In Python 3 through 3.9.0, the Lib/test/multibytecodecsupport.py CJK codec tests call eval() on content retrieved via HTTP.

In Python 3 through 3.9.0, the Lib/test/multibytecodecsupport.py CJK codec tests call eval() on content retrieved via HTTP.

In Python 3 through 3.9.0, the Lib/test/multibytecodecsupport.py CJK codec tests call eval() on content retrieved via HTTP.

In Python 3 through 3.9.0, the Lib/test/multibytecodecsupport.py CJK codec tests call eval() on content retrieved via HTTP.

In Python before 3,9,5, the ipaddress library mishandles leading zero characters in the octets of an IP address string. This (in some situations) allows attackers to bypass access control that is based on IP addresses.

In Python before 3,9,5, the ipaddress library mishandles leading zero characters in the octets of an IP address string. This (in some situations) allows attackers to bypass access control that is based on IP addresses.

In Python before 3,9,5, the ipaddress library mishandles leading zero characters in the octets of an IP address string. This (in some situations) allows attackers to bypass access control that is based on IP addresses.

In Python before 3,9,5, the ipaddress library mishandles leading zero characters in the octets of an IP address string. This (in some situations) allows attackers to bypass access control that is based on IP addresses.

A flaw was found in the Python tarfile module. Extracting a crafted TAR archive with the tarfile.extract or tarfile.extractall functions could lead to a directory traversal vulnerability, resulting in overwrite of arbitrary files.

Distrust compromised intermediate certificates in ssl module

Allows arbitrary filesystem writes outside the extraction directory during extraction with filter="data".

You are affected by this vulnerability if using the tarfile module to extract untrusted tar archives using TarFile.extractall() or TarFile.extract() using the filter= parameter with a value of "data" or "tar". See the tarfile extraction filters documentation https://docs.python.org/3/library/tarfile.html#tarfile-extraction-filter  for more information.

Note that for Python 3.14 or later the default value of filter= changed from "no filtering" to "data", so if you are relying on this new default behavior then your usage is also affected.

Note that none of these vulnerabilities significantly affect the installation of source distributions which are tar archives as source distributions already allow arbitrary code execution during the build process. However when evaluating source distributions it's important to avoid installing source distributions with suspicious links.

Allows arbitrary filesystem writes outside the extraction directory during extraction with filter="data".

You are affected by this vulnerability if using the tarfile module to extract untrusted tar archives using TarFile.extractall() or TarFile.extract() using the filter= parameter with a value of "data" or "tar". See the tarfile extraction filters documentation https://docs.python.org/3/library/tarfile.html#tarfile-extraction-filter  for more information.

Note that for Python 3.14 or later the default value of filter= changed from "no filtering" to "data", so if you are relying on this new default behavior then your usage is also affected.

Note that none of these vulnerabilities significantly affect the installation of source distributions which are tar archives as source distributions already allow arbitrary code execution during the build process. However when evaluating source distributions it's important to avoid installing source distributions with suspicious links.

Allows arbitrary filesystem writes outside the extraction directory during extraction with filter="data".

You are affected by this vulnerability if using the tarfile module to extract untrusted tar archives using TarFile.extractall() or TarFile.extract() using the filter= parameter with a value of "data" or "tar". See the tarfile extraction filters documentation https://docs.python.org/3/library/tarfile.html#tarfile-extraction-filter  for more information.

Note that for Python 3.14 or later the default value of filter= changed from "no filtering" to "data", so if you are relying on this new default behavior then your usage is also affected.

Note that none of these vulnerabilities significantly affect the installation of source distributions which are tar archives as source distributions already allow arbitrary code execution during the build process. However when evaluating source distributions it's important to avoid installing source distributions with suspicious links.

Allows arbitrary filesystem writes outside the extraction directory during extraction with filter="data".

You are affected by this vulnerability if using the tarfile module to extract untrusted tar archives using TarFile.extractall() or TarFile.extract() using the filter= parameter with a value of "data" or "tar". See the tarfile extraction filters documentation https://docs.python.org/3/library/tarfile.html#tarfile-extraction-filter  for more information.

Note that for Python 3.14 or later the default value of filter= changed from "no filtering" to "data", so if you are relying on this new default behavior then your usage is also affected.

Note that none of these vulnerabilities significantly affect the installation of source distributions which are tar archives as source distributions already allow arbitrary code execution during the build process. However when evaluating source distributions it's important to avoid installing source distributions with suspicious links.

A remote, unauthenticated TLS client can make a server crash or call through a freed pointer if its snicallback assigns a different context to SSLSocket.context (the documented way to select a certificate per server name) and nothing else keeps the original ssl.SSLContext alive. Typical cases are servers that create an SSLContext per connection or replace it while connections are open; servers that wrap their listening socket with it are not affected.

Mitigation: keep a reference to every SSLContext that sets snicallback for the lifetime of the server. TLS clients are not affected.

A remote, unauthenticated TLS client can make a server crash or call through a freed pointer if its snicallback assigns a different context to SSLSocket.context (the documented way to select a certificate per server name) and nothing else keeps the original ssl.SSLContext alive. Typical cases are servers that create an SSLContext per connection or replace it while connections are open; servers that wrap their listening socket with it are not affected.

Mitigation: keep a reference to every SSLContext that sets snicallback for the lifetime of the server. TLS clients are not affected.

A remote, unauthenticated TLS client can make a server crash or call through a freed pointer if its snicallback assigns a different context to SSLSocket.context (the documented way to select a certificate per server name) and nothing else keeps the original ssl.SSLContext alive. Typical cases are servers that create an SSLContext per connection or replace it while connections are open; servers that wrap their listening socket with it are not affected.

Mitigation: keep a reference to every SSLContext that sets snicallback for the lifetime of the server. TLS clients are not affected.

