When Routinator encounters a file via RRDP using a specifically crafted Document Type Definition, Routinator crashes.
When sending a specifically crafted non-UTF-8 string as select-asn query parameter to the /api/v1/origins endpoint, Routinator crashes.
This only affects users who allow API access from untrusted networks.
Routinator does not properly check the module component of rsync URIs, which are used to create the file system paths for the Routinator cache. This allows for path traversal by having a module name containing .., potentially providing an attacker access to the entire Routinator rsync cache.
Routinator exits on any error when accepting incoming HTTP or RTR connections, including ones it can recover from such as running out of file descriptors. This condition can be triggered maliciously by an attacker by opening a large number of connections to the HTTP or RTR server.
This only affects users that make their HTTP or RTR server available to untrusted networks.
The initial code parsing the manifest did not check the content of the file names yet later code assumed that it was checked and panicked when encountering illegal characters, resulting in a crash of Routinator.
Due to a mistake in error checking, Routinator will terminate when an incoming RTR connection is reset by the peer too quickly after opening.
NLnet Labs’ Routinator 0.9.0 up to and including 0.12.1 as well as 0.14.0 up to and including 0.14.2 contains a possible path traversal vulnerability in the optional, off-by-default keep-rrdp-responses feature that allows users to store the content of responses received for RRDP requests. The location of these stored responses is constructed from the URL of the request. Due to insufficient sanitation of the URL, it is possible for an attacker to craft a URL that results in the response being stored outside of the directory specified for it.
NLnet Labs' Routinator up to and including version 0.12.1 may crash when trying to parse certain malformed RPKI objects. This is due to insufficient input checking in the bcder library covered by CVE-2023-39914.
In NLnet Labs Routinator prior to 0.10.2, a validation run can be delayed significantly by an RRDP repository by not answering but slowly drip-feeding bytes to keep the connection alive. This can be used to effectively stall validation. While Routinator has a configurable time-out value for RRDP connections, this time-out was only applied to individual read or write operations rather than the complete request. Thus, if an RRDP repository sends a little bit of data before that time-out expired, it can continuously extend the time it takes for the request to finish. Since validation will only continue once the update of an RRDP repository has concluded, this delay will cause validation to stall, leading to Routinator continuing to serve the old data set or, if in the initial validation run directly after starting, never serve any data at all.
NLnet Labs Routinator prior to 0.10.2 happily processes a chain of RRDP repositories of infinite length causing it to never finish a validation run. In RPKI, a CA can choose the RRDP repository it wishes to publish its data in. By continuously generating a new child CA that only consists of another CA using a different RRDP repository, a malicious CA can create a chain of CAs of de-facto infinite length. Routinator prior to version 0.10.2 did not contain a limit on the length of such a chain and will therefore continue to process this chain forever. As a result, the validation run will never finish, leading to Routinator continuing to serve the old data set or, if in the initial validation run directly after starting, never serve any data at all.
An issue was discovered in NLnet Labs Routinator 0.1.0 through 0.7.1. It allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions or to cause a denial of service on dependent routing systems by strategically withholding RPKI Route Origin Authorisation ".roa" files or X509 Certificate Revocation List files from the RPKI relying party's view.