A user with organization administrator permissions can delete dashboard snapshots belonging to other organizations on the same Grafana instance, and can recover a snapshot's secret delete key using only its public share key (broken access control).
This vulnerability only affects Grafana stacks configured with multiple organizations; single-organization deployments are not impacted. In a multi-organization stack, a user who is an Org Admin of a single organization can call GET /api/access-control/users/permissions/search?actionPrefix=dashboards: and receive permission data belonging to other organizations. The disclosed data is limited to dashboard and folder identifiers (UIDs) and per-user permission/scope mappings (which user holds which access on which dashboard). Dashboard contents, panels, query results, datasource credentials, secrets, and personal data are not exposed. This is a limited cross-organization information disclosure affecting multi-org deployments only.
Several Grafana API endpoints, some of them unauthenticated, do not limit the size of the request body before processing it. An attacker can send very large payloads that force excessive memory allocation, potentially exhausting memory and causing a denial of service.
A user with Editor permissions can craft a dashboard whose table (TableNG) panel contains a malicious field name that executes as a script in the browser of any user who views the dashboard (stored cross-site scripting).
An unauthenticated attacker can repeatedly call Grafana's OAuth login route with unique values, causing unbounded memory growth that can eventually exhaust memory and crash the Grafana instance (denial of service).
Several Grafana API endpoints, some of them unauthenticated, do not limit the size of the request body before processing it. An attacker can send very large payloads that force excessive memory allocation, potentially exhausting memory and causing a denial of service.
The public dashboard deletion endpoint does not enforce organization isolation, allowing an Org Admin in one organization to delete public dashboards belonging to a different organization by supplying the target dashboard's identifiers.
The public dashboard query endpoint does not limit request body size before processing, allowing unauthenticated attackers to trigger excessive memory allocation by sending arbitrarily large JSON payloads. This can lead to denial of service through memory exhaustion. No valid dashboard access token or authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.
A user with Editor permissions can place a malicious script in the attribution field of a Geomap panel's XYZ tile layer via a template variable. The script then executes in the browser of any user who views the affected dashboard (stored cross-site scripting).
A user with Viewer permissions can use specially crafted requests to the Tempo and Loki data source plugins to reach unintended backend endpoints. Depending on the backend configuration this can expose data source credentials, leak internal responses, or trigger administrative actions on the configured backend.
Editors could delete any annotation, even those they do not have read access to. The editor user cannot create or read the annotations.
Using the $timeGroup macro, one can achieve an OOM by overloading the server. This requires a SQL datasource. If the server is set up to auto-restart, the impact is minimal or non-existent, as the attack can take upwards of half an hour to crash the server.
A request to the Grafana plugin resources endpoint can cause unbounded memory allocation by reading the entire request body into memory. An authenticated user can exploit this to trigger an out-of-memory condition, potentially causing a denial of service.
When using an IPv6 allow-list for the Auth Proxy feature, it defaults to /32 addresses. Addresses specifying a mask explicitly are not affected; to mitigate easily, add the desired mask (usually /128) to the addresses. Only auth proxy is affected; Okta, SAML, LDAP, etc are unaffected here.
Any Editor could delete any snapshot, even if they have no access to read or write them.
A vulnerability in SQL Expressions allows an authenticated attacker to read arbitrary files from the Grafana server's filesystem. Only instances with the sqlExpressions feature toggle enabled are vulnerable.
When a user's access to mint tokens for a service account is revoked, it is sometimes still possible to do so for a few seconds after the event. The user will eventually lose access to do this.
An Editor can overwrite a dashboard not owned by them to acquire admin on that specific dashboard. The user must have write access to the dashboard to escalate privilege.
The Grafana Live push endpoint can be exploited to cause unbounded memory allocation by sending a large or streaming request body, potentially leading to out-of-memory conditions. An authenticated user with access to the Grafana Live API can trigger this issue.
A race condition in Grafana Live allows authenticated users with Viewer role to trigger a server crash by sending concurrent requests that cause a fatal map access error. This results in complete service unavailability requiring restart of the Grafana server.
A cross-tenant isolation vulnerability was found in Grafana’s Correlations feature affecting legacy correlation records. Due to a backward compatibility condition allowing orgid = 0 records to be returned across organizations, a user with datasource management privileges could read and permanently delete legacy correlation data belonging to another organization. This issue affects correlations created prior to Grafana 10.2 and is fixed in >=11.6.11, >=12.0.9, >=12.1.6, and >=12.2.4.
Thanks to Gyu-hyeok Lee (g2h) for reporting this vulnerability.
In Grafana's alerting system, users with edit permissions for a contact point, specifically the permissions “alert.notifications:write” or “alert.notifications.receivers:test” that are granted as part of the fixed role "Contact Point Writer", which is part of the basic role Editor - can edit contact points created by other users, modify the endpoint URL to a controlled server. By invoking the test functionality, attackers can capture and extract redacted secure settings, such as authentication credentials for third-party services (e.g., Slack tokens). This leads to unauthorized access and potential compromise of external integrations.
A resample query can be used to trigger out-of-memory crashes in Grafana.
A testdata data-source can be used to trigger out-of-memory crashes in Grafana.
A chained attack via SQL Expressions and a Grafana Enterprise plugin can lead to a remote arbitrary code execution impact (RCE). This is enabled by a feature in Grafana (OSS), so all users are always recommended to update to avoid future attack vectors going this path.
Only instances with the sqlExpressions feature toggle enabled are vulnerable.
Only instances in the following version ranges are affected:
- 11.6.0 (inclusive) to 11.6.14 (exclusive): 11.6.14 has the fix. 11.5 and below are not affected. - 12.0.0 (inclusive) to 12.1.10 (exclusive): 12.1.10 has the fix. 12.0 did not receive an update, as it is end-of-life. - 12.2.0 (inclusive) to 12.2.8 (exclusive): 12.2.8 has the fix. - 12.3.0 (inclusive) to 12.3.6 (exclusive): 12.3.6 has the fix. - 12.4.0 (inclusive) to 12.4.2 (exclusive): 12.4.2 has the fix. 13.0.0 and above also have the fix: no v13 release is affected.
The OpenFeature feature toggle evaluation endpoint reads unbounded values into memory, which can cause out-of-memory crashes.
When using public dashboards and direct data-sources, all direct data-sources' passwords are exposed despite not being used in dashboards.
No passwords of proxied data-sources are exposed. We encourage all direct data-sources to be converted to proxied data-sources as far as possible to improve your deployments' security.
A vulnerability has been discovered in Grafana OSS where an authorization bypass in the provisioning contact points API allows users with Editor role to modify protected webhook URLs without the required alert.notifications.receivers.protected:write permission.
The Grafana MSSQL data source plugin contains a logic flaw that allows a low-privileged user (Viewer) to bypass API restrictions and trigger a catastrophic Out-Of-Memory (OOM) memory exhaustion, crashing the host container.
A time-of-create-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) vulnerability lets recently deleted-then-recreated data sources be re-deleted without permission to do so.
This requires several very stringent conditions to be met:
- The attacker must have admin access to the specific datasource prior to its first deletion. - Upon deletion, all steps within the attack must happen within the next 30 seconds and on the same pod of Grafana. - The attacker must delete the datasource, then someone must recreate it. - The new datasource must not have the attacker as an admin. - The new datasource must have the same UID as the prior datasource. These are randomised by default. - The datasource can now be re-deleted by the attacker. - Once 30 seconds are up, the attack is spent and cannot be repeated. - No datasource with any other UID can be attacked.