xml.parsers.expat and xml.etree.ElementTree use insufficient entropy for Expat hash-flooding protection, which allows a crafted XML document to trigger hash flooding.\r\n\r\nFully mitigating this vulnerability requires both updating libexpat to 2.8.0 or later and applying this patch.

Out-of-memory when loading Plist

Summary A path traversal vulnerability in PackageIndex was fixed in setuptools version 78.1.1

Details def downloadurl(self, url, tmpdir): # Determine download filename # name, fragment = egginfoforurl(url) if name: while '..' in name: name = name.replace('..', '.').replace('\\', '') else: name = "downloaded" # default if URL has no path contents

if name.endswith('.egg.zip'): name = name[:-4] # strip the extra .zip before download

--> filename = os.path.join(tmpdir, name)

Here: https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/blob/6ead555c5fb29bc57fe6105b1bffc163f56fd558/setuptools/packageindex.py#L810C1-L825C88

os.path.join() discards the first argument tmpdir if the second begins with a slash or drive letter. name is derived from a URL without sufficient sanitization. While there is some attempt to sanitize by replacing instances of '..' with '.', it is insufficient.

Risk Assessment As easyinstall and packageindex are deprecated, the exploitation surface is reduced. However, it seems this could be exploited in a similar fashion like https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r9hx-vwmv-q579, and as described by POC 4 in https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cx63-2mw6-8hw5 report: via malicious URLs present on the pages of a package index.

Impact An attacker would be allowed to write files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem with the permissions of the process running the Python code, which could escalate to RCE depending on the context.

References https://huntr.com/bounties/d6362117-ad57-4e83-951f-b8141c6e7ca5 https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/issues/4946

setuptools is a package that allows users to download, build, install, upgrade, and uninstall Python packages. A path traversal vulnerability in PackageIndex is present in setuptools prior to version 78.1.1. An attacker would be allowed to write files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem with the permissions of the process running the Python code, which could escalate to remote code execution depending on the context. Version 78.1.1 fixes the issue.

Summary

In the fallback extraction path for source distributions, pip used Python’s tarfile module without verifying that symbolic/hard link targets resolve inside the intended extraction directory. A malicious sdist can include links that escape the target directory and overwrite arbitrary files on the invoking host during pip install.

Impact

Successful exploitation enables arbitrary file overwrite outside the build/extraction directory on the machine running pip. This can be leveraged to tamper with configuration or startup files and may lead to further code execution depending on the environment, but the direct, guaranteed impact is integrity compromise on the vulnerable system.

Conditions

The issue is triggered when installing an attacker-controlled sdist (e.g., from an index or URL) and the fallback extraction code path is used. No special privileges are required beyond running pip install; active user action is necessary.

Remediation

The fix, while available as a patch that can be manually applied, has not yet been put into a numbered version but is planned for 25.3. Using a Python interpreter that implements the safe-extraction behavior described by PEP 706 provides additional defense in depth for other tarfile issues but is not a substitute for upgrading pip for this specific flaw.

There is a MEDIUM severity vulnerability affecting CPython.

The email module didn’t properly quote newlines for email headers when serializing an email message allowing for header injection when an email is serialized.

Last updated 6 July 2026

Last updated 6 July 2026

Incomplete mitigation of CVE-2026-4519, %action expansion for command injection to webbrowser.open()

bz2.BZ2Decompressor objects could be reused after a decompression error. If an application caught the resulting OSError and retried with the same decompressor, crafted input could cause the decompressor to resume from an invalid internal state and perform out-of-bounds writes to a stack buffer. This could crash the process when processing untrusted data.

Potential DoS via quadratic complexity in unicodedata.normalize()

Improper validation of IPv6 and IPvFuture addresses

CR/LF bytes were not rejected by HTTP client proxy tunnel headers or host.

Last updated 6 July 2026

Last updated 24 March 2025

There is a defect in the CPython “tarfile” module affecting the “TarFile” extraction and entry enumeration APIs. The tar implementation would process tar archives with negative offsets without error, resulting in an infinite loop and deadlock during the parsing of maliciously crafted tar archives.

This vulnerability can be mitigated by including the following patch after importing the “tarfile” module:

import tarfile

def blockpatched(self, count): if count < 0: # pragma: no cover raise tarfile.InvalidHeaderError("invalid offset") return blockpatched.origblock(self, count)

blockpatched.origblock = tarfile.TarInfo.block tarfile.TarInfo.block = blockpatched

The "profiling.sampling" module (Python 3.15+) and "asyncio introspection capabilities" (3.14+, "python -m asyncio ps" and "python -m asyncio pstree") features could be used to read and write addresses in a privileged process if that process connected to a malicious or "infected" Python process via the remote debugging feature. This vulnerability requires persistently and repeatedly connecting to the process to be exploited, even after the connecting process crashes with high likelihood due to ASLR.

