Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
10
EPSS
0.04%
Code Injection
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact By creating a document with a specially crafted title, it is possible to trigger remote code execution in the (Solr-based) search in XWiki. This allows any user who can edit the title of a space (all users by default) to execute any Groovy code in the XWiki installation which compromises the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation.

To reproduce, as a user without script nor programming rights, create a document with title {{/html}}{{async}}{{groovy}}println("Hello from Groovy Title!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}} and content Test Document. Using the search UI, search for "Test Document", then deploy the Location facet on the right of the screen, next to the search results. The installation is vulnerable if you see an item such as: Hello from Groovy Title! </a> <div class="itemCount">1</div> </li> </ul> {{/html}}

Patches This has been patched in XWiki 14.10.20, 15.5.4 and 15.10 RC1.

Workarounds Modify the Main.SolrSpaceFacet page following this patch.

References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21471 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/acba74c149a041345b24dcca52c586f872ba97fb https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/74e301c481e69eeea674dac7fed6af3614cf08c5

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
10
EPSS
0.04%
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact

In multilingual wikis, translations can be edited by any user who has edit right, circumventing the rights that are normally required for authoring translations (script right for user-scope translations, wiki admin for translations on the wiki). This can be exploited for remote code execution if the translation value is not properly escaped where it is used. To reproduce, in a multilingual wiki, as a user without script or admin right, edit a translation of AppWithinMinutes.Translations and in the line platform.appwithinminutes.description= add {{async}}{{groovy}}println("Hello from Translation"){{/groovy}}{{/async}} at the end. Then open the app with in minutes home page (AppWithinMinutes.WebHome) in the same locale. If translations are still working and "Hello from Translation" is displayed at the end of the introduction, the installation is vulnerable.

Patches This has been patched in XWiki 14.10.20, 15.5.4 and 15.10RC1.

Workarounds We're not aware of any workaround except restricting edit right on documents that contain translations.

References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21411 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/c4c8d61c30de72298d805ccc82df2a307f131c54

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
10
EPSS
0.04%
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact Remote code execution is possible via PDF export templates. To reproduce on an installation, register a new user account with username PDFClass if XWiki.PDFClass does not exist. On XWiki.PDFClass, use the class editor to add a "style" property of type "TextArea" and content type "Plain Text". Then, add an object of class PDFClass and set the "style" attribute to $services.logging.getLogger('PDFClass').error("I got programming: $services.security.authorization.hasAccess('programming')"). Finally, go to <host>/xwiki/bin/export/Main/WebHome?format=pdf&pdftemplate=XWiki.PDFClass. If the logs contain "ERROR PDFClass - I got programming: true", the instance is vulnerable.

Patches This vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 14.10.20, 15.5.4 and 15.10-rc-1.

Workarounds If PDF templates are not typically used on the instance, an administrator can create the document XWiki.PDFClass and block its edition, after making sure that it does not contain a style attribute. Otherwise, the instance needs to be updated.

References - https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21337 - https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/d28e21a670c69880b951e415dd2ddd69d273eae9

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
10
EPSS
0.04%
Code Injection
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact The HTML escaping of escaping tool that is used in XWiki doesn't escape {, which, when used in certain places, allows XWiki syntax injection and thereby remote code execution.

To reproduce in an XWiki installation, open <xwiki-host>/xwiki/bin/view/Panels/PanelLayoutUpdate?place=%7B%7B%2Fhtml%7D%7D%7B%7Basync%20async%3Dfalse%7D%7D%7B%7Bvelocity%7D%7D%23evaluate(%24request.eval)%7B%7B%2Fvelocity%7D%7D%7B%7B%2Fasync%7D%7D&eval=Hello%20from%20URL%20Parameter!%20I%20got%20programming%3A%20%24services.security.authorization.hasAccess(%27programming%27) where <xwiki-host> is the URL of your XWiki installation. If this displays You are not admin on this place Hello from URL Parameter! I got programming: true, the installation is vulnerable.

Patches The vulnerability has been fixed on XWiki 14.10.19, 15.5.5, and 15.9 RC1.

Workarounds Apart from upgrading, there is no generic workaround. However, replacing $escapetool.html by $escapetool.xml in XWiki documents fixes the vulnerability. In a standard XWiki installation, we're only aware of the document Panels.PanelLayoutUpdate that exposes this vulnerability, patching this document is thus a workaround. Any extension could expose this vulnerability and might thus require patching, too.

References - https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-commons/commit/b94142e2a66ec32e89eacab67c3da8d91f5ef93a - https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XCOMMONS-2828 - https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21438

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
10
EPSS
0.04%
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact Any user who can edit any page like their profile can create a custom skin with a template override that is executed with programming right, thus allowing remote code execution.

