The TranslatePress – Translate Multilingual sites with AI Translation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'comment' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 3.3.7 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. Exploitation requires the target site to allow unmoderated comment submission on at least one post and to have a secondary language configured — both conditions reflect TranslatePress's primary use case.

The TranslatePress – Translate Multilingual sites with AI Translation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Sensitive Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 3.3.1 via the 'trpgettranslationsregular' AJAX action. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to extract the raw administrator password-reset URL — including the plaintext reset key and login parameters stored in the translation dictionary table — enabling full administrator account takeover. This vulnerability is only exploitable when automatic string saving is enabled (the default setting) and the target administrator's profile locale is set to a published secondary language, as these conditions cause the password-reset URL to be persisted as a translatable string in the secondary-language dictionary table.

The TranslatePress – Translate Multilingual sites with AI Translation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthenticated Stored Cross-Site Scripting in versions up to and including 3.2.5. The special gettext markers '#!trpst#' and '#!trpen#' are unconditionally rewritten to '<' and '>' by translatepage() in includes/class-translation-render.php (lines 538-539). Because those markers are plain text with no HTML-special characters, an unauthenticated attacker can embed them in a comment; the markers survive wpkses, and when the post is viewed in a secondary language the substitution turns the attacker's '#!trpst#img ... #!trpen#' into a real <img> tag. removetagsfromoutput() only strips <script>/<style>, so an <img onerror=...> executes in the visitor's browser.