A remote, unauthenticated TLS client can make a server crash or call through a freed pointer if its snicallback assigns a different context to SSLSocket.context (the documented way to select a certificate per server name) and nothing else keeps the original ssl.SSLContext alive. Typical cases are servers that create an SSLContext per connection or replace it while connections are open; servers that wrap their listening socket with it are not affected.

Mitigation: keep a reference to every SSLContext that sets snicallback for the lifetime of the server. TLS clients are not affected.

A remote, unauthenticated TLS client can make a server crash or call through a freed pointer if its snicallback assigns a different context to SSLSocket.context (the documented way to select a certificate per server name) and nothing else keeps the original ssl.SSLContext alive. Typical cases are servers that create an SSLContext per connection or replace it while connections are open; servers that wrap their listening socket with it are not affected.

Mitigation: keep a reference to every SSLContext that sets snicallback for the lifetime of the server. TLS clients are not affected.

Last updated 6 July 2026

Use-after-free (UAF) was possible in the lzma.LZMADecompressor, bz2.BZ2Decompressor, and gzip.GzipFile when a memory allocation fails with a MemoryError and the decompression instance is re-used. This scenario can be triggered if the process is under memory pressure. The fix cleans up the dangling pointer in this specific error condition.

The vulnerability is only present if the program re-uses decompressor instances across multiple decompression calls even after a MemoryError is raised during decompression. Using the helper functions to one-shot decompress data such as lzma.decompress(), bz2.decompress(), gzip.decompress(), and zlib.decompress() are not affected as a new decompressor instance is used per call. If the decompressor instance is not re-used after an error condition, this usage is similarly not vulnerable.

Use-after-free (UAF) was possible in the lzma.LZMADecompressor, bz2.BZ2Decompressor, and gzip.GzipFile when a memory allocation fails with a MemoryError and the decompression instance is re-used. This scenario can be triggered if the process is under memory pressure. The fix cleans up the dangling pointer in this specific error condition.

The vulnerability is only present if the program re-uses decompressor instances across multiple decompression calls even after a MemoryError is raised during decompression. Using the helper functions to one-shot decompress data such as lzma.decompress(), bz2.decompress(), gzip.decompress(), and zlib.decompress() are not affected as a new decompressor instance is used per call. If the decompressor instance is not re-used after an error condition, this usage is similarly not vulnerable.

Use-after-free (UAF) was possible in the lzma.LZMADecompressor, bz2.BZ2Decompressor, and gzip.GzipFile when a memory allocation fails with a MemoryError and the decompression instance is re-used. This scenario can be triggered if the process is under memory pressure. The fix cleans up the dangling pointer in this specific error condition.

The vulnerability is only present if the program re-uses decompressor instances across multiple decompression calls even after a MemoryError is raised during decompression. Using the helper functions to one-shot decompress data such as lzma.decompress(), bz2.decompress(), gzip.decompress(), and zlib.decompress() are not affected as a new decompressor instance is used per call. If the decompressor instance is not re-used after an error condition, this usage is similarly not vulnerable.

Use-after-free (UAF) was possible in the lzma.LZMADecompressor, bz2.BZ2Decompressor, and gzip.GzipFile when a memory allocation fails with a MemoryError and the decompression instance is re-used. This scenario can be triggered if the process is under memory pressure. The fix cleans up the dangling pointer in this specific error condition.

The vulnerability is only present if the program re-uses decompressor instances across multiple decompression calls even after a MemoryError is raised during decompression. Using the helper functions to one-shot decompress data such as lzma.decompress(), bz2.decompress(), gzip.decompress(), and zlib.decompress() are not affected as a new decompressor instance is used per call. If the decompressor instance is not re-used after an error condition, this usage is similarly not vulnerable.

Use-after-free (UAF) was possible in the lzma.LZMADecompressor, bz2.BZ2Decompressor, and gzip.GzipFile when a memory allocation fails with a MemoryError and the decompression instance is re-used. This scenario can be triggered if the process is under memory pressure. The fix cleans up the dangling pointer in this specific error condition.

The vulnerability is only present if the program re-uses decompressor instances across multiple decompression calls even after a MemoryError is raised during decompression. Using the helper functions to one-shot decompress data such as lzma.decompress(), bz2.decompress(), gzip.decompress(), and zlib.decompress() are not affected as a new decompressor instance is used per call. If the decompressor instance is not re-used after an error condition, this usage is similarly not vulnerable.

The method "sockrecvfrominto()" of "asyncio.ProacterEventLoop" (Windows only) was missing a boundary check for the data buffer when using nbytes parameter. This allowed for an out-of-bounds buffer write if data was larger than the buffer size. Non-Windows platforms are not affected.

The method "sockrecvfrominto()" of "asyncio.ProacterEventLoop" (Windows only) was missing a boundary check for the data buffer when using nbytes parameter. This allowed for an out-of-bounds buffer write if data was larger than the buffer size. Non-Windows platforms are not affected.

The method "sockrecvfrominto()" of "asyncio.ProacterEventLoop" (Windows only) was missing a boundary check for the data buffer when using nbytes parameter. This allowed for an out-of-bounds buffer write if data was larger than the buffer size. Non-Windows platforms are not affected.

The method "sockrecvfrominto()" of "asyncio.ProacterEventLoop" (Windows only) was missing a boundary check for the data buffer when using nbytes parameter. This allowed for an out-of-bounds buffer write if data was larger than the buffer size. Non-Windows platforms are not affected.

The method "sockrecvfrominto()" of "asyncio.ProacterEventLoop" (Windows only) was missing a boundary check for the data buffer when using nbytes parameter. This allowed for an out-of-bounds buffer write if data was larger than the buffer size. Non-Windows platforms are not affected.