-Infinity
0
Severity
7.5
Integer Overflow, Buffer Overflow
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

A flaw was found in spice-server. The GLZ encoder dictionary restore path truncates a sizet allocation size to int when calling the malloc callback, allowing a malicious authenticated SPICE client during VM live migration to trigger a massive heap buffer overflow by sending a crafted maxencoders value in migration data.

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Source: MITRE
First published (updated )
Severity
7.5
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

A flaw was found in spice-server. Multiple migration data handlers use client-supplied offsets from SPICEMSGCMIGRATEDATA messages without bounds validation, allowing a malicious authenticated SPICE client during VM live migration to read arbitrary heap memory or trigger heap corruption via out-of-bounds read and write operations on the message buffer.

First published (updated )
Severity
7
Buffer Overflow

The GLZ encoder dictionary restore path in the SPICE server truncates a sizet allocation size to int when calling the GlzEncoderUsrContext::malloc callback. The client-controlled maxencoders value from migration data controls the allocation size via sizeof(uint32t) maxencoders.

On 64-bit systems, with a crafted maxencoders value (e.g., 0xC0000001), the product sizeof(uint32t) 0xC0000001 = 0x300000004 (sizet) is truncated to int value 4, causing gmalloc to allocate only 4 bytes. The subsequent reset loop (glz-encoder-dict.c lines 104-107) then writes 4 bytes per iteration for 0xC0000001 iterations into the 4-byte buffer, resulting in a massive heap buffer overflow (~12.88 GB write past the allocation).

Exploitation requires SPICE client authentication (ticket or SASL) and an active live migration window. The attacker sends a crafted SPICEMSGCMIGRATEDATA on the display channel with a malicious maxencoders value in GlzEncDictRestoreData.

Upstream fix: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/-/mergerequests/253 (merged 2026-10-09)

First published (updated )
Severity
7

An unquoted search path flaw was found in the way Spice service for Windows was installed into the system.

A local unprivileged user could use this flaw to increase their privileges.

References:

http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/428.html

First published (updated )
Severity
5.3
EPSS
0.05%
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

The Spice Starter Sites plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the spicestartersitesimportercreater function in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.5. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to import demo content.

First published (updated )
Severity
4

It was discovered that the spice-gtk setuid helper application, spice-client-glib-usb-acl-helper, did not clear the environment variables read by the libraries it uses. A local attacker could possibly use this flaw to escalate their privileges by setting specific environment variables before running the helper application.

This flaw is similar to CVE-2012-3524

First published (updated )
Severity
4

An uninitialized pointer use flaw was found in the SPICE Firefox plug-in. If a user were tricked into visiting a malicious web page with Firefox while the SPICE plug-in is enabled, it could cause Firefox to crash or, possibly, execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the user running Firefox.

First published (updated )
Severity
1

The CAC(Common Access Card) library, used by Quick Emulator(Qemu) to implement smartcard support, is vulnerable to a host memory leakage issue. It could occur while allocating a new APDU object using guest supplied raw byte stream in 'vcardapdunew'.

A guest user/process could use this flaw to leak host memory resulting in DoS.

Upstream patch: --------------- -> https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/libcacard/commit/?id=9113dc6a303604a2d9812ac70c17d076ef11886c

Reference: ---------- -> http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/03/01/11

First published (updated )

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