The fix for CVE-2026-0672, which rejected control characters in http.cookies.Morsel, was incomplete. The Morsel.update(), |= operator, and unpickling paths were not patched, allowing control characters to bypass input validation. Additionally, BaseCookie.jsoutput() lacked the output validation applied to BaseCookie.output().

The import hook in CPython that handles legacy .pyc files (SourcelessFileLoader) is incorrectly handled in FileLoader (a base class) and so does not use io.opencode() to read the .pyc files. sys.audit handlers for this audit event therefore do not fire.

A flaw was found in the Python tarfile module. Extracting a crafted TAR archive with the tarfile.extract or tarfile.extractall functions could lead to a directory traversal vulnerability, resulting in overwrite of arbitrary files.

-------- Forwarded Message -------- Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 16:01:03 +0100 From: Steve Dower <steve.dower () python org> Reply-To: security-sig () python org To: security-announce () python org

Reported by Jake Yamaki, Senior Consultant, Bishop Fox.

Please see the linked CVE ID for the latest information on affected versions:

https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-12003 https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/151545 Security-announce mailing list -- security-announce () python org https://mail.python.org/mailman3//lists/security-announce.python.org

-------- Forwarded Message -------- Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2026 14:56:33 +0100 From: Stan Ulbrych via Security-announce <security-announce () python org> Reply-To: security-sig () python org To: security-announce () python org CC: Stan Ulbrych <stanulbrych () gmail com>

There is a MEDIUM severity vulnerability affecting CPython.

unicodedata.normalize() can take excessive CPU time when processing specially crafted Unicode input containing long runs of combining characters with alternating Canonical Combining Class values. This affects all normalization forms.

Please see the linked CVE ID for the latest information on affected versions:

https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-3276 https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/149080

Security-announce mailing list -- security-announce () python org https://mail.python.org/mailman3//lists/security-announce.python.org

A Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in the jaraco/zipp library, affecting all versions prior to 3.19.1. The vulnerability is triggered when processing a specially crafted zip file that leads to an infinite loop. This issue also impacts the zipfile module of CPython, as features from the third-party zipp library are later merged into CPython, and the affected code is identical in both projects. The infinite loop can be initiated through the use of functions affecting the Path module in both zipp and zipfile, such as joinpath, the overloaded division operator, and iterdir. Although the infinite loop is not resource exhaustive, it prevents the application from responding. The vulnerability was addressed in version 3.19.1 of jaraco/zipp.

When loading a plist file, the plistlib module reads data in size specified by the file itself, meaning a malicious file can cause OOM and DoS issues

-------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [Security-announce][CVE-2026-7210] The expat and elementtree parsers use insufficient entropy for XML hash-flooding protection Date: Mon, 11 May 2026 17:58:49 +0100 From: Stan Ulbrych via Security-announce <security-announce () python org> Reply-To: security-sig () python org To: security-announce () python org CC: Stan Ulbrych <stanulbrych () gmail com>

There is a MEDIUM severity vulnerability affecting CPython.

xml.parsers.expat and xml.etree.ElementTree use insufficient entropy for Expat hash-flooding protection, which allows a crafted XML document to trigger hash flooding.

Fully mitigating this vulnerability requires both updating libexpat to 2.8.0 or later and applying this patch.

Please see the linked CVE ID for the latest information on affected versions:

https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-7210 https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/149023

Best regards,  Stan Ulbrych. Security-announce mailing list -- security-announce () python org To unsubscribe send an email to security-announce-leave () python org https://mail.python.org/mailman3//lists/security-announce.python.org

-------- Forwarded Message -------- Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2026 20:48:33 +0000 From: Seth Larson <seth () python org> Reply-To: security-sig () python org To: security-announce () python org

There is a MEDIUM severity vulnerability affecting CPython. Please see the linked CVE ID for the latest information on affected versions:

https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-3087 https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/146591

Security-announce mailing list -- security-announce () python org To unsubscribe send an email to security-announce-leave () python org https://mail.python.org/mailman3//lists/security-announce.python.org

Buffer overflow in the repr function in Python 2.3 through 2.6 before 20060822 allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service and possibly execute arbitrary code via crafted wide character UTF-32/UCS-4 strings to certain scripts.

