The Dokan: AI Powered WooCommerce Multivendor Marketplace Solution – Build Your Own Amazon, eBay, Etsy plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 5.2.1 via the 'password' parameter due to missing validation on a user controlled key. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with custom-level access and above, to change the WordPress account password of any customer who has placed at least one order with the attacking vendor, enabling login as that customer and resulting in a limited account takeover. Vendor-level access, required to exploit this vulnerability, can be self-registered through the public 'I am a vendor' registration flow when that option is enabled on the site.

The Dokan: AI Powered WooCommerce Multivendor Marketplace Solution WordPress plugin before 5.2.0 does not verify that the vendor a commission calculation is requested for is the requesting vendor, allowing vendors to disclose the commission rate and fixed fee the marketplace administrator configured for other vendors.

The Dokan: AI Powered WooCommerce Multivendor Marketplace Solution – Build Your Own Amazon, eBay, Etsy plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 5.0.3 via the changeorderstatus, addordernote, deleteordernote, addshippingtrackinginfo, grantaccesstodownload, and revokeaccesstodownload AJAX handlers due to missing ownership validation on a user-controlled order ID key. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with custom vendor-level access and above, to modify the status of arbitrary orders, add attacker-controlled notes to any order (including customer-facing notes that trigger WooCommerce notification emails to buyers), delete any order note or WordPress comment by ID regardless of ownership, inject fake shipping tracking information on any order, and grant or revoke downloadable-product permissions on any order in the marketplace. Critically, nonce validity is not a barrier to exploitation: each of these AJAX handlers generates and embeds its nonce on the authenticated vendor's own dashboard order pages (e.g., /dashboard/orders/?orderid=OWNORDERID), which the attacker legitimately controls. The attacker harvests a valid nonce from their own order detail page and replays it against a victim order ID — the nonce only proves the request originates from a logged-in session, not that the order belongs to that vendor. This directly rebuts the prior rejection reasoning that 'users cannot generate valid nonces on command': vendor users can and do generate valid nonces on demand simply by loading their own dashboard pages. Source-code analysis confirmed the vulnerable code path is present and unpatched through version 5.0.1.