments passed to batch files. Unfortunately it was reported that our escaping logic was not thorough enough, and it was possible to pass malicious arguments that would result in arbitrary shell execution.

Due to the complexity of cmd.exe, we didn't identify a solution that would correctly escape arguments in all cases. To maintain our API guarantees, we improved the robustness of the escaping code, and changed the Command API to return an InvalidInput error when it cannot safely escape an argument. This error will be emitted when spawning the process.

The fix is included in Rust 1.77.2. Note that the new escaping logic for batch files errs on the conservative side, and could reject valid arguments. Those who implement the escaping themselves or only handle trusted inputs on Windows can also use the CommandExt::rawarg method to bypass the standard library's escaping logic.

An issue was discovered in the futures-task crate before 0.3.6 for Rust. futurestask::waker may cause a use-after-free in a non-static type situation.

Cargo downloads a Rust project’s dependencies and compiles the project. Starting in Rust 1.60.0 and prior to 1.72, Cargo did not escape Cargo feature names when including them in the report generated by cargo build --timings. A malicious package included as a dependency may inject nearly arbitrary HTML here, potentially leading to cross-site scripting if the report is subsequently uploaded somewhere. The vulnerability affects users relying on dependencies from git, local paths, or alternative registries. Users who solely depend on crates.io are unaffected.

Rust 1.60.0 introduced cargo build --timings, which produces a report of how long the different steps of the build process took. It includes lists of Cargo features for each crate. Prior to Rust 1.72, Cargo feature names were allowed to contain almost any characters (with some exceptions as used by the feature syntax), but it would produce a future incompatibility warning about them since Rust 1.49. crates.io is far more stringent about what it considers a valid feature name and has not allowed such feature names. As the feature names were included unescaped in the timings report, they could be used to inject Javascript into the page, for example with a feature name like features = ["<img src='' onerror=alert(0)"]. If this report were subsequently uploaded to a domain that uses credentials, the injected Javascript could access resources from the website visitor.

This issue was fixed in Rust 1.72 by turning the future incompatibility warning into an error. Users should still exercise care in which package they download, by only including trusted dependencies in their projects. Please note that even with these vulnerabilities fixed, by design Cargo allows arbitrary code execution at build time thanks to build scripts and procedural macros: a malicious dependency will be able to cause damage regardless of these vulnerabilities. crates.io has server-side checks preventing this attack, and there are no packages on crates.io exploiting these vulnerabilities. crates.io users still need to excercise care in choosing their dependencies though, as remote code execution is allowed by design there as well.

regex is an implementation of regular expressions for the Rust language. The regex crate features built-in mitigations to prevent denial of service attacks caused by untrusted regexes, or untrusted input matched by trusted regexes. Those (tunable) mitigations already provide sane defaults to prevent attacks. This guarantee is documented and it's considered part of the crate's API. Unfortunately a bug was discovered in the mitigations designed to prevent untrusted regexes to take an arbitrary amount of time during parsing, and it's possible to craft regexes that bypass such mitigations. This makes it possible to perform denial of service attacks by sending specially crafted regexes to services accepting user-controlled, untrusted regexes. All versions of the regex crate before or equal to 1.5.4 are affected by this issue. The fix is include starting from regex 1.5.5. All users accepting user-controlled regexes are recommended to upgrade immediately to the latest version of the regex crate. Unfortunately there is no fixed set of problematic regexes, as there are practically infinite regexes that could be crafted to exploit this vulnerability. Because of this, it us not recommend to deny known problematic regexes.

Cargo is a package manager for the rust programming language. After a package is downloaded, Cargo extracts its source code in the ~/.cargo folder on disk, making it available to the Rust projects it builds. To record when an extraction is successful, Cargo writes "ok" to the .cargo-ok file at the root of the extracted source code once it extracted all the files. It was discovered that Cargo allowed packages to contain a .cargo-ok symbolic link, which Cargo would extract. Then, when Cargo attempted to write "ok" into .cargo-ok, it would actually replace the first two bytes of the file the symlink pointed to with ok. This would allow an attacker to corrupt one file on the machine using Cargo to extract the package. Note that by design Cargo allows code execution at build time, due to build scripts and procedural macros. The vulnerabilities in this advisory allow performing a subset of the possible damage in a harder to track down way. Your dependencies must still be trusted if you want to be protected from attacks, as it's possible to perform the same attacks with build scripts and procedural macros. The vulnerability is present in all versions of Cargo. Rust 1.64, to be released on September 22nd, will include a fix for it. Since the vulnerability is just a more limited way to accomplish what a malicious build scripts or procedural macros can do, we decided not to publish Rust point releases backporting the security fix. Patch files are available for Rust 1.63.0 are available in the wg-security-response repository for people building their own toolchain. Mitigations We recommend users of alternate registries to exercise care in which package they download, by only including trusted dependencies in their projects. Please note that even with these vulnerabilities fixed, by design Cargo allows arbitrary code execution at build time thanks to build scripts and procedural macros: a malicious dependency will be able to cause damage regardless of these vulnerabilities. crates.io implemented server-side checks to reject these kinds of packages years ago, and there are no packages on crates.io exploiting these vulnerabilities. crates.io users still need to exercise care in choosing their dependencies though, as remote code execution is allowed by design there as well.

