Conda Organization Infrastructure is a centralized location for infrastructure codes. Prior to commit 9c0f238, a GitHub Actions Pwn Request vulnerability appears to remain present in conda/conda. The affected workflow is .github/workflows/update.yml. It is triggered by issuecomment events containing @conda-bot render or @conda-bot recreate. For the render path, the workflow obtains the pull request head repository and branch from the PR API, checks out that PR-controlled repository/ref using secrets.SYNCTOKEN, and then runs conda/actions/template-files@7f6830b1428a9bd47f0b068892c77eae95207037. The external template-files action reads its default configuration and templates from the checked-out working directory. In the confirmed finding, that action uses an unsandboxed Jinja2 environment to render attacker-controlled template content. This creates a Pwn Request chain in which an untrusted PR/comment path can reach template rendering in a privileged token context. This issue has been patched via commit 9c0f238.

Miniconda3 macOS installers before 23.11.0-1 contain a local privilege escalation vulnerability when installed outside the user's home directory. During installation, world-writable files are created and executed with root privileges. This flaw allows a local low-privileged user to inject arbitrary commands, leading to code execution as the root user.

(conda) Constructor is a tool that enables users to create installers for conda package collections. In versions 3.12.2 and below, the installation directory inherits permissions from its parent directory. Outside of restricted directories, the permissions are very permissive and often allow write access by authenticated users. Any logged in user can make modifications during the installation for both single-user and all-user installations. This constitutes a local attack vector if the installation is in a directory local users have access to. For single-user installations in a shared directory, these permissions persist after the installation. This issue is fixed in version 3.13.0.

(conda) Constructor is a tool which allows constructing an installer for a collection of conda packages. Prior to version 3.11.3, shell installer scripts process the installation prefix (userprefix) using an eval statement, which executes unsanitized user input as shell code. Although the script runs with user privileges (not root), an attacker could exploit this by injecting arbitrary commands through a malicious path during installation. Exploitation requires explicit user action. This issue has been patched in version 3.11.3.

Conda-build contains commands and tools to build conda packages. Prior to version 25.3.1, the writebuildscripts function in conda-build creates the temporary build script condabuild.sh with overly permissive file permissions (0o766), allowing write access to all users. Attackers with filesystem access can exploit a race condition to overwrite the script before execution, enabling arbitrary code execution under the victim's privileges. This risk is significant in shared environments, potentially leading to full system compromise. Even with non-static directory names, attackers can monitor parent directories for file creation events. The brief window between script creation (with insecure permissions) and execution allows rapid overwrites. Directory names can also be inferred via timestamps or logs, and automation enables exploitation even with semi-randomized paths by acting within milliseconds of detection. This issue has been patched in version 25.3.1. A workaround involves restricting condabuild.sh permissions from 0o766 to 0o700 (owner-only read/write/execute). Additionally, use atomic file creation (write to a temporary randomized filename and rename atomically) to minimize the race condition window.

Anaconda Anaconda3 (Anaconda Distribution) through 2021.11.0.0 and Miniconda3 through 4.11.0.0 can create a world-writable directory under %PROGRAMDATA% and place that directory into the system PATH environment variable. Thus, for example, local users can gain privileges by placing a Trojan horse file into that directory. (This problem can only happen in a non-default installation. The person who installs the product must specify that it is being installed for all users. Also, the person who installs the product must specify that the system PATH should be changed.