Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
9.3
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

In @neo4j/graphql versions up to and including 7.6.3, @authentication directives applied at the schema level or on the Query or Mutation types are silently ignored for top-level fields annotated with @cypher. Only @authentication directives placed directly on the individual fields are enforced. An application that exposes a top-level @cypher field and relies on schema-level or type-level @authentication to protect it allows unauthenticated callers to invoke the field and run the configured Cypher statement with the privileges of the GraphQL service account, which may permit reading and modifying data. Fixed in 7.6.4.

First published (updated )
Severity
8.6
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

In @neo4j/graphql versions from 7.0.0 up to but not including 7.6.4, the none quantifier in @authorization filters on relationships and connections is not negated when translated to Cypher, so it behaves like some. A rule such as "none of the related denied users matches the JWT subject" therefore returns exactly the records it was meant to exclude, and excludes those it was meant to return. An authenticated user whom such a rule is meant to deny can read the protected records. This is also the case for mutations, so the impact is that sensitive data could also be created and deleted by users that shouldn't have access according to the typedefs. Fixed in 7.6.4.

First published (updated )
Severity
7.6
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

@neo4j/graphql from 5.2.0 until the patched versions fails to enforce field-level @authentication rules on root custom-resolver fields when a type-level @authentication rule is also present on the same operation type. When both a type-level @authentication (on Query/Mutation) and a field-level @authentication (on a root custom-resolver field within that type) are declared, only the type-level rule is evaluated and the field-level rule is silently discarded. As a result a stricter per-field requirement — such as an admin-role JWT claim (jwt: { rolesINCLUDES: "admin" }) — is never checked, and any client that satisfies the coarser type-level requirement can invoke the more-restricted field. No token forgery is involved: a legitimately issued, correctly signed non-admin token (e.g. roles: ["user"]) is sufficient.

First published (updated )

Contact

SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
132 Wickham Terrace
Fortitude Valley,
QLD 4006, Australia
info@secalerts.co
By using SecAlerts services, you agree to our services end-user license agreement. This website is safeguarded by reCAPTCHA and governed by the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. All names, logos, and brands of products are owned by their respective owners, and any usage of these names, logos, and brands for identification purposes only does not imply endorsement. If you possess any content that requires removal, please get in touch with us.
© 2026 SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
ABN: 70 645 966 203, ACN: 645 966 203