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Severity
7.4
Weak RNG
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Poweradmin is a web-based DNS administration tool for PowerDNS server. From 4.0.0 until 4.2.6, 4.3.5, and 4.4.1, lib/Domain/Service/MfaService.php verifies email second-factor codes through MfaService::verifyCode() without limiting failed attempts, and lib/Application/Controller/MfaVerifyController.php logs failures without throttling them. An attacker who knows the user's password can repeatedly guess the six-digit code during its ten-minute validity period when email MFA is enabled, potentially bypassing the second factor; the advisory notes MFA is disabled by default and that the practical request rate was not measured. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.6, 4.3.5, and 4.4.1.

First published (updated )
Severity
9.6
Input Validation
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L

Summary Poweradmin v4.3.2 uses the attacker-controlled HTTPHOST request header as the authoritative source for building callback URLs in its OIDC, SAML, and logout authentication flows without any validation. An unauthenticated attacker can poison the redirecturi sent to the Identity Provider, causing the IdP to redirect the victim's authorization code to an attacker-controlled server - resulting in full account takeover with no credentials required.

Three independent code paths are affected:

- Primary (Critical): OidcService::getCallbackUrl() - redirecturi poisoning - Secondary (High): SamlConfigurationService::getBaseUrl() - SAML ACS/SLO URL poisoning - Tertiary (Medium): LogoutController::getBaseUrl() - post-logout redirect poisoning

Details

Root Cause

The application constructs absolute URLs dynamically from HTTPHOST rather than from a trusted configured base URL. The header is fully client-controlled and is not validated before use in any authentication flow.

Poweradmin's own codebase contains the correct pattern - DocsController::getValidatedHost() (line 244) calls isValidHostname() before using the value - but this was never applied to authentication flows.

### Primary: lib/Application/Service/OidcService.php (~line 460)

php private function getCallbackUrl(): string { $scheme = $this->detectScheme(); // HTTPHOST taken directly with zero validation $host = $this->request->getServerParam('HTTPHOST', 'localhost'); $basePrefix = $this->configManager->get('interface', 'baseurlprefix', ''); return $scheme . '://' . $host . $basePrefix . '/oidc/callback'; }

HTTPHOST is embedded verbatim as redirecturi in the OAuth 2.0 authorization request sent to the IdP. HTTPXFORWARDEDPROTO is similarly used unvalidated for scheme detection.

Secondary: lib/Application/Service/SamlConfigurationService.php (~line 134)

private function getBaseUrl(): string { $configuredBaseUrl = $this->configManager->get('interface', 'baseurl', ''); if (!empty($configuredBaseUrl)) { return rtrim($configuredBaseUrl, '/'); // safe path - rarely configured } // Falls through on every default installation $host = $SERVER['HTTPHOST'] ?? 'localhost'; ... return $scheme . '://' . $host . $prefix; }

Used to construct SAML ACS URL, SLO URL, and entity ID - all poisonable via Host header. The safe fallback only activates when interface.baseurl is explicitly set, which is optional and empty by default.

Tertiary: lib/Application/Controller/LogoutController.php (~line 272)

Same $SERVER['HTTPHOST'] pattern used for post-logout redirect URL construction.

PoC Environment: Poweradmin v4.3.2, Docker, PHP 8.2, OIDC enabled, interface.baseurl empty (default).

docker exec poweradmin-container php -r " require '/app/vendor/autoload.php'; putenv('PACONFIGPATH=/app/config/settings.php');

use PowerAdmin\Application\Service\OidcService; use PowerAdmin\Infrastructure\Configuration\ConfigurationManager; use PowerAdmin\Infrastructure\Web\Request;

\$SERVER['HTTPHOST'] = 'attacker.com'; \$SERVER['HTTPS'] = '';

\$config = ConfigurationManager::getInstance(); \$request = new Request(); \$oidcService = new OidcService(\$config, \$request); \$authUrl = \$oidcService->initiateAuthFlow('test');

parsestr(parseurl(\$authUrl, PHPURLQUERY), \$p); echo 'redirecturi: ' . urldecode(\$p['redirecturi']) . PHPEOL;

if (strcontains(\$p['redirecturi'], 'attacker.com')) { echo '[CONFIRMED] Host header injection successful' . PHPEOL; } "

Output:

redirecturi: http://attacker.com/oidc/callback

[CONFIRMED] Host header injection successful - redirecturi contains attacker.com

The redirecturi in the authorization request sent to the Identity Provider is http://attacker.com/oidc/callback. The victim's authorization code will be delivered to this URL upon successful authentication.

Note on PKCE: PKCE does not mitigate this attack. The attacker initiates the flow themselves and controls both codechallenge and codeverifier.

Impact Direct Impact

An attacker who can send a request with a spoofed Host header - directly or via a misconfigured reverse proxy (proxysetheader Host $httphost is the nginx default) - can steal any user's authorization code and gain full authenticated access to Poweradmin. No credentials, malware, or prior access required.

DNS Infrastructure Impact

Poweradmin manages PowerDNS. A compromised administrator account grants full DNS zone control, enabling:

- MX hijacking - redirect all inbound email to attacker's mail server; intercept password reset emails and 2FA codes for any third-party service registered with the domain - SPF/DKIM manipulation - add attacker's IP to SPF, publish attacker's DKIM key → send cryptographically authenticated email as the organization (passes DMARC) - Subdomain takeover - point mail., vpn., app. to attacker infrastructure - SSL certificate theft - remove CAA records and complete ACME DNS-01 challenge to obtain wildcard certificate .company.com from any CA - Full domain delegation - delegate subdomains to attacker nameserver

CVSS v3.1

┌──────────────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┬──────────────┐ │ Scenario │ Vector │ Score │ ├──────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────┤ │ Standard deployment │ AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L │ 8.2 High │ ├──────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────┤ │ Proxy misconfigured ($httphost) │ AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L │ 9.3 Critical │ └──────────────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────────────────┴──────────────┘

Recommended Fix

Immediate mitigation: Set interface.baseurl in config/settings.php - activates the safe branch in SamlConfigurationService immediately.

Code fix for OidcService: Prefer the configured base URL; if absent, validate HTTPHOST via filtervar($hostname, FILTERVALIDATEDOMAIN, FILTERFLAGHOSTNAME) before use - the same pattern already implemented in DocsController::getValidatedHost().

1 / 3
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
5.4
XSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

A cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Power Admin PA Server Monitor 8.2.1.1 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via Console.exe.

First published (updated )

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