Where
AND
-Infinity
0
Severity
8.8
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

The Samba vfsfruit module uses extended file attributes (EA, xattr) to provide "...enhanced compatibility with Apple SMB clients and interoperability with a Netatalk 3 AFP fileserver." Samba versions prior to 4.13.17, 4.14.12 and 4.15.5 with vfsfruit configured allow out-of-bounds heap read and write via specially crafted extended file attributes. A remote attacker with write access to extended file attributes can execute arbitrary code with the privileges of smbd, typically root.

First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

As per samba upstream advisory:

The Samba AD DC includes checks when adding service principals names (SPNs) to an account to ensure that SPNs do not alias with those already in the database. Some of these checks are able to be bypassed if an account modification re-adds an SPN that was previously present on that account, such as one added when a computer is joined to a domain.

An attacker who has the ability to write to an account can exploit this to perform a denial-of-service attack by adding an SPN that matches an existing service. Additionally, an attacker who can intercept traffic can impersonate existing services, resulting in a loss of confidentiality and integrity.

1 / 2
Source: Red Hat
First published (updated )
Severity
8.1
Input Validation
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

A flaw was found in the way Samba maps domain users to local users. An authenticated attacker could use this flaw to cause possible privilege escalation.

1 / 3
First published (updated )
Severity
7.5
Input Validation
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

A flaw was found in the way samba implemented DCE/RPC. If a client to a Samba server sent a very large DCE/RPC request, and chose to fragment it, an attacker could replace later fragments with their own data, bypassing the signature requirements.

1 / 4
First published (updated )
Severity
7.2
Race Condition
AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

A flaw was found in the way Samba, as an Active Directory Domain Controller, implemented Kerberos name-based authentication. The Samba AD DC, could become confused about the user a ticket represents if it did not strictly require a Kerberos PAC and always use the SIDs found within. The result could include total domain compromise.

1 / 3
Source: Launchpad
First published (updated )
Severity
7.2
AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C

A security feature bypass vulnerability exists in the way Key Distribution Center (KDC) determines if a service ticket can be used for delegation via Kerberos Constrained Delegation (KCD). To exploit the vulnerability, a compromised service that is configured to use KCD could tamper with a service ticket that is not valid for delegation to force the KDC to accept it.

1 / 3
Source: Red Hat
First published (updated )
Severity
6.8
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

A flaw was found in the way samba implemented SMB1 authentication. An attacker could use this flaw to retrieve the plaintext password sent over the wire even if Kerberos authentication was required.

1 / 3
First published (updated )
Severity
6.8
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

A flaw was found in samba. The Samba smbd file server must map Windows group identities (SIDs) into unix group ids (gids). The code that performs this had a flaw that could allow it to read data beyond the end of the array in the case where a negative cache entry had been added to the mapping cache. This could cause the calling code to return those values into the process token that stores the group membership for a user. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity.

1 / 2
Source: MITRE
First published (updated )
Severity
6.5
Null Pointer Dereference
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

A null pointer de-reference was found in the way samba kerberos server handled missing sname in TGS-REQ (Ticket Granting Server - Request). An authenticated user could use this flaw to crash the samba server.

1 / 3
Source: Launchpad
First published (updated )

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