cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.27.0, a vulnerability allows attacker-controlled HTTP headers to influence server-visible metadata, logging, and authorization decisions. An attacker can inject headers named REMOTEADDR, REMOTEPORT, LOCALADDR, LOCALPORT that are parsed into the request header multimap via readheaders() in httplib.h (headers.emplace), then the server later appends its own internal metadata using the same header names in Server::processrequest without erasing duplicates. Because Request::getheadervalue returns the first entry for a header key (id == 0) and the client-supplied headers are parsed before server-inserted headers, downstream code that uses these header names may inadvertently use attacker-controlled values. Affected files/locations: cpp-httplib/httplib.h (readheaders, Server::processrequest, Request::getheadervalue, getheadervalueu64) and cpp-httplib/docker/main.cc (getclientip, nginxaccesslogger, nginxerrorlogger). Attack surface: attacker-controlled HTTP headers in incoming requests flow into the Request.headers multimap and into logging code that reads forwarded headers, enabling IP spoofing, log poisoning, and authorization bypass via header shadowing. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.27.0.

cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.44.0, when cpp-httplib's server parses an incoming request, it applies percent-decoding to every header value except Location and Referer. The validity check (isfieldvalue) is run before decoding, so encoded %0D%0A passes the check and is then expanded to a literal \r\n byte pair inside the stored header value. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.44.0.

cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.20.1, cpp-httplib does not have a limit for a unique line, permitting an attacker to explore this to allocate memory arbitrarily. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.20.1. NOTE: This vulnerability is related to CVE-2025-53629.

cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to version 0.30.1, a Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in cpp-httplib due to the unsafe handling of compressed HTTP request bodies (Content-Encoding: gzip, br, etc.). The library validates the payloadmaxlength against the compressed data size received from the network, but does not limit the size of the decompressed data stored in memory.

cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.37.2, when a cpp-httplib client is configured with a proxy and setfollowlocation(true), any HTTPS redirect it follows will have TLS certificate and hostname verification silently disabled on the new connection. The client will accept any certificate presented by the redirect target — expired, self-signed, or forged — without raising an error or notifying the application. A network attacker in a position to return a redirect response can fully intercept the follow-up HTTPS connection, including any credentials or session tokens in flight. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.37.2.

cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.44.0, When the server has called Server::settrustedproxies() with a non-empty trusted-proxy list, an attacker can send an HTTP request that includes an X-Forwarded-For header whose value parses to no valid IP segments. The code path then executes getclientip(), which calls front() on an empty std::vector—undefined behavior in C++. On typical implementations this manifests as abnormal process termination (denial of service). With Sanitizers enabled, you get an explicit runtime diagnostic. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.44.0.

cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to version 0.30.0, the writeheaders function does not check for CR & LF characters in user supplied headers, allowing untrusted header value to escape header lines. This vulnerability allows attackers to add extra headers, modify request body unexpectedly & trigger an SSRF attack. When combined with a server that supports http1.1 pipelining (springboot, python twisted etc), this can be used for server side request forgery (SSRF). Version 0.30.0 fixes this issue.

cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. In version 0.21.0, when many http headers fields are passed in, the library does not limit the number of headers, and the memory associated with the headers will not be released when the connection is disconnected. This leads to potential exhaustion of system memory and results in a server crash or unresponsiveness. Version 0.22.0 contains a patch for the issue.

cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.23.0, incoming requests using Transfer-Encoding: chunked in the header can allocate memory arbitrarily in the server, potentially leading to its exhaustion. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.23.0. NOTE: This vulnerability is related to CVE-2025-53628.

cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.35.0, cpp-httplib (httplib.h) does not enforce Server::setpayloadmaxlength() on the decompressed request body when using HandlerWithContentReader (streaming ContentReader) with Content-Encoding: gzip (or other supported encodings). A small compressed payload can expand beyond the configured payload limit and be processed by the application, enabling a payload size limit bypass and potential denial of service (CPU/memory exhaustion). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.35.0.

cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.37.1, when a cpp-httplib client uses the streaming API (httplib::stream::Get, httplib::stream::Post, etc.), the library calls std::stoull() directly on the Content-Length header value received from the server with no input validation and no exception handling. std::stoull throws std::invalidargument for non-numeric strings and std::outofrange for values exceeding ULLONGMAX. Since nothing catches these exceptions, the C++ runtime calls std::terminate(), which kills the process with SIGABRT. Any server the client connects to — including servers reached via HTTP redirects, third-party APIs, or man-in-the-middle positions can crash the client application with a single HTTP response. No authentication is required. No interaction from the end user is required. The crash is deterministic and immediate. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.37.1.

cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.43.4, negative chunk-size in chunked Transfer-Encoding causes unbounded memory allocation and process crash. The ChunkedDecoder::readpayload function in cpp-httplib (httplib.h) parses the chunk-size field of HTTP chunked transfer encoding using std::strtoul(). Per the C standard (§7.22.1.4), strtoul silently accepts a leading minus sign, performing unsigned wrap-around: strtoul("-2", …, 16) returns ULONGMAX − 1 (0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE). The library's only guard (line 12833) rejects ULONGMAX (the result of "-1"), but any other negative value such as "-2" passes validation. The resulting near-maximum value is stored in chunkremaining and controls how many bytes the server's read loop consumes from the network. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.43.4.

cpp-httplib through 0.5.8 does not filter \r\n in parameters passed into the setredirect and setheader functions, which creates possibilities for CRLF injection and HTTP response splitting in some specific contexts.

cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.39.0, the cpp-httplib HTTP client forwards stored Basic Auth, Bearer Token, and Digest Auth credentials to arbitrary hosts when following cross-origin HTTP redirects (301/302/307/308). A malicious or compromised server can redirect the client to an attacker-controlled host, which then receives the plaintext credentials in the Authorization header. Version 0.39.0 fixes the issue.

cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. In affected Mbed TLS backend versions from 0.31.0 through 0.46.1 and wolfSSL backend versions from 0.33.0 through 0.46.1, when cpp-httplib is built with CPPHTTPLIBMBEDTLSSUPPORT or CPPHTTPLIBWOLFSSLSUPPORT and a client connects to an IP-literal host with server certificate verification enabled, SSLClient and Client in HTTPS mode skip certificate chain validation and WebSocketClient on the Mbed TLS backend skips verification altogether, allowing a man-in-the-middle attacker positioned to intercept traffic to present a crafted certificate and read or modify the traffic. This issue is fixed in version 0.47.0.

cpp-httplib version v0.17.3 through v0.18.3 fails to filter CRLF characters ("\r\n") when those are prefixed with a null byte. This enables attackers to exploit CRLF injection that could further lead to HTTP Response Splitting, XSS, and more.

cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to version 0.40.0, cpp-httplib is vulnerable to HTTP Request Smuggling. The server's static file handler serves GET responses without consuming the request body. On HTTP/1.1 keep-alive connections, the unread body bytes remain on the TCP stream and are interpreted as the start of a new HTTP request. An attacker can embed an arbitrary HTTP request inside the body of a GET request, which the server processes as a separate request. This issue has been patched in version 0.40.0.

cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to version 0.37.0, cpp-httplib uses std::regex (libstdc++) to parse RFC 5987 encoded filename values in multipart Content-Disposition headers. The regex engine in libstdc++ implements backtracking via deep recursion, consuming one stack frame per input character. An attacker can send a single HTTP POST request with a crafted filename parameter that causes uncontrolled stack growth, resulting in a stack overflow (SIGSEGV) that crashes the server process. This issue has been patched in version 0.37.0.

cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.27.0, a vulnerability allows attacker-controlled HTTP headers to influence server-visible metadata, logging, and authorization decisions. An attacker can supply X-Forwarded-For or X-Real-IP headers which get accepted unconditionally by getclientip() in docker/main.cc, causing access and error logs (nginxaccesslogger / nginxerrorlogger) to record spoofed client IPs (log poisoning / audit evasion). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.27.0.

cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.35.0, when a request handler throws a C++ exception and the application has not registered a custom exception handler via setexceptionhandler(), the library catches the exception and writes its message directly into the HTTP response as a header named EXCEPTIONWHAT. This header is sent to whoever made the request, with no authentication check and no special configuration required to trigger it. The behavior is on by default. A developer who does not know to opt in to setexceptionhandler() will ship a server that leaks internal exception messages to any client. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.35.0.