Cargo is a package manager for the rust programming language. It was discovered that Cargo did not limit the amount of data extracted from compressed archives. An attacker could upload to an alternate registry a specially crafted package that extracts way more data than its size (also known as a "zip bomb"), exhausting the disk space on the machine using Cargo to download the package. Note that by design Cargo allows code execution at build time, due to build scripts and procedural macros. The vulnerabilities in this advisory allow performing a subset of the possible damage in a harder to track down way. Your dependencies must still be trusted if you want to be protected from attacks, as it's possible to perform the same attacks with build scripts and procedural macros. The vulnerability is present in all versions of Cargo. Rust 1.64, to be released on September 22nd, will include a fix for it. Since the vulnerability is just a more limited way to accomplish what a malicious build scripts or procedural macros can do, we decided not to publish Rust point releases backporting the security fix. Patch files are available for Rust 1.63.0 are available in the wg-security-response repository for people building their own toolchain. We recommend users of alternate registries to excercise care in which package they download, by only including trusted dependencies in their projects. Please note that even with these vulnerabilities fixed, by design Cargo allows arbitrary code execution at build time thanks to build scripts and procedural macros: a malicious dependency will be able to cause damage regardless of these vulnerabilities. crates.io implemented server-side checks to reject these kinds of packages years ago, and there are no packages on crates.io exploiting these vulnerabilities. crates.io users still need to excercise care in choosing their dependencies though, as the same concerns about build scripts and procedural macros apply here.

LLVM. A race condition was addressed with additional validation.

Cargo is a Rust package manager. The Rust Security Response WG was notified that Cargo did not perform SSH host key verification when cloning indexes and dependencies via SSH. An attacker could exploit this to perform man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2022-46176. All Rust versions containing Cargo before 1.66.1 are vulnerable. Note that even if you don't explicitly use SSH for alternate registry indexes or crate dependencies, you might be affected by this vulnerability if you have configured git to replace HTTPS connections to GitHub with SSH (through git's [url.<base>.insteadOf][1] setting), as that'd cause you to clone the crates.io index through SSH. Rust 1.66.1 will ensure Cargo checks the SSH host key and abort the connection if the server's public key is not already trusted. We recommend everyone to upgrade as soon as possible.

Impact Due to a non-constant-time implementation, information about the private key is leaked through timing information which is observable over the network. An attacker may be able to use that information to recover the key.

Patches No patch is yet available, however work is underway to migrate to a fully constant-time implementation.

Workarounds The only currently available workaround is to avoid using the rsa crate in settings where attackers are able to observe timing information, e.g. local use on a non-compromised computer is fine.

References This vulnerability was discovered as part of the "Marvin Attack", which revealed several implementations of RSA including OpenSSL had not properly mitigated timing sidechannel attacks.

- https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2023-0071.html - https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/ - https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/issues/19

A flaw was found in the rust-cargo package. Cargo, as bundled with the Rust compiler, did not respect the umask when extracting dependency tarballs and caching the extraction for future builds. If a dependency contained files with 0777 permissions, another local user could edit the cache of the extracted source code, potentially executing arbitrary code with the privileges of the user running Cargo during the next build.

Rust is a programming language. The fix for CVE-2024-24576, where std::process::Command incorrectly escaped arguments when invoking batch files on Windows, was incomplete. Prior to Rust version 1.81.0, it was possible to bypass the fix when the batch file name had trailing whitespace or periods (which are ignored and stripped by Windows). To determine whether to apply the cmd.exe escaping rules, the original fix for the vulnerability checked whether the command name ended with .bat or .cmd. At the time that seemed enough, as we refuse to invoke batch scripts with no file extension. Windows removes trailing whitespace and periods when parsing file paths. For example, .bat. . is interpreted by Windows as .bat, but the original fix didn't check for that. Affected users who are using Rust 1.77.2 or greater can remove the trailing whitespace (ASCII 0x20) and trailing periods (ASCII 0x2E) from the batch file name to bypass the incomplete fix and enable the mitigations. Users are affected if their code or one of their dependencies invoke a batch script on Windows with trailing whitespace or trailing periods in the name, and pass untrusted arguments to it. Rust 1.81.0 will update the standard library to apply the CVE-2024-24576 mitigations to all batch files invocations, regardless of the trailing chars in the file name.

