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Obot from 0.14.0 before 0.27.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows Power Users to bypass outbound protections by supplying unspecified addresses, IPv6 transition addresses, or registry icon URLs. Attackers can add remote MCP servers pointing to 0.0.0.0, ::, or NAT64/6to4/Teredo addresses embedding blocked IPv4 addresses to probe internal services for reachability.
Obot from 0.14.0 before 0.27.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows Power Users to bypass outbound protections by supplying unspecified addresses, IPv6 transition addresses, or registry icon URLs. Attackers can add remote MCP servers pointing to 0.0.0.0, ::, or NAT64/6to4/Teredo addresses embedding blocked IPv4 addresses to probe internal services for reachability.
Obot before 0.27.0 contains an open redirect vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass same-site validation of the rd parameter by inserting a tab character. Attackers can craft sign-in or sign-out links on the Obot domain that browsers resolve to external hosts, redirecting victims to phishing pages.
Obot from 0.9.0 before 0.27.0 contains a command injection vulnerability that allows authenticated users to execute shell commands by embedding an EOF line in file-type MCP server configuration values. Attackers can terminate the heredoc in the generated init container script to run commands, modify the MCP server files volume, and reach services on Obot's Docker network.
Obot from 0.8.0 before 0.27.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows Power User accounts to reach internal hosts by advertising a malicious OAuth token endpoint in remote MCP server metadata. Attackers can direct token exchange or refresh requests, including redirected GET requests, to cloud metadata services or private-network hosts and read error response bodies.
Obot from 0.26.0 before 0.27.0 fails to validate the resource identifier in remote MCP server protected resource metadata, allowing malicious MCP servers to steal access tokens. Attackers can name a different service and authorization server with chosen scopes, causing Obot to obtain the victim's token for that service and forward it to the attacker.
Obot before 0.27.0 contains an open redirect vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass same-site validation of the rd parameter by inserting a tab character. Attackers can craft sign-in or sign-out links on the Obot domain that browsers resolve to external hosts, redirecting victims to phishing pages.
Obot from 0.9.0 before 0.27.0 contains a command injection vulnerability that allows authenticated users to execute shell commands by embedding an EOF line in file-type MCP server configuration values. Attackers can terminate the heredoc in the generated init container script to run commands, modify the MCP server files volume, and reach services on Obot's Docker network.
Obot from 0.8.0 before 0.27.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows Power User accounts to reach internal hosts by advertising a malicious OAuth token endpoint in remote MCP server metadata. Attackers can direct token exchange or refresh requests, including redirected GET requests, to cloud metadata services or private-network hosts and read error response bodies.
Obot from 0.26.0 before 0.27.0 fails to validate the resource identifier in remote MCP server protected resource metadata, allowing malicious MCP servers to steal access tokens. Attackers can name a different service and authorization server with chosen scopes, causing Obot to obtain the victim's token for that service and forward it to the attacker.
Obot before 0.26.0 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the CLI login flow that allows unauthenticated attackers to steal API keys by choosing token request IDs. Attackers can create a token request via POST /api/token-request, send the login link to a signed-in user, and fetch the resulting non-expiring API key to take over the victim's account.
Obot 0.26.0 before 0.26.2 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability that allows authenticated users matching any vMCP profile to reach prompts and resources of ungranted components. Because profiles were enforced only on tools, attackers can access prompts, resources, and resource templates through the vMCP owner's shared component connection.
Obot 0.25.0 before 0.25.6 and 0.26.0 before 0.26.1 contains a race condition in auth provider group refreshes that can restore group memberships just revoked in the identity provider. When overlapping refreshes for the same user commit out of order, stale memberships are persisted and the user retains revoked group-based access for about ten minutes.
Obot 0.12.0 before 0.26.2 contains an insufficiently protected credentials vulnerability that allows authenticated users to read static secrets set on MCP catalog entries by admins or power users. Basic users granted an entry by access control rules can request GET /api/all-mcps/entries/{entryid} to obtain plaintext API keys or tokens and abuse them against backend services.
Obot 0.21.1 through 0.24.1 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability that allows authenticated users to reach MCP servers because the checkUI deny list omits the /mcp-connect-composite/ route. Basic-role users with a composite MCP ID can proxy requests through mcpGateway.Proxy to invoke tools on MCP servers restricted by Access Control Rules.
obot versions before v0.21.1 fail to enforce Access Control Rules on the /mcp-connect endpoint, allowing any authenticated user to connect to restricted MCP servers if they possess the server ID. Attackers can bypass authorization checks to access and manipulate sensitive backend systems through MCP tool calls using stored OAuth credentials.
Obot is an open-source AI agent/MCP platform. In all versions up to and including commit d7e6970, the Docker quickstart command documented in the README starts the container listening on 0.0.0.0:8080 with authentication disabled by default. When authentication is disabled, every request is mapped to a synthetic "nobody" user that holds the Owner and Admin roles, so any unauthenticated party who can reach the exposed port obtains full administrative access to the Obot API and UI, including the ability to register and launch attacker-controlled MCP servers. Because the quickstart also mounts /var/run/docker.sock into the container, the MCP runtime backend reachable this way has access to the host's Docker control surface. The fix is documentation-only: the quickstart now enables authentication, and operators who followed the previous instructions should set OBOTSERVERENABLEAUTHENTICATION=true before exposing the host to any untrusted network.
Obot before v0.23.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in remote MCP server registration that allows privileged users to specify arbitrary URLs without destination validation. Attackers with Power User or higher roles can coerce Obot to make requests to internal services and cloud metadata endpoints, reading responses in error messages to disclose sensitive credentials.
Obot before v0.23.0 (affected versions <= v0.22.1) running with OBOTSERVERENABLEAUTHENTICATION=true exposes OAuth dynamic client registration without authentication and without any restriction on the redirect URIs a client may register. Because the authorization flow auto-completes for an already logged-in user with no consent screen, an attacker who registers a client pointing at their own domain and induces a logged-in victim to visit a single crafted authorization URL receives an authorization code at the attacker-controlled redirect URI and can exchange it for an access token and refresh token. The token minted by the MCP OAuth flow carries the victim's full group set in the JWT, and Obot validated only the issuer and not the audience, so the token is accepted as a bearer token against any Obot API endpoint the victim can access rather than being scoped to the requested MCP server, allowing the attacker to read or modify the victim's resources until the token is revoked. v0.23.0 adds a consent screen, restricts MCP OAuth tokens to the MCP involved in the request, and enforces audience validation.
Obot versions before v0.23.0 fail to enforce authentication on MCP Registry endpoints under /v0.1/ when registry authentication is enabled. Unauthenticated attackers can read registry metadata including server names, descriptions, repository URLs, and connect URLs by sending GET requests to /v0.1/servers.