When calling base64.b64decode() or related functions the decoding process would stop after encountering the first padded quad regardless of whether there was more information to be processed. This can lead to data being accepted which may be processed differently by other implementations. Use "validate=True" to enable stricter processing of base64 data.

-------- Forwarded Message -------- Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2026 18:19:00 +0000 From: Seth Larson <seth () python org> Reply-To: security-sig () python org To: security-announce () python org

There is a MEDIUM severity vulnerability affecting {project}. Please see the linked CVE ID for the latest information on affected versions:

https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34460 https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/145267

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Summary

ldap.dn.escapednchars() escapes \x00 incorrectly by emitting a backslash followed by a literal NUL byte instead of the RFC-4514 hex form \00. Any application that uses this helper to construct DNs from untrusted input can be made to consistently fail before a request is sent to the LDAP server (e.g., AD), resulting in a client-side denial of service.

Details

Affected function: ldap.dn.escapednchars(s)

File: Lib/ldap/dn.py

Buggy behavior: For NUL, the function does:

s = s.replace('\000', '\\\000') # backslash + literal NUL

This produces Python strings which, when passed to python-ldap APIs (e.g., adds, modifys, renames, or used as search bases), contain an embedded NUL. python-ldap then raises ValueError: embedded null character (or otherwise fails) before any network I/O. With correct RFC-4514 encoding (\00), the client proceeds and the server can apply its own syntax rules (e.g., AD will reject NUL in CN with result: 34), proving the failure originates in the escaping helper.

Why it matters: Projects follow the docs which state this function “should be used when building LDAP DN strings from arbitrary input.” The function’s guarantee is therefore relied upon as a safety API. A single NUL in attacker-controlled input reliably breaks client workflows (crash/unhandled exception, stuck retries, poison queue record), i.e., a DoS.

Standards: RFC 4514 requires special characters and controls to be escaped using hex form; a literal NUL is not a valid DN character.

Minimal fix: Escape NUL as hex:

s = s.replace('\x00', r'\00')

PoC

Prereqs: Any python-ldap install and a reachable LDAP server (for the second half). The first half (client-side failure) does not require a live server.

import ldap from ldap.dn import escapednchars, str2dn

l = ldap.initialize("ldap://10.0.1.11") # your lab DC/LDAP l.protocolversion = 3 l.setoption(ldap.OPTREFERRALS, 0) l.simplebinds(r"DSEC\dani.aga", "PassAa1")

--- Attacker-controlled value contains NUL --- cn = "bad\0name" escapedcn = escapednchars(cn) dn = f"CN={escapedcn},OU=Users,DC=dsec,DC=local" attrs = [('objectClass', [b'user']), ('sAMAccountName', [b'badsam'])]

print("=== BUGGY DN (contains literal NUL) ===") print("escapedcn repr:", repr(escapedcn)) print("dn repr:", repr(dn)) print("contains NUL?:", "\x00" in dn, "at index:", dn.find("\x00"))

print("=> adds(buggy DN): expected client-side failure (no server contact)") try: l.adds(dn, attrs) print("adds(buggy): succeeded (unexpected)") except Exception as e: print("adds(buggy):", type(e).name, e) # ValueError: embedded null character

--- Correct hex escape demonstrates the client proceeds to the server --- safedn = dn.replace("\x00", r"\00") # RFC 4514-compliant print("\n=== HEX-ESCAPED DN (\\00) ===") print("safedn repr:", repr(safedn)) print("=> sanity parse:", str2dn(safedn)) # parses locally

print("=> adds(safe DN): reaches server (AD will likely reject with 34)") try: l.adds(safedn, attrs) print("adds(safe): success (unlikely without required attrs/rights)") except ldap.LDAPError as e: print("adds(safe):", e.class.name, e) # e.g., result 34 Invalid DN syntax (AD forbids NUL in CN)

Observed result (example):

adds(buggy): ValueError embedded null character ← client-side DoS

adds(safe): INVALIDDNSYNTAX (result 34, BADNAME) ← request reached server; rejection due to server policy, not client bug

Impact

Type: Denial of Service (client-side).

Who is impacted: Any application that uses ldap.dn.escapednchars() to build DNs from (partially) untrusted input—e.g., user creation/rename tools, sync/ETL jobs, portals allowing self-service attributes, device onboarding, batch imports. A single crafted value with \x00 reliably forces exceptions/failures and can crash handlers or jam pipelines with poison records.