To reproduce, as a user without edit, script or admin right, add an object of class XWiki.XWikiSkins to your profile. Name it whatever you want and set the Base Skin to flamingo. Add an object of class XWikiSkinFileOverrideClass and set the path to macros.vm and the content to: #macro(mediumUserAvatar $username) #resizedUserAvatar($username 50) $services.logging.getLogger('Skin').error("I got programming: $services.security.authorization.hasAccess('programming')") #end Back to your profile, click Test this skin. Force a refresh, just in case. If the error "Skin - I got programming: true" gets logged, the installation is vulnerable.

Patches This has been patched in XWiki 14.10.19, 15.5.4 and 15.10RC1.

Workarounds We're not aware of any workaround except upgrading.

References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21478 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/3d4dbb41f52d1a6e39835cfb1695ca6668605a39 (>= 15.8 RC1) https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/da177c3c972e797d92c1a31e278f946012c41b56 (< 15.8 RC1)

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
10
EPSS
0.04%
Code Injection
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact Any user with edit right on any page can execute any code on the server by adding an object of type XWiki.SearchSuggestSourceClass to their user profile or any other page. This compromises the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation.

To reproduce on an instance, as a user without script nor programming rights, add an object of type XWiki.SearchSuggestSourceClass to your profile page. On this object, set every possible property to }}}{{async}}{{groovy}}println("Hello from Groovy!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}} (i.e., name, engine, service, query, limit and icon). Save and display the page, then append ?sheet=XWiki.SearchSuggestSourceSheet to the URL. If any property displays as Hello from Groovy!}}}, then the instance is vulnerable.

Patches This vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 14.10.20, 15.5.4 and 15.10 RC1.

Workarounds This patch can be manually applied to the document XWiki.SearchSuggestSourceSheet.

References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21474 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/6a7f19f6424036fce3d703413137adde950ae809

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
10
EPSS
0.04%
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact Parameters of UI extensions are always interpreted as Velocity code and executed with programming rights. Any user with edit right on any document like the user's own profile can create UI extensions. This allows remote code execution and thereby impacts the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation.

To reproduce, edit your user profile with the object editor and add a UIExtension object with the following values: Extension Point ID: org.xwiki.platform.panels.Applications Extension ID: platform.panels.myFakeApplication Extension parameters:  label=I got programming right: $services.security.authorization.hasAccess('programming') target=Main.WebHome targetQueryString= icon=icon:bomb Extension Scope: "Current User".

Save the document and open any document. If an application entry with the text "I got programming right: true" is displayed, the attack succeeded, if the code in "label" is displayed literally, the XWiki installation isn't vulnerable.

Patches This vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 14.10.19, 15.5.4 and 15.9-RC1.

Workarounds We're not aware of any workarounds apart from upgrading.

References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21335 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/171e7c7d0e56deaa7b3678657ae26ef95379b1ea

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
10
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact

The content of a document included using {{include reference="targetdocument"/}} is executed with the right of the includer and not with the right of its author.

This means that any user able to modify the target document can impersonate the author of the content which used the include macro.

Patches

This has been patched in XWiki 15.0 RC1 by making the default behavior safe.

Workarounds

Make sure to protect any included document to make sure only allowed users can modify it.

A workaround have been provided in 14.10.2 to allow forcing to execute the included content with the target content author instead of the default behavior. See https://extensions.xwiki.org/xwiki/bin/view/Extension/Include%20Macro#HAuthor for more details.

References

https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-5027 https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20471

For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
10
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Pro Macros provides XWiki rendering macros. Missing escaping in the Viewpdf macro allows any user with view right on the CKEditor.HTMLConverter page or edit or comment right on any page to perform remote code execution. Other macros like Viewppt are vulnerable to the same kind of attack. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.10.1.

First published (updated )
Severity
10
Code Injection
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact On instances where Extension Repository Application is installed, any user can execute any code requiring programming rights on the server. In order to reproduce on an instance, as a normal user without script nor programming rights, go to your profile and add an object of type ExtensionCode.ExtensionClass. Set the description to {{async}}{{groovy}}println("Hello from Description"){{/groovy}}{{/async}} and press Save and View. If the description displays as Hello from Description without any error, then the instance is vulnerable.

Patches This vulnerability has been fixed in XWiki 15.10.9 and 16.3.0.

Workarounds Since Extension Repository Application is not mandatory, it can be safely disabled on instances that do not use it. It is also possible to manually apply this patch to the page ExtensionCode.ExtensionSheet, as well as this patch to the page ExtensionCode.ExtensionAuthorsDisplayer.

