A flaw was found in Python, specifically in the FTP (File Transfer Protocol) client library in PASV (passive) mode. The issue is how the FTP client trusts the host from the PASV response by default. This flaw allows an attacker to set up a malicious FTP server that can trick FTP clients into connecting back to a given IP address and port. This vulnerability could lead to FTP client scanning ports, which otherwise would not have been possible.

A flaw was found in Python, specifically in the FTP (File Transfer Protocol) client library in PASV (passive) mode. The issue is how the FTP client trusts the host from the PASV response by default. This flaw allows an attacker to set up a malicious FTP server that can trick FTP clients into connecting back to a given IP address and port. This vulnerability could lead to FTP client scanning ports, which otherwise would not have been possible.

A flaw was found in Python, specifically in the FTP (File Transfer Protocol) client library in PASV (passive) mode. The issue is how the FTP client trusts the host from the PASV response by default. This flaw allows an attacker to set up a malicious FTP server that can trick FTP clients into connecting back to a given IP address and port. This vulnerability could lead to FTP client scanning ports, which otherwise would not have been possible.

A remote, unauthenticated TLS client can make a server crash or call through a freed pointer if its snicallback assigns a different context to SSLSocket.context (the documented way to select a certificate per server name) and nothing else keeps the original ssl.SSLContext alive. Typical cases are servers that create an SSLContext per connection or replace it while connections are open; servers that wrap their listening socket with it are not affected.

Mitigation: keep a reference to every SSLContext that sets snicallback for the lifetime of the server. TLS clients are not affected.

A remote, unauthenticated TLS client can make a server crash or call through a freed pointer if its snicallback assigns a different context to SSLSocket.context (the documented way to select a certificate per server name) and nothing else keeps the original ssl.SSLContext alive. Typical cases are servers that create an SSLContext per connection or replace it while connections are open; servers that wrap their listening socket with it are not affected.

Mitigation: keep a reference to every SSLContext that sets snicallback for the lifetime of the server. TLS clients are not affected.

A remote, unauthenticated TLS client can make a server crash or call through a freed pointer if its snicallback assigns a different context to SSLSocket.context (the documented way to select a certificate per server name) and nothing else keeps the original ssl.SSLContext alive. Typical cases are servers that create an SSLContext per connection or replace it while connections are open; servers that wrap their listening socket with it are not affected.

Mitigation: keep a reference to every SSLContext that sets snicallback for the lifetime of the server. TLS clients are not affected.

A remote, unauthenticated TLS client can make a server crash or call through a freed pointer if its snicallback assigns a different context to SSLSocket.context (the documented way to select a certificate per server name) and nothing else keeps the original ssl.SSLContext alive. Typical cases are servers that create an SSLContext per connection or replace it while connections are open; servers that wrap their listening socket with it are not affected.

Mitigation: keep a reference to every SSLContext that sets snicallback for the lifetime of the server. TLS clients are not affected.

A remote, unauthenticated TLS client can make a server crash or call through a freed pointer if its snicallback assigns a different context to SSLSocket.context (the documented way to select a certificate per server name) and nothing else keeps the original ssl.SSLContext alive. Typical cases are servers that create an SSLContext per connection or replace it while connections are open; servers that wrap their listening socket with it are not affected.

Mitigation: keep a reference to every SSLContext that sets snicallback for the lifetime of the server. TLS clients are not affected.

Last updated 6 July 2026

The fix for CVE-2026-0672, which rejected control characters in http.cookies.Morsel, was incomplete. The Morsel.update(), |= operator, and unpickling paths were not patched, allowing control characters to bypass input validation. Additionally, BaseCookie.jsoutput() lacked the output validation applied to BaseCookie.output().

The import hook in CPython that handles legacy .pyc files (SourcelessFileLoader) is incorrectly handled in FileLoader (a base class) and so does not use io.opencode() to read the .pyc files. sys.audit handlers for this audit event therefore do not fire.

The "profiling.sampling" module (Python 3.15+) and "asyncio introspection capabilities" (3.14+, "python -m asyncio ps" and "python -m asyncio pstree") features could be used to read and write addresses in a privileged process if that process connected to a malicious or "infected" Python process via the remote debugging feature. This vulnerability requires persistently and repeatedly connecting to the process to be exploited, even after the connecting process crashes with high likelihood due to ASLR.

CR/LF bytes were not rejected by HTTP client proxy tunnel headers or host.

