Where
AND
-Infinity
0
Severity
8.8
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact

An attacker who can provide configuration to a TechDocs build may execute code in the generator runtime. Impact is greatest when documentation generation runs with backend credentials or host access.

Patches

Patched in @backstage/plugin-techdocs-node version 1.15.4.

Workarounds

Use external TechDocs generation in an isolated environment without sensitive credentials or host access. Restrict and review changes to documentation configuration before generation.

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
7.7
OS Command Injection
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L

Backstage is an open framework for building developer portals. Prior to 1.14.6, the @backstage/plugin-techdocs-node package is affected by configuration bypass in techdocs mkdocs.yml sanitization. Insufficient validation of MkDocs configuration during TechDocs generation could allow an authenticated user who can register or modify documentation sources to execute arbitrary commands in the build environment. Impact is limited to resources accessible to the TechDocs backend or build container. This issue is fixed in versions 1.14.6 and 1.15.4.

First published (updated )
Severity
7.7
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L

Impact

An authenticated user who can register catalog entities can provide a crafted mkdocs.yml causing arbitrary OS command execution on the TechDocs build host when the docs are built.

Patches

Patched in @backstage/plugin-techdocs-node, version 1.15.4.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately:

- Switch to techdocs.builder: external to isolate TechDocs builds in a container. - Restrict who can register catalog entities with TechDocs annotations. - Audit existing catalog entities for suspicious markdownextensions values in their mkdocs.yml files.

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
Code Injection
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L

Impact

When TechDocs is configured to build documentation locally or in a container, a user with write access to a registered repository can include configuration values in mkdocs.yml that cause arbitrary code execution during the documentation build process.

Patches

Patched in @backstage/plugin-techdocs-node version 1.15.4

Workarounds

- Configure TechDocs with techdocs.generator.runIn: 'docker' instead of 'local' to provide container isolation, though this does not fully mitigate the risk. - Restrict write access to repositories registered in the Backstage catalog to trusted users.

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
8.5
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L

Impact

Users with the ability to commit changes to a repository that uses TechDocs can circumvent the MkDocs configuration file sanitizer introduced in response to CVE-2026-25153 and execute arbitrary code on the TechDocs backend host during documentation generation.

Patches

Patched in@backstage/plugin-techdocs-node version 1.15.4

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately:

- Use Docker mode with restricted access: Configure TechDocs with runIn: docker instead of runIn: local. This provides container isolation, though it does not fully mitigate the risk. - Limit repository write access to trusted parties, since exploitation requires the ability to commit files to a repository with TechDocs enabled. - Review incoming changes to MkDocs configuration files as part of your code review process.

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
8.1
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Impact

An authenticated user with access to affected Scaffolder templates could bypass configured action restrictions. Depending on integration credentials, this could grant unauthorized access to repositories and related source-control resources.

Patches

Patched in @backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend version 4.1.0

Workarounds

- Restrict affected Scaffolder actions to trusted users and configure source-control integrations with least-privilege credentials.

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
9.6
Infoleak
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Impact

An authenticated Backstage user who can read another user's Scaffolder task may receive internal execution data. In deployments where that data contains credentials for an external service, this may permit disclosure and unauthorized changes in that external service.

Patches

Patched in @backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend version 4.1.0

Workarounds

- Configure scaffolder.task.read with the isTaskOwner condition so users can only read tasks they created. - Restrict affected integrations and workflows to trusted operators until an upgrade is available.

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
8.5
Race Condition
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact

An authenticated user with permission to create and access Scaffolder tasks may, under specific timing and deployment conditions, affect files accessible to the Backstage backend. If backend application files are writable, the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the backend may be compromised.

Patches

Patched in @backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend version 4.1.0

Workarounds

- Restrict Scaffolder task creation and task-read permissions to trusted users through the permission policy. - Limit who can register or modify templates and which Scaffolder actions may execute. - Run backend application files read-only outside a dedicated, least-privilege Scaffolder working directory.

References

- Authorizing Scaffolder tasks, parameters, steps, and actions

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
7.7
SSRF
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Impact

An authenticated Backstage user could craft a catalog entity with placeholder directives that reference resources outside the entity's source repository. Under certain configurations, this could allow access to data not intended to be available to the user.

Patches

Patched in @backstage/plugin-catalog-backend version 3.9.1

Workarounds

If you're not able to update immediately:

- Limit the scope of integration credentials (e.g., GitHub tokens) to only the repositories that Backstage needs to access.

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
7.7
SSRF
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Impact

An authenticated attacker with control over a TechDocs source repository could cause a documentation build to retrieve and publish data from network locations reachable by the build environment. Exposure depends on deployment topology, build mode, and target endpoint protections. Modern cloud metadata services that require tokens or special headers are not directly accessible through the affected behavior.

Patches

Upgrade @backstage/plugin-techdocs-node to a patched version for the applicable release line:

- 1.14.x: upgrade to 1.14.7 or later in that line, available in Backstage v1.50.6. - 1.15.x: upgrade to 1.15.5 or later, available in Backstage v1.54.8. - Current mainline: upgrade to 2.0.0 or later, available in Backstage v1.55.0.

The update removes MkDocs plugins outside the built-in allowlist. To retain additional plugins, review them and configure techdocs.generator.mkdocs.dangerouslyAllowAdditionalPlugins, or supply dangerouslyAllowAdditionalPlugins when creating the generator directly. Plugins supplied through defaultPlugins remain permitted.

Workarounds

- Restrict control of TechDocs source repositories and catalog registration to trusted maintainers. - Run documentation builders with outbound access to private and link-local networks denied. - Require token- or header-protected cloud instance metadata services.

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )

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