References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21890 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/8659f17d500522bf33595e402391592a35a162e8

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
10
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

XWiki Platform is a generic wiki platform. Starting in version 13.10, it's possible to use the right of an existing document content author to execute a text area property. This has been patched in XWiki 14.10, 14.4.7, and 13.10.11. There are no known workarounds.

First published (updated )
Severity
10
Code Injection
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

XWiki Platform is a generic wiki platform. Starting in versions 6.3-rc-1 and 6.2.4, it's possible to inject arbitrary wiki syntax including Groovy, Python and Velocity script macros via the newThemeName request parameter (URL parameter), in combination with additional parameters. This has been patched in the supported versions 13.10.10, 14.9-rc-1, and 14.4.6. As a workaround, it is possible to edit FlamingoThemesCode.WebHomeSheet and manually perform the changes from the patch fixing the issue.

First published (updated )
Severity
10
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

XWiki Platform is a generic wiki platform. Starting in version 11.6-rc-1, comments are supposed to be executed with the right of superadmin but in restricted mode (anything dangerous is disabled), but the async macro does not take into account the restricted mode. This means that any user with comment right can use the async macro to make it execute any wiki content with the right of superadmin. This has been patched in XWiki 14.9, 14.4.6, and 13.10.10. The only known workaround consists of applying a patch and rebuilding and redeploying org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-rendering-async-macro.

First published (updated )
Severity
10
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

XWiki Platform is a generic wiki platform. Starting in version 2.3-milestone-1, the annotation displayer does not execute the content in a restricted context. This allows executing anything with the right of the author of any document by annotating the document. This has been patched in XWiki 13.10.11, 14.4.7 and 14.10. There is no easy workaround except to upgrade.

First published (updated )
Severity
10
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

XWiki Commons are technical libraries common to several other top level XWiki projects. Starting in version 3.1-milestone-1, any user can edit their own profile and inject code, which is going to be executed with programming right. The same vulnerability can also be exploited in all other places where short text properties are displayed, e.g., in apps created using Apps Within Minutes that use a short text field. The problem has been patched on versions 13.10.9, 14.4.4, 14.7RC1.

First published (updated )
Severity
10
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

XWiki Platform is a generic wiki platform offering runtime services for applications built on top of it. In affected versions any user with view rights can execute arbitrary Groovy, Python or Velocity code in XWiki leading to full access to the XWiki installation. The root cause is improper escaping of UIX parameters. A proof of concept exploit is to log in, add an XWiki.UIExtensionClass xobject to the user profile page, with an Extension Parameters content containing label={{/html}} {{async async="true" cached="false" context="doc.reference"}}{{groovy}}println("Hello " + "from groovy!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}}. Then, navigating to PanelsCode.ApplicationsPanelConfigurationSheet (i.e., <xwiki-host>/xwiki/bin/view/PanelsCode/ApplicationsPanelConfigurationSheet where <xwiki-host> is the URL of your XWiki installation) should not execute the Groovy script. If it does, you will see Hello from groovy! displayed on the screen. This vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 13.10.11, 14.4.7 and 14.10-rc-1. Users are advised to upgrade. For users unable to upgrade the issue can be fixed by editing the PanelsCode.ApplicationsPanelConfigurationSheet wiki page and making the same modifications as shown in commit 6de5442f3c.

1 / 2
Source: MITRE
First published (updated )
Severity
10
Code Injection
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

XWiki Commons are technical libraries common to several other top level XWiki projects. Any user with edit rights can execute arbitrary Groovy, Python or Velocity code in XWiki leading to full access to the XWiki installation. The root cause is improper escaping of the included pages in the included documents edit panel. The problem has been patched on XWiki 14.4.7, and 14.10.

First published (updated )
Severity
10
Code Injection
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

XWiki Commons are technical libraries common to several other top level XWiki projects. Any user with edit rights can execute arbitrary Groovy, Python or Velocity code in XWiki leading to full access to the XWiki installation. The root cause is improper escaping of the included pages in the IncludedDocuments panel. The problem has been patched on XWiki 14.4.7, and 14.10.

First published (updated )
Severity
10
Code Injection
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

XWiki Commons are technical libraries common to several other top level XWiki projects. Any user with view rights WikiManager.DeleteWiki can execute arbitrary Groovy, Python or Velocity code in XWiki leading to full access to the XWiki installation. The root cause is improper escaping of the wikiId url parameter. The problem has been patched on XWiki 13.10.11, 14.4.7, and 14.10.