Cargo prior to Rust 1.26.0 may download the wrong dependency if your package.toml file uses the package configuration key. Usage of the package key to rename dependencies in Cargo.toml is ignored in Rust 1.25.0 and prior. When Rust 1.25.0 and prior is used Cargo may download the wrong dependency, which could be squatted on crates.io to be a malicious package. This not only affects manifests that you write locally yourself, but also manifests published to crates.io. Rust 1.0.0 through Rust 1.25.0 is affected by this advisory because Cargo will ignore the package key in manifests. Rust 1.26.0 through Rust 1.30.0 are not affected and typically will emit an error because the package key is unstable. Rust 1.31.0 and after are not affected because Cargo understands the package key. Users of the affected versions are strongly encouraged to update their compiler to the latest available one. Preventing this issue from happening requires updating your compiler to be either Rust 1.26.0 or newer. There will be no point release for Rust versions prior to 1.26.0. Users of Rust 1.19.0 to Rust 1.25.0 can instead apply linked patches to mitigate the issue.

In the standard library in Rust before 1.2.0, BinaryHeap is not panic-safe. The binary heap is left in an inconsistent state when the comparison of generic elements inside siftup or siftdownrange panics. This bug leads to a drop of zeroed memory as an arbitrary type, which can result in a memory safety violation.

In the standard library in Rust before 1.19.0, there is a synchronization problem in the MutexGuard object. MutexGuards can be used across threads with any types, allowing for memory safety issues through race conditions.

The Rust Programming Language Standard Library version 1.29.0, 1.28.0, 1.27.2, 1.27.1, 127.0, 126.2, 126.1, 126.0 contains a CWE-680: Integer Overflow to Buffer Overflow vulnerability in standard library that can result in buffer overflow. This attack appear to be exploitable via str::repeat, passed a large number, can overflow an internal buffer. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 1.29.1.

Rust Programming Language Rust standard library version Commit bfa0e1f58acf1c28d500c34ed258f09ae021893e and later; stable release 1.3.0 and later contains a Buffer Overflow vulnerability in std::collections::vecdeque::VecDeque::reserve() function that can result in Arbitrary code execution, but no proof-of-concept exploit is currently published.. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in after commit fdfafb510b1a38f727e920dccbeeb638d39a8e60; stable release 1.22.0 and later.

The Rust Programming Language rustdoc version Between 0.8 and 1.27.0 contains a CWE-427: Uncontrolled Search Path Element vulnerability in rustdoc plugins that can result in local code execution as a different user. This attack appear to be exploitable via using the --plugin flag without the --plugin-path flag. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 1.27.1.

In the standard library in Rust before 1.29.0, there is weak synchronization in the Arc::getmut method. This synchronization issue can be lead to memory safety issues through race conditions.

The Rust Programming Language Standard Library 1.18.0 and later is affected by: CWE-200: Information Exposure. The impact is: Contents of uninitialized memory could be printed to string or to log file. The component is: Debug trait implementation for std::collections::vecdeque::Iter. The attack vector is: The program needs to invoke debug printing for iterator over an empty VecDeque. The fixed version is: 1.30.0, nightly versions after commit b85e4cc8fadaabd41da5b9645c08c68b8f89908d.

The Rust Programming Language Standard Library 1.34.x before 1.34.2 contains a stabilized method which, if overridden, can violate Rust's safety guarantees and cause memory unsafety. If the Error::typeid method is overridden then any type can be safely cast to any other type, causing memory safety vulnerabilities in safe code (e.g., out-of-bounds write or read). Code that does not manually implement Error::typeid is unaffected.

In the standard library in Rust before 1.52.0, there is an optimization for joining strings that can cause uninitialized bytes to be exposed (or the program to crash) if the borrowed string changes after its length is checked.

In the standard library in Rust before 1.49.0, String::retain() function has a panic safety problem. It allows creation of a non-UTF-8 Rust string when the provided closure panics. This bug could result in a memory safety violation when other string APIs assume that UTF-8 encoding is used on the same string.

In the standard library in Rust before 1.49.0, VecDeque::makecontiguous has a bug that pops the same element more than once under certain condition. This bug could result in a use-after-free or double free.

An issue was discovered in the async-h1 crate before 2.3.0 for Rust. Request smuggling can occur when used behind a reverse proxy.

An issue was discovered in the socket2 crate before 0.3.16 for Rust. It has false expectations about the std::net::SocketAddr memory representation.

An issue was discovered in the futures-util crate before 0.3.2 for Rust. FuturesUnordered can lead to data corruption because Sync is mishandled.