(A flaw was found in libtirpc. The SunRPC UDP/datagram server transport ...)
A flaw was found in libtirpc. The SunRPC UDP/datagram server transport (svcdgrecv / svcudpcreate) reuses a single XDR decode stream sized to the allocated receive buffer. On each datagram, the receive path resets the stream position and calls xdrcallmsg, but it does not rebind the decode bound (xhandy) to the actual received length rlen. Because the XDR memory backend uses xhandy as the remaining length, a shorter request can be decoded together with stale bytes left by a prior datagram. Florian Weimer reproduced this with tst-udp-stale: a full request leaves argument bytes at the tail of the buffer after a shorter reply is encoded; a follow-up truncated AUTHNONE call with no arguments then has svcgetargs consume those leftover bytes and echo them back. A correctly bounded decoder would fail with GARBAGEARGS. This is a logical datagram-boundary violation, not a read past the allocated buffer. The same inherited SunRPC pattern exists in glibc sunrpc/svcudp.c (legacy ABI compatibility; glibc is expected to assign a separate CVE) and in other copies such as krb5 GSSRPC. CVE-2026-104357 is assigned to the libtirpc implementation. Reported by Aisle Research against glibc; Red Hat confirmed the bug is present in libtirpc. Related tracking: OSIM-77274 / RHEL-217046 (glibc report), PSIRTSUPT-22635 (coordination).
A flaw was found in libtirpc. An authenticated remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending oversized wrapped data requests to an RPC (Remote Procedure Call) service configured with RPCSECGSS (Remote Procedure Call Security-Generic Security Service) integrity or privacy. This can lead to unbounded memory allocation, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) by exhausting system resources and causing the service to become unstable or terminate.