First published (updated )
Severity
10
XSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

XWiki Commons are technical libraries common to several other top level XWiki projects. The HTML macro does not systematically perform a proper neutralization of script-related html tags. As a result, any user able to use the html macro in XWiki, is able to introduce an XSS attack. This can be particularly dangerous since in a standard wiki, any user is able to use the html macro directly in their own user profile page. The problem has been patched in XWiki 14.8RC1. The patch involves the HTML macros and are systematically cleaned up whenever the user does not have the script correct.

First published (updated )
Severity
10
Code Injection
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

XWiki Commons are technical libraries common to several other top level XWiki projects. Any user with view rights on commonly accessible documents including the legacy notification activity macro can execute arbitrary Groovy, Python or Velocity code in XWiki leading to full access to the XWiki installation. The root cause is improper escaping of the macro parameters of the legacy notification activity macro. This macro is installed by default in XWiki. The vulnerability can be exploited via every wiki page that is editable including the user's profile, but also with just view rights using the HTMLConverter that is part of the CKEditor integration which is bundled with XWiki. The vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 13.10.11, 14.4.7 and 14.10.

First published (updated )
Severity
10
Code Injection
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

XWiki Commons are technical libraries common to several other top level XWiki projects. Any user with view rights on commonly accessible documents including the notification preferences macros can execute arbitrary Groovy, Python or Velocity code in XWiki leading to full access to the XWiki installation. The root cause is improper escaping of the user parameter of the macro that provide the notification filters. These macros are used in the user profiles and thus installed by default in XWiki. The vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 13.10.11, 14.4.7 and 14.10.

First published (updated )
Severity
10
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact

It's possible to execute anything with the right of the Scheduler Application sheet page.

To reproduce: 1. As a user without script or programming rights, edit your user profile with the object editor and add a new object of type XWiki.SchedulerJobClass (search for "Scheduler") 1. In "Job Script", add the following {{/code}} {{async async="true" cached="false" context="doc.reference"}}{{groovy}}println("Hello " + "from groovy!"){{/groovy} {{/async}} 1. Click "Save & View" 1. If the job information isn't already displayed (you should see "Job Name", "Job Description", etc.), append ?sheet=XWiki.SchedulerJobSheet to the URL.

Patches

This has been patched in XWiki 14.10.3 and 15.0 RC1.

Workarounds

While the fix in the scheduler itself is easy, it relies on the code macro source parameter, which was introduced in 14.10.2 so you have to upgrade to benefit from it.

References

https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20295 https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20462

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List

1 / 2
First published (updated )
Severity
10
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact

Any user who can edit their own user profile can execute arbitrary script macros including Groovy and Python macros that allow remote code execution including unrestricted read and write access to all wiki contents. The following syntax, to be put, e.g., in the about section of the user profile, demonstrates a proof of concept:

{{html wiki="true"}}~{~{~/~h~t~m~l~}~}~ ~{~{~c~a~c~h~e~}~}~{~{~g~r~o~o~v~y~}~}~p~r~i~n~t~l~n~(~1~)~{~{~/~g~r~o~o~v~y~}~}~{~{~/~c~a~c~h~e~}~}~{{/html}}

While it would be expected that the above code is displayed just without the ~, in fact just "1" is displayed, followed by a lot of raw HTML code. The same vulnerability can also be exploited in other contexts where the display method on a document is used to display a field with wiki syntax, for example in applications created using App Within Minutes.

Patches This has been patched in XWiki 13.10.11, 14.4.8, 14.10.2 and 15.0RC1.

Workarounds There is no workaround apart from upgrading.

References https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20327 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/0d547181389f7941e53291af940966413823f61c

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List

1 / 2
First published (updated )
Severity
10
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact

Any user with edit rights on any document (e.g., the own user profile) can execute code with programming rights, leading to remote code execution by following these steps:

1. Set the title of any document you can edit (can be the user profile) to {{async async="true" cached="false" context="doc.reference"}}{{groovy}}println("Hello " + "from groovy!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}} 2. Use the object editor to add an object of type XWiki.TemplateProviderClass (named "Template Provider Class") to that document. 3. Go to another document you can view (can be the home page) and append ?sheet=XWiki.AdminTemplatesSheet to the URL.

When the attack is successful, a template with name "Hello from groovy!" is displayed in the list while on fixed systems, the full title should be displayed.

Patches

This vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 13.10.11, 14.4.8, 14.10.1 and 15.0 RC1.

Workarounds

The vulnerability can be fixed by patching the code in the affected XWiki document as shown in the patch.

