Tinxy WiFi Lock Controller v1 RF was discovered to transmit sensitive information in plaintext, including control information and device credentials, allowing attackers to possibly intercept and access sensitive information via a man-in-the-middle attack.

Tinxy WiFi Lock Controller v1 RF was discovered to be configured to transmit on an open Wi-Fi network, allowing attackers to join the network without authentication.

Tinxy WiFi Lock Controller v1 RF was discovered to store users' sensitive information, including credentials and mobile phone numbers, in plaintext.

This vulnerability exists in the Tinxy smart devices due to storage of credentials in plaintext within the device firmware. An attacker with physical access could exploit this by extracting the firmware and analyzing the binary data to obtain the plaintext credentials stored on the vulnerable device.

This vulnerability exists in the Tinxy mobile app due to storage of logged-in user information in plaintext on the device database. An attacker with physical access to the rooted device could exploit this vulnerability by accessing its database leading to unauthorized access of user information such as username, email address and mobile number. Note: To exploit this vulnerability, the device must be rooted/jailbroken.

Tinxy Door Lock with firmware before 3.2 allow attackers to unlock a door by replaying an Unlock request that occurred when the attacker was previously authorized. In other words, door-access revocation is mishandled.