Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
6.9
AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

hickory-proto and hickory-resolver 0.26.0 before 0.26.2, hickory-server 0.25.0-alpha.1 before 0.26.2, and hickory-recursor 0.25.0-alpha.3 through 0.26.0-alpha.1 fail to canonicalize IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses when checking denyanswers, denyserver, or AccessControlSet rules. Attackers can use IPv4-mapped addresses to evade answer filtering, trigger queries to denied nameservers, or reach hickory-server library deployments on dual-stack IPv6 sockets from denied clients.

First published (updated )
Severity
6.3
AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

The validating recursor in Hickory DNS hickory-recursor 0.25.0 through 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-resolver 0.26.0-alpha.1 before 0.26.2, and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 caches DNSSEC-bogus answers using the untrusted, attacker-supplied record TTL (capped at 24 hours) instead of a short validation-failure TTL. A remote attacker who spoofs a single authoritative response with an invalid signature and a long TTL can keep the bogus result cached for up to 24 hours.

First published (updated )
Severity
8.7
AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

The recursive resolver in Hickory DNS (all versions of the hickory-recursor crate, and hickory-resolver 0.26.0 before 0.26.2) caches an empty connection pool when it follows a referral with no glue records and all queries for the name servers' IP addresses fail. An attacker able to spoof DNS responses can make these lookups fail, causing all subsequent queries for the affected zone to fail until the cache entry expires or is evicted.

First published (updated )
Severity
7

hickory-resolver versions before 0.26.2 fail to propagate bogus DNSSEC proof states through the Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookupip() APIs, allowing invalid records to be returned as successful results. Attackers controlling the answering zone or positioned on the network path can have forged DNS records accepted as validated, bypassing DNSSEC authentication checks.

First published (updated )
Severity
8.7
EPSS
0.23%
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

hickory-resolver versions before 0.26.2 fail to propagate bogus DNSSEC proof states through the Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookupip() APIs, allowing invalid records to be returned as successful results. Attackers controlling the answering zone or positioned on the network path can have forged DNS records accepted as validated, bypassing DNSSEC authentication checks.

1 / 3
Source: MITRE
First published (updated )

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