This vulnerability only affects Grafana stacks configured with multiple organizations; single-organization deployments are not impacted. In a multi-organization stack, a user who is an Org Admin of a single organization can call GET /api/access-control/users/permissions/search?actionPrefix=dashboards: and receive permission data belonging to other organizations. The disclosed data is limited to dashboard and folder identifiers (UIDs) and per-user permission/scope mappings (which user holds which access on which dashboard). Dashboard contents, panels, query results, datasource credentials, secrets, and personal data are not exposed. This is a limited cross-organization information disclosure affecting multi-org deployments only.

Tempo queries with large limits can cause large memory allocations which can impact the availability of the service, depending on its deployment strategy.

Mitigation can be done by setting maxresultlimit in the search config, e.g. to 262144 (2^18).

An authenticated user with permission to query a SQL data source can bypass the fix for CVE-2026-33375 by injecting the timeGroup macro through a WHERE clause, which Grafana's regex-based macro parsing does not reject. Evaluating the injected macro causes uncontrolled memory consumption that can terminate the Grafana server process, resulting in a denial of service. The Microsoft SQL Server, PostgreSQL, and MySQL data sources are affected.

Only self-managed Grafana instances with Auth Proxy authentication and identity caching enabled (syncttl greater than zero) are affected. The Auth Proxy cache key concatenated the username and forwarded identity attributes without a delimiter, so distinct identities could collide on one key. An authenticated user who shapes their own attributes to collide with a higher-privileged user's, while that user's cache entry is live, is authenticated as that user, up to Administrator (authentication bypass by spoofing).

A user with organization administrator permissions can delete dashboard snapshots belonging to other organizations on the same Grafana instance, and can recover a snapshot's secret delete key using only its public share key (broken access control).

Grafana Alloy’s prometheus.operator.servicemonitors component allows a user who can create or modify ServiceMonitor resources in a watched namespace to specify an arbitrary local file through bearerTokenFile. Alloy reads the file and sends its contents as a bearer token to an attacker-controlled scrape endpoint. This may disclose files accessible to the Alloy process, including its projected Kubernetes service account token, potentially granting the attacker Alloy’s Kubernetes permissions. Exploitation requires ServiceMonitor write access and lower privileges than Alloy’s service account.

Pyroscope is an open-source continuous profiling database. The database supports various storage backends, including Tencent Cloud Object Storage (COS).

If the database is configured to use Tencent COS as the storage backend, an attacker could extract the secretkey configuration value from the Pyroscope API.

To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker needs direct access to the Pyroscope API. We highly recommend limiting the public internet exposure of all our databases, such that they are only accessible by trusted users or internal systems.

This vulnerability is fixed in versions:

1.15.x: 1.15.2 and above. 1.16.x: 1.16.1 and above. 1.17.x: 1.17.0 and above (i.e. all versions).

Thanks to Théo Cusnir for reporting this vulnerability to us via our bug bounty program.

SCIM provisioning was introduced in Grafana Enterprise and Grafana Cloud in April to improve how organizations manage users and teams in Grafana by introducing automated user lifecycle management.

In Grafana versions 12.x where SCIM provisioning is enabled and configured, a vulnerability in user identity handling allows a malicious or compromised SCIM client to provision a user with a numeric externalId, which in turn could allow to override internal user IDs and lead to impersonation or privilege escalation.

This vulnerability applies only if all of the following conditions are met: - enableSCIM feature flag set to true - usersyncenabled config option in the [auth.scim] block set to true

Stack traces in Grafana's Explore Traces view can be rendered as raw HTML, and thus inject malicious JavaScript in the browser. This would require malicious JavaScript to be entered into the stack trace field.

Only datasources with the Jaeger HTTP API appear to be affected; Jaeger gRPC and Tempo do not appear affected whatsoever.

When using an IPv6 allow-list for the Auth Proxy feature, it defaults to /32 addresses. Addresses specifying a mask explicitly are not affected; to mitigate easily, add the desired mask (usually /128) to the addresses. Only auth proxy is affected; Okta, SAML, LDAP, etc are unaffected here.

The OpenFeature feature toggle evaluation endpoint reads unbounded values into memory, which can cause out-of-memory crashes.

