Where
AND
-Infinity
0
Severity
9
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

A vulnerability was discovered in vdsm, version 4.19 through 4.30.3 and 4.30.5 through 4.30.8. The systemdrun function exposed to the vdsm system user could be abused to execute arbitrary commands as root.

1 / 2
Source: MITRE
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

A flaw was found in RPC request using gfs3symlinkreq in glusterfs server which allows symlink destinations to point to file paths outside of the gluster volume. An authenticated attacker could use this flaw to create arbitrary symlinks pointing anywhere on the server and execute arbitrary code on glusterfs server nodes.

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Remedy

To limit exposure of gluster server nodes : 1. gluster server should be on LAN and not reachable from public networks. 2. Use gluster auth.allow and auth.reject. 3. Use TLS certificates to authenticate gluster clients. caveat: This does not protect from attacks by authenticated gluster clients.
First published (updated )
Severity
8.5
Input Validation
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

A flaw was found in the way Samba maps domain users to local users. An authenticated attacker could use this flaw to cause possible privilege escalation.

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Remedy

Setting "gensec:require_pac=true" in the smb.conf makes, due to a cache prime in winbind, the DOMAIN\user lookup succeed, provided nss_winbind is in use, 'winbind use default domain = no' (the default) and no error paths are hit. It would be prudent to pre-create disabled users in Active Directory matching on all privileged names not held in Active Directory, eg ~~~ samba-tool user add root -H ldap://$SERVER -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD --random-password samba-tool user add ubuntu -H ldap://$SERVER -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD --random-password ~~~ (repeat for eg all system users under 1000 in /etc/passwd or special to any other AD-connected services, eg perhaps "admin" for a web-app)
First published (updated )
Severity
8.3
AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

A privilege escalation flaw was found in gluster 3.x snapshot scheduler. Any gluster client allowed to mount gluster volumes could also mount shared gluster storage volume and escalate privileges by scheduling malicious cronjob via symlink.

1 / 3

Remedy

To limit exposure of gluster server nodes : 1. gluster server should be on LAN and not reachable from public networks. 2. Use gluster auth.allow and auth.reject. 3. Use TLS certificates between gluster server nodes and clients. Caveat: This would only mitigate attacks from unauthorized malicious clients. gluster clients allowed by auth.allow or having signed TLS client certificates would still be able to trigger this attack.
First published (updated )
Severity
6.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

A flaw was found in the way samba implemented SMB1 authentication. An attacker could use this flaw to retrieve the plaintext password sent over the wire even if Kerberos authentication was required.

1 / 3

Remedy

Ensure the following [global] smb.conf parameters are set to their default values as shown below: ~~~ client lanman auth = no client NTLMv2 auth = yes client plaintext auth = no client min protocol = SMB2_02 ~~~ Or use the '-k' command line option only without the -U option, which will make use of an existing krb5 ccache.
First published (updated )
Severity
5.5
Path Traversal
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

A flaw was found in the way samba implemented an RPC endpoint emulating the Windows registry service API. An unprivileged attacker could use this flaw to create a new registry hive file anywhere they have unix permissions which could lead to creation of a new file in the Samba share. Versions before 4.8.11, 4.9.6 and 4.10.2 are vulnerable.

1 / 2
Source: MITRE
First published (updated )

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