GetImagePath returns imageOverrides[component] verbatim with zero validation — no registry allow-list, no digest requirement, no signature check. The resulting image runs with Privileged: true, Capabilities: ALL, hostNetwork, RW hostPath mounts, on every node (route-agent) including control-plane nodes. A cluster-admin or anyone who can patch the Submariner CR can point any component to a malicious image and achieve privileged code execution across the entire cluster.

Source: Project Glasswing AI-SAST audit of submariner-io/submariner-operator. Finding ID: FIND-006 Assurance: machineverified

Long-lived broker SA bearer token may be placed directly in the Submariner CR .spec field. Per the broker shared-trust findings, possession of any broker token grants full mesh control (CRUD on all endpoints, secrets, and endpointslices in the broker namespace). Same etcd-cleartext / kubectl get / must-gather exposure as the PSK cleartext finding.

Source: Project Glasswing AI-SAST audit of submariner-io/submariner-operator. Finding ID: FIND-004 Assurance: executionproven

A flaw was found in the Submariner operator. The Submariner Custom Resource (CR), used for configuring network connectivity, stores the IPsec pre-shared key (PSK) in an unencrypted format. This key, which is critical for securing communication between Kubernetes clusters, can be accessed by unauthorized parties. Such access enables an attacker to passively decrypt network traffic flowing between any two clusters in the mesh, resulting in sensitive information disclosure.

A flaw was found in the submariner-operator component of Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes. This vulnerability allows a cluster administrator, or any user with permissions to modify the Submariner Custom Resource (CR), to specify an unvalidated image path. This lack of validation enables an attacker to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges across the entire cluster, including control-plane nodes, by deploying a malicious image.