When using public dashboards and direct data-sources, all direct data-sources' passwords are exposed despite not being used in dashboards.

No passwords of proxied data-sources are exposed. We encourage all direct data-sources to be converted to proxied data-sources as far as possible to improve your deployments' security.

Using the $timeGroup macro, one can achieve an OOM by overloading the server. This requires a SQL datasource. If the server is set up to auto-restart, the impact is minimal or non-existent, as the attack can take upwards of half an hour to crash the server.

Every uncached /avatar/:hash request spawns a goroutine that refreshes the Gravatar image. If the refresh sits in the 10-slot worker queue longer than three seconds, the handler times out and stops listening for the result, so that goroutine blocks forever trying to send on an unbuffered channel. Sustained traffic with random hashes keeps tripping this timeout, so goroutine count grows linearly, eventually exhausting memory and causing Grafana to crash on some systems.

When a user's access to mint tokens for a service account is revoked, it is sometimes still possible to do so for a few seconds after the event. The user will eventually lose access to do this.

The Grafana Live push endpoint can be exploited to cause unbounded memory allocation by sending a large or streaming request body, potentially leading to out-of-memory conditions. An authenticated user with access to the Grafana Live API can trigger this issue.

A user with Editor permissions can craft a dashboard whose table (TableNG) panel contains a malicious field name that executes as a script in the browser of any user who views the dashboard (stored cross-site scripting).

A cross-tenant isolation vulnerability was found in Grafana’s Correlations feature affecting legacy correlation records. Due to a backward compatibility condition allowing orgid = 0 records to be returned across organizations, a user with datasource management privileges could read and permanently delete legacy correlation data belonging to another organization. This issue affects correlations created prior to Grafana 10.2 and is fixed in >=11.6.11, >=12.0.9, >=12.1.6, and >=12.2.4.

Thanks to Gyu-hyeok Lee (g2h) for reporting this vulnerability.

Public dashboards with annotations enabled did not limit their annotation timerange to the locked timerange of the public dashboard. This means one could read the entire history of annotations visible on the specific dashboard, even those outside the locked timerange.

This did not leak any annotations that would not otherwise be visible on the public dashboard.

A user with Viewer permissions can use specially crafted requests to the Tempo and Loki data source plugins to reach unintended backend endpoints. Depending on the backend configuration this can expose data source credentials, leak internal responses, or trigger administrative actions on the configured backend.

The Grafana MSSQL data source plugin contains a logic flaw that allows a low-privileged user (Viewer) to bypass API restrictions and trigger a catastrophic Out-Of-Memory (OOM) memory exhaustion, crashing the host container.

Any Editor could delete any snapshot, even if they have no access to read or write them.

Editors could delete any annotation, even those they do not have read access to. The editor user cannot create or read the annotations.

The public dashboard deletion endpoint does not enforce organization isolation, allowing an Org Admin in one organization to delete public dashboards belonging to a different organization by supplying the target dashboard's identifiers.

An unauthenticated attacker can repeatedly call Grafana's OAuth login route with unique values, causing unbounded memory growth that can eventually exhaust memory and crash the Grafana instance (denial of service).

The public dashboard query endpoint does not limit request body size before processing, allowing unauthenticated attackers to trigger excessive memory allocation by sending arbitrarily large JSON payloads. This can lead to denial of service through memory exhaustion. No valid dashboard access token or authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.

Loki queries with large limits can cause large memory allocations which can impact the availability of the service, depending on its deployment strategy.

A vulnerability in Grafana Tempo exposes the S3 SSE-C encryption key in plaintext through the /status/config endpoint, potentially allowing unauthorized users to obtain the key used to encrypt trace data stored in S3.

Thanks to williamgoodfellow for reporting this vulnerability.

A TraceQL query in Grafana Tempo with a large exemplars hint value can cause the Tempo instance to allocate an excessive amount of memory, resulting in an out-of-memory crash. This could allow an authenticated user to trigger a denial of service against the Tempo service.

The dashboard permissions API does not verify the target dashboard scope and only checks the dashboards.permissions: action. As a result, a user who has permission management rights on one dashboard can read and modify permissions on other dashboards. This is an organization‑internal privilege escalation.