Impact

Affected versions of Laminas Diactoros accepted a single line feed (LF / \n ) character at the end of a header name. When serializing such a header name containing a line-feed into the on-the-wire representation of a HTTP/1.x message, the resulting message would be syntactically invalid, due to the header line being terminated too early. An attacker that is able to control the header names that are passed to Laminas Diactoros would be able to intentionally craft invalid messages, possibly causing application errors or invalid HTTP requests being sent out with an PSR-18 HTTP client. The latter might present a denial of service vector if a remote service’s web application firewall bans the application due to the receipt of malformed requests.

Patches

The problem has been patched in the following versions:

- 2.18.1 - 2.19.1 - 2.20.1 - 2.21.1 - 2.22.1 - 2.23.1 - 2.24.2 - 2.25.2

Workarounds

Validate HTTP header keys and/or values, and if using user-supplied values, filter them to strip off leading or trailing newline characters before calling withHeader().

References

- CVE-2023-29197 - GHSA-wxmh-65f7-jcvw

Impact

Applications that use Diactoros, and are either not behind a proxy, or can be accessed via untrusted proxies, can potentially have the host, protocol, and/or port of a Laminas\Diactoros\Uri instance associated with the incoming server request modified to reflect values from X-Forwarded- headers. Such changes can potentially lead to XSS attacks (if a fully-qualified URL is used in links) and/or URL poisoning.

Patches

Any version after 2.11.0.

Starting in laminas/laminas-diactoros 2.11.1, we have added Laminas\Diactoros\ServerRequestFilter\FilterServerRequestInterface, which defines the single method invoke(Psr\Http\Message\ServerRequestInterface $request): Psr\Http\Message\ServerRequestInterface. Filters implementing this interface allow modifying and returning a generated ServerRequest.

The primary use case of the interface is to allow modifying the generated URI based on the presence of headers such as X-Forwarded-Host. When operating behind a reverse proxy, the Host header is often rewritten to the name of the node to which the request is being forwarded, and an X-Forwarded-Host header is generated with the original Host value to allow the server to determine the original host the request was intended for. (We have always examined the X-Forwarded-Proto header; as of Diactoros 2.11.1, we also examine the X-Forwarded-Port header.) To accommodate this use case, we created Laminas\Diactoros\ServerRequestFilter\FilterUsingXForwardedHeaders.

Due to potential security issues, it is generally best to only accept these headers if you trust the reverse proxy that has initiated the request. (This value is found in $SERVER['REMOTEADDR'], which is present as $request->getServerParams()['REMOTEADDR'] within PSR-7 implementations.) FilterUsingXForwardedHeaders provides named constructors to allow you to trust these headers from any source (which has been the default behavior of Diactoros since the beginning), or to specify specific IP addresses or CIDR subnets to trust, along with which headers are trusted.

Laminas\Diactoros\ServerRequestFactory::fromGlobals() was updated to accept a FilterServerRequestInterface as an additional, optional argument. Since the X-Forwarded- headers do have valid use cases, particularly in clustered environments using a load balancer, to prevent backwards compatibility breaks, if no filter is provided, we generate an instance via FilterUsingXForwardedHeaders::trustReservedSubnets(), which generates an instance marked to trust only proxies on private subnets.

Workarounds

Infrastructure or DevOps can configure web servers to reject X-Forwarded- headers at the web server level.

Users of laminas/laminas-diactoros can make use of the Laminas\Diactoros\RequestFilter\RequestFilterInterface functionality in order to either (a) disable usage of the X-Forwarded- headers entirely, (b) opt-in to it, or (c) opt-in to the usage for configured proxy servers.

References

- HTTP Host Header Attacks

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

- Open an issue in laminas/laminas-diactoros - Email us

laminas-form is a package for validating and displaying simple and complex forms. When rendering validation error messages via the formElementErrors() view helper shipped with laminas-form, many messages will contain the submitted value. However, in laminas-form prior to version 3.1.1, the value was not being escaped for HTML contexts, which could potentially lead to a reflected cross-site scripting attack. Versions 3.1.1 and above contain a patch to mitigate the vulnerability. A workaround is available. One may manually place code at the top of a view script where one calls the formElementErrors() view helper. More information about this workaround is available on the GitHub Security Advisory.

DISPUTED Laminas Project laminas-http before 2.14.2, and Zend Framework 3.0.0, has a deserialization vulnerability that can lead to remote code execution if the content is controllable, related to the destruct method of the Zend\Http\Response\Stream class in Stream.php. NOTE: Zend Framework is no longer supported by the maintainer. NOTE: the laminas-http vendor considers this a "vulnerability in the PHP language itself" but has added certain type checking as a way to prevent exploitation in (unrecommended) use cases where attacker-supplied data can be deserialized.