References

https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20268 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/7bf7094f8ffac095f5d66809af7554c9cc44de09

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List

1 / 2
First published (updated )
Severity
10
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact In XWiki, every user can add translations that are only applied to the current user. This also allows overriding existing translations. Such translations are often included in privileged contexts without any escaping which allows remote code execution for any user who has edit access on at least one document which could be the user's own profile where edit access is enabled by default.

The following describes a proof of concept exploit to demonstrate this vulnerability:

1. Edit the user profile with the wiki editor and set the content to error={{/html}} {{async async="true" cached="false" context="doc.reference"}}{{groovy}}println("hello from groovy!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}} 2. Use the object editor to add an object of type XWiki.TranslationDocumentClass with scope USER. 3. Open the document WikiManager.AdminWikiDescriptorSheet.

The expected result would be that a message with title {{/html}} {{async async="true" cached="false" context="doc.reference"}}{{groovy}}println("hello from groovy!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}} is displayed while in fact an error that the HTML macro couldn't be executed is displayed, followed by the text "hello from groovy!" and some raw HTML, showing that the Groovy macro has been executed.

Patches

A mitigation for this vulnerability is part of XWiki 14.10.2 and XWiki 15.0 RC1: translations with user scope now require script right. This means that regular users cannot exploit this anymore as users don't have script right by default anymore starting with XWiki 14.10.

Workarounds

There are no known workarounds apart from upgrading to a patched versions.

References

https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-19749 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/d06ff8a58480abc7f63eb1d4b8b366024d990643

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List

1 / 2
First published (updated )
Severity
10
Code Injection
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact

It's possible to display any page you cannot access through the combination of the async and display macro.

Steps to reproduce:

1. Enable comments for guests by giving guests comment rights 2. As a guest, create a comment with content {{async}}{{display reference="Menu.WebHome" /}}{{/async}} 3. Open the comments viewer from the menu (appends ?viewer=comments to the URL)

-> the Menu.WebHome is displayed while the expectation would be to have an error that the current user is not allowed to see it

Patches

The vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 15.0-rc-1, 14.10.3, 14.4.8, and 13.10.11.

Workarounds

There is no known workaround.

References

https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20394 https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XRENDERING-694

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List

1 / 2
First published (updated )
Severity
10
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact Steps to reproduce:

1. As a user without script or programming right, edit your user profile (or any other document) with the wiki editor and add the content {{groovy}}println("Hello " + "from Groovy!"){{/groovy}} 1. Edit the document with the object editor and add an object of type AppWithinMinutes.LiveTableClass (no values need to be set, just save) 1. View the document

Patches

The vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 15.0-rc-1 and 14.10.3.

Workarounds

There is no known workaround.

References

https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20423

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List

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First published (updated )
Severity
10
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact

It's possible for a user to execute anything with the right of the author of the XWiki.ClassSheet document.

Steps to Reproduce:

1. Edit your user profile with the object editor and add an object of type DocumentSheetBinding with value Default Class Sheet 1. Edit your user profile with the wiki editor and add the syntax {{async}}{{groovy}}println("Hello " + "from groovy!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}} 1. Click "Save & View"

Expected result:

An error is displayed as the user doesn't have the right to execute the Groovy macro.

Actual result:

The text "Hello from groovy!" is displayed at the top of the document.

Patches

This has been patched in XWiki 15.0-rc-1 and 14.10.4.

Workarounds

There are no known workarounds for it.

References

https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20566 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/de72760d4a3e1e9be64a10660a0c19e9534e2ec4

For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org Email us at Security Mailing List

1 / 2
First published (updated )
Severity
10
Code Injection
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact Any user who can edit their own user profile can execute arbitrary script macros including Groovy and Python macros that allow remote code execution including unrestricted read and write access to all wiki contents. This can be reproduced with the following steps:

1. As an advanced user, use the object editor to add an object of type UIExtensionClass to your user profile. Set the value "Extension Point ID" to {{/html}}{{async async=false cache=false}}{{groovy}}println("Hello from Groovy!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}} 2. Open <xwiki-host>/xwiki/bin/edit/XWiki/<username>?sheet=Menu.UIExtensionSheet where <xwiki-host> is the URL of your XWiki installation and <username> is your user name.

If the text Hello from Groovy!" selected="selected"> is displayed in the output, the attack succeeded.

Patches

This has been patched in XWiki 14.10.8 and 15.3 RC1 by adding proper escaping.

Workarounds The patch can be manually applied to the document Menu.UIExtensionSheet, only three lines need to be changed.

References

https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20746 https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/9e8f080094333dec63a8583229a3799208d773be

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First published (updated )

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