Summary
The main Electrum server the client connects to is trusted with mempool ("unconfirmed") transactions. This is documented design. [0]
However now someone figured out a way to practically exploit it: - when the client broadcasts a new tx1, a malicious server can swallow it, - and update the client's history with a conflicting (invalid) tx2 that replaces the outputs with the attacker's output address. - Tx2 has invalid signatures, but this is not checked (due to light client design). - The wallet will display tx2 as an unconfirmed transaction - tx1 will not be displayed. - If the client then manually RBF fee-bumps tx2, the client will sign it with a higher fee, and hence pay the attacker.
Fixes
Commit 90fe30822 contains the fix [1], included in version 4.8.3. The client now verifies the signatures of wallet.ismine inputs for mempool txs (before adding them to its local history).
Users should upgrade (and regularly do so in any case). As a workaround, without upgrading, when signing any transaction, for bumping the fee or not, they should verify the output addresses and amounts are as expected.
Clients that connect to servers they trust (e.g. run their own) are not affected.
Remarks
- some servers are performing this attack in the wild - electrum received two user-reports of this. user1 noticed after broadcasting tx1 the wallet history contained a different tx. user2 bumped the fee of tx2 and lost money. - user1 reported tx1 was not propagated over the bitcoin p2p, so the server held it - both reported the attacker's output address in tx2 was grinded to match the last four chars of the legit address from tx1 - based on user2's report, the server constructed a tx2 with zero fee (presumably in hope of the user bumping its fee) - even with the fix, we still only validate "ismine" inputs (i.e. paying from addresses that the wallet owns). So e.g. "incoming" txs are not validated. The client lacks a full consensus engine / script interpreter, though even with that, to cover non-ismine inputs, it would have to validate the unconfirmed parents recursively until reaching mined txs. Mined txs we already SPV.
Timeline
- 2026-10-11: user1 sends private disclosure, but the bumpfee vector is not realised - 2026-10-18: user2 (Raju-K12) reports privately that they lost money after bumpfee - 2026-10-23: version 4.8.3 git tagged, with the fix - 2026-10-24: version 4.8.3 binaries released - 2026-10-24: public disclosure
Credits
Electrum thanks user1 and Raju-K12 for finding and responsibly disclosing this issue to us.
paymentrequest.py in Electrum before 4.2.2 allows a file:// URL in the r parameter of a payment request (e.g., within QR code data). On Windows, this can lead to capture of credentials over SMB. On Linux and UNIX, it can lead to a denial of service by specifying the /dev/zero filename.
Electrum 4.6.0 before 4.7.2 contains an authorization bypass in the external plugin loader, which executes a plugin's init.py module when the plugin is marked enabled in the config file, without verifying its plugin-password signature. A rogue local process with write access to the Electrum data directory can place plugin code in the plugins/ folder and mark it enabled, causing arbitrary code execution inside the Electrum process.
Electrum 4.6.0 before 4.7.2 contains an authorization bypass in the external plugin loader, which executes a plugin's init.py module when the plugin is marked enabled in the config file, without verifying its plugin-password signature. A rogue local process with write access to the Electrum data directory can place plugin code in the plugins/ folder and mark it enabled, causing arbitrary code execution inside the Electrum process.
Electrum before 4.7.2 contains a spending limit bypass vulnerability in the Nostr Wallet Connect plugin that allows malicious NWC clients to exceed dailylimitsat by exploiting non-atomic budget checks and millisatoshi truncation. Attackers can send concurrent payinvoice requests that pass budgetallowsspend() before addtobudget() runs, or repeatedly pay msat amounts that are floored to whole satoshis, to drain funds beyond the limit.
Electrum before 4.7.2 contains a spending limit bypass vulnerability in the Nostr Wallet Connect plugin that allows malicious NWC clients to exceed dailylimitsat by exploiting non-atomic budget checks and millisatoshi truncation. Attackers can send concurrent payinvoice requests that pass budgetallowsspend() before addtobudget() runs, or repeatedly pay msat amounts that are floored to whole satoshis, to drain funds beyond the limit.
The Python console in Electrum through 2.9.4 and 3.x through 3.0.5 supports arbitrary Python code without considering (1) social-engineering attacks in which a user pastes code that they do not understand and (2) code pasted by a physically proximate attacker at an unattended workstation, which makes it easier for attackers to steal Bitcoin via hook code that runs at a later time when the wallet password has been entered, a different vulnerability than CVE-2018-1000022.