In ScreenConnect™ versions prior to 26.2, input validation within the Host Pass creation functionality could allow an authenticated user with Host Pass creation privileges the ability to specify a token expiration duration beyond the intended maximum when generating delegated access tokens.

ConnectWise ManagedITSync integration through 2017 for Kaseya VSA is vulnerable to unauthenticated remote commands that allow full direct access to the Kaseya VSA database. In February 2019, attackers have actively exploited this in the wild to download and execute ransomware payloads on all endpoints managed by the VSA server. If the ManagedIT.asmx page is available via the Kaseya VSA web interface, anyone with access to the page is able to run arbitrary SQL queries, both read and write, without authentication.

ConnectWise ScreenConnect 23.9.7 and prior are affected by path-traversal vulnerability, which may allow an attacker

the ability to execute remote code or directly impact confidential data or critical systems.

The ConnectWise Automate™ Agent does not fully verify the authenticity of components obtained during plugin loading and self-update operations. This issue is addressed in Automate 2026.5.

A condition in the ScreenConnect server component may allow an actor with access to server-level cryptographic material used for authentication to obtain unauthorized access, including elevated privileges, in certain scenarios. ScreenConnect host and guest client agents are not independently affected by this CVE.

ConnectWise has released a security update for ConnectWise Automate™ that addresses a behavior in the ConnectWise Automate Solution Center where certain client-to-server communications could occur without transport-layer encryption. This could allow network‑based interception of Solution Center traffic in Automate deployments. The issue has been resolved in Automate 2026.4 by enforcing secure communication for affected Solution Center connections.

In ConnectWise PSA versions older than 2025.9, a vulnerability exists where authenticated users could gain access to sensitive user information. Specific API requests were found to return an overly verbose user object, which included encrypted password hashes for other users. Authenticated users could then retrieve these hashes.

An attacker or privileged user could then use these exposed hashes to conduct offline brute-force or dictionary attacks. Such attacks could lead to credential compromise, allowing unauthorized access to accounts, and potentially privilege escalation within the system.

ConnectWise ScreenConnect contains an improper authentication vulnerability. This vulnerability could allow a ViewState code injection attack, which could allow remote code execution if machine keys are compromised.

ConnectWise ScreenConnect 23.9.7 and prior are affected by an Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel

vulnerability, which may allow an attacker direct access to confidential information or

critical systems.

UniFi: 10.0 NVD - CVE-2026-22557 ScreenConnect: 9.0 NVD - CVE-2026-3564

Nobody has said it yet (not that I've heard), but this would be how I assume adversarial AI systems enter the arena. Hopefully these were security researchers using tools to bug hunt & claim bounties, but two major players in the same week - makes me wonder.

As I've been telling friends and clients, the rate of small intrusion to network takeover is accelerating. The window to respond is closing. Historically, a foothold gave enough time to detect, triage, & remediate, at attack team/human operation cycles. Humans vs humans, you've got (some) time.

My hypothesis/assumption here, but that rate is probably thrown out the window. A small breach + rapidly iterating attacks against all internal services will turn up the next weakness in the chain, until full access is accomplished.

These AI systems are like a 50-Cal Rifle, you use them to punch a hole into the network, and the attack pours through that hole.

For defenders, you can't be constantly on guard, can't be constantly ready to "fire back" or deploy time/energy chasing down everything that makes the system throw an alert.

Maybe I'm just a bit burned out, but two days in a row my evenings have gone to shit, as I'm digging through logs and reading up on the next problem to tackle tomorrow - and meanwhile keeping clients advised of what's going on, and still trying to leverage remote support via tools that are BROKEN because of the PATCH - effing ScreenConnect - no notice no comms - not a care in the world to share it with PAYING CUSTOMERS.

In the ConnectWise Automate Agent, communications could be configured to use HTTP instead of HTTPS. In such cases, an on-path threat actor with a man-in-the-middle network position could intercept, modify, or replay agent-server traffic. Additionally, the encryption method used to obfuscate some communications over the HTTP channel is updated in the Automate 2025.9 patch to enforce HTTPS for all agent communications.

The ConnectWise Automate Agent does not fully verify the authenticity of files downloaded from the server, such as updates, dependencies, and integrations. This creates a risk where an on-path attacker could perform a man-in-the-middle attack and substitute malicious files for legitimate ones by impersonating a legitimate server. This risk is mitigated when HTTPS is enforced and is related to CVE-2025-11492.

In versions of ScreenConnect™ prior to 25.8, server-side validation and integrity checks within the extension subsystem could allow the installation and execution of untrusted or arbitrary extensions by authorized or administrative users. Abuse of this behavior could result in the execution of custom code on the server or unauthorized access to application configuration data. This issue affects only the ScreenConnect server component; host and guest clients are not impacted. ScreenConnect 25.8 introduces enhanced server-side configuration handling and integrity checks to ensure only trusted extensions can be installed.

In ConnectWise PSA versions older than 2026.1, Time Entry notes stored in the Time Entry Audit Trail may be rendered without applying output encoding to certain content. Under specific conditions, this may allow stored script code to execute in the context of a user’s browser when the affected content is displayed.

In ConnectWise PSA versions older than 2026.1, certain session cookies were not set with the HttpOnly attribute. In some scenarios, this could allow client-side scripts access to session cookie values.

In deployments using the ScreenConnect™ Certificate Signing Extension, encrypted configuration values including an Azure Key Vault-related key, could be returned to unauthenticated users through a client-facing endpoint under certain conditions. The values remained encrypted and securely stored at rest; however, an encrypted representation could be exposed in client responses. Updating the Certificate Signing Extension to version 1.0.12 or higher ensures configuration handling occurs exclusively on the server side, preventing encrypted values from being transmitted to or rendered by client-side components.

ConnectWise-Password-Encryption-Utility.exe in ConnectWise Risk Assessment allows an attacker to extract a hardcoded AES decryption key via reverse engineering. This key is embedded in plaintext within the binary and used in cryptographic operations without dynamic key management. Once obtained the key can be used to decrypt CSV input files used for authenticated network scanning.

ConnectWise Control before 22.9.10032 (formerly known as ScreenConnect) fails to validate user-supplied parameters such as the Bin/ConnectWiseControl.Client.exe h parameter. This results in reflected data and injection of malicious code into a downloaded executable. The executable can be used to execute malicious queries or as a denial-of-service vector. NOTE: this CVE Record is only about the parameters, such as the h parameter (this CVE Record is not about the separate issue of signed executable files that are supposed to have unique configurations across customers' installations).

DISPUTED In ConnectWise Control through 22.9.10032 (formerly known as ScreenConnect), after an executable file is signed, additional instructions can be added without invalidating the signature, such as instructions that result in offering the end user a (different) attacker-controlled executable file. It is plausible that the end user may allow the download and execution of this file to proceed. There are ConnectWise Control configuration options that add mitigations. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2023-25719. NOTE: the vendor's position is that this purported vulnerability represents a "fundamental lack of understanding of Authenticode code signing behavior."

ConnectWise ScreenConnect through 23.8.4 allows local users to connect to arbitrary relay servers via implicit trust of proxy settings

ConnectWise ScreenConnect through 23.8.4 allows man-in-the-middle attackers to achieve remote code execution via crafted messages.

DISPUTED Connectwise Control 22.8.10013.8329 is vulnerable to Cross Origin Resource Sharing (CORS). The vendor's position is that two endpoints have Access-Control-Allow-Origin wildcarding to support product functionality, and that there is no risk from this behavior. The vulnerability report is thus not valid.