Impact
A symlink traversal issue in go-git could allow worktree operations to modify files outside the intended worktree path.
The worktreeFilesystem wrapper rejected dangerous path strings, including paths containing .git, parent-directory components, or control characters. However, it did not prevent filesystem operations from following symbolic links that were already present in the worktree.
As a result, a path that is safe when evaluated as a string could still resolve into the repository's Git metadata directory. For example, if s is a symbolic link to .git, writing to s/config would modify .git/config.
A symbolic link at the final path component could also be followed. For example, if s points directly to .git/config, opening s for writing with truncation could overwrite the repository configuration.
Exploitation requires an attacker to be able to introduce or control a symbolic link in the worktree and cause the application to perform a write through that path.
Applications using storage/memory for their Storer, or go-billy/memfs for their Worktree, are not affected by this vulnerability.
Patches
The issue has been addressed by making the worktree filesystem wrapper a symlink-safe boundary.
Worktree operations now reject paths where an existing symbolic link in any path component could cause the operation to escape the intended worktree location, including symbolic links at the final component.
Users of filesystem-backed worktrees should upgrade to a patched version.
Credits
Thanks to @kodareef5 for reporting this issue and working with the go-git security team toward its resolution. :1stplacemedal: We would also like to thank @HughLewis20, who independently reported the same issue while a fix was already in progress.
go-git is a highly extensible git implementation library written in pure Go. A denial of service (DoS) vulnerability was discovered in go-git versions prior to v5.13. This vulnerability allows an attacker to perform denial of service attacks by providing specially crafted responses from a Git server which triggers resource exhaustion in go-git clients. Users running versions of go-git from v4 and above are recommended to upgrade to v5.13 in order to mitigate this vulnerability.
go-git is an extensible git implementation library written in pure Go. Prior to 5.19.2 and 6.0.0-alpha.5, worktree operations (including checkout, status, and add) resolve symbolic links inside the working tree without confining resolution to the worktree boundary, so a maliciously crafted repository containing a symlink can cause go-git to read from or write to files outside the intended working directory when the repository is cloned and its worktree operations are used. Versions 5.19.2 and 6.0.0-alpha.5.
A flaw was found in flightctl. The configureRepoHTTPSClient() function in the device-render worker builds a per-repository tls.Config (which may include InsecureSkipVerify, a custom CA bundle, or tenant-supplied mTLS client certificates) and installs it into go-git's process-global client.Protocols map via gitclient.InstallProtocol("https", ...). Because the worker renders devices for multiple organizations concurrently from a shared goroutine pool, whichever tenant's repository configuration is written last wins for all in-flight git.Clone calls. This race condition can cause one tenant's TLS settings, including InsecureSkipVerify or mTLS client credentials, to leak into another tenant's git operations.
Impact A path traversal issue in go-git could allow malicious reference names to access files outside the repository's intended reference storage.
Loose references are stored under .git/<reference-name>. The reference name was previously used as a path without verifying that the resolved path remained within the reference storage. A name such as refs/heads/../../config could therefore resolve to unrelated repository metadata such as .git/config or .git/HEAD.
A malicious Git server could advertise such a reference name. The name may also survive refspec mapping; for example, it could be mapped to refs/remotes/origin/../../config during a clone or fetch operation.
This vulnerability affects filesystem-backed repositories using the storage/filesystem package and its dotgit reference storage. Users relying exclusively on the in-memory storage implementation, storage/memory, are not affected, because reference names are not resolved as filesystem paths.
Exploitation requires an application using go-git with filesystem-backed storage to interact with a malicious Git server or otherwise process attacker-controlled reference names.
Patches The issue has been addressed by validating reference names at the dotgit storage entry points and rejecting names whose resolved paths could escape the reference storage.
Users of filesystem-backed storage should upgrade to a patched version.
Workarounds Applications that exclusively use storage/memory are not affected and do not require a workaround for this vulnerability.
For applications using filesystem-backed storage, avoid cloning from or fetching from untrusted Git servers until an upgrade is possible.
Applications that directly construct or process reference names may also validate them before passing them to filesystem-backed go-git storage. Application-level validation should only be considered a temporary mitigation and does not replace upgrading to a patched version.
References - Fixes: - https://github.com/go-git/go-git/pull/2247 - https://github.com/go-git/go-git/pull/2254
Credits
Thanks to @Saku0512 for reporting this issue and @Sahana2524 for proposing the initial fix. 🙇
go-git is an extensible git implementation library written in pure Go. Prior to versions 5.18.0 and 6.0.0-alpha.2, go-git may leak HTTP authentication credentials when following redirects during smart-HTTP clone and fetch operations. This issue has been patched in versions 5.18.0 and 6.0.0-alpha.2.