Race condition in tempfile.TemporaryDirectory cleanup allows deleting files outside the temporary directory

Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith () oracle com> writes: https://www.runsybil.com/blog/cpython-0-day-vulnerabilities-threaten-the-ai-supply-chain reports on a sandbox escape it found in CPython: The bug we discovered abuses CPython's handling of generic types to accomplish a breakout. We exploited it using objects that sandboxes make available in every template, even in empty sandbox contexts. (See the above URL for full details.)

They were not successful in reporting it as a security vulnerability: CPython’s stance on our memory bugs is documented, and was reiterated to us: > CPython does not support sandboxing untrusted Python code as a security > boundary, so escapes from such a sandbox are not vulnerabilities in > Python and should be reported to the sandbox’s developers instead. The maintainers of Jinja provided a response at odds with CPython’s guidance: > Report this to cpython. It's problem with cpython, not with Jinja. https://lwn.net/Articles/574215/ Instead they submitted a fix as https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/155761 but note that upstream is not backporting it to security releases. sam

https://www.runsybil.com/blog/cpython-0-day-vulnerabilities-threaten-the-ai-supply-chain reports on a sandbox escape it found in CPython: The bug we discovered abuses CPython's handling of generic types to accomplish a breakout. We exploited it using objects that sandboxes make available in every template, even in empty sandbox contexts. (See the above URL for full details.)

They were not successful in reporting it as a security vulnerability: CPython’s stance on our memory bugs is documented, and was reiterated to us:

> CPython does not support sandboxing untrusted Python code as a security > boundary, so escapes from such a sandbox are not vulnerabilities in > Python and should be reported to the sandbox’s developers instead.

The maintainers of Jinja provided a response at odds with CPython’s guidance:

> Report this to cpython. It's problem with cpython, not with Jinja. Instead they submitted a fix as https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/155761 but note that upstream is not backporting it to security releases.

-- -Alan Coopersmith- alan.coopersmith () oracle com Oracle Solaris Engineering - https://blogs.oracle.com/solaris

Decoding a maliciously-crafted MIME header containing many invalid encoded-words can consume excessive CPU.

ssl.SSLContext.wrapbio() didn't require the serverhostname argument to not be None if ssl.SSLContext.checkhostname was set. Due to a missing parameter check in SSLObject, if the serverhostname argument isn't supplied then hostname verification would be silently skipped.

This defect could lead to programs where certificate hostname verification appeared to be succeeding with SSLContext.checkhostname = True and no ValueError being raised due to misconfiguration.

If the program passes a serverhostname value that isn't an empty string or None to any of these APIs then certificate hostname verification proceeds as expected and the program is not affected by this vulnerability.

Mitigating this vulnerability doesn't require updating Python or applying the patch. To mitigate, pass a valid non-None and non-empty serverhostname value to SSLContext.wrapbio(), asyncio.createconnection(), or asyncio.loop.starttls() and certificate hostname verification will proceed as expected. Upgrading to the latest version of Python or applying the patch only changes the behavior from silently skipping hostname verification to raising a ValueError, similar to SSLContext.wrapsocket(), when serverhostname isn't supplied.

ssl.SSLContext.wrapbio() didn't require the serverhostname argument to not be None if ssl.SSLContext.checkhostname was set. Due to a missing parameter check in SSLObject, if the serverhostname argument isn't supplied then hostname verification would be silently skipped.

This defect could lead to programs where certificate hostname verification appeared to be succeeding with SSLContext.checkhostname = True and no ValueError being raised due to misconfiguration.

If the program passes a serverhostname value that isn't an empty string or None to any of these APIs then certificate hostname verification proceeds as expected and the program is not affected by this vulnerability.

Mitigating this vulnerability doesn't require updating Python or applying the patch. To mitigate, pass a valid non-None and non-empty serverhostname value to SSLContext.wrapbio(), asyncio.createconnection(), or asyncio.loop.starttls() and certificate hostname verification will proceed as expected. Upgrading to the latest version of Python or applying the patch only changes the behavior from silently skipping hostname verification to raising a ValueError, similar to SSLContext.wrapsocket(), when serverhostname isn't supplied.

A remote, unauthenticated TLS client can make a server crash or call through a freed pointer if its snicallback assigns a different context to SSLSocket.context (the documented way to select a certificate per server name) and nothing else keeps the original ssl.SSLContext alive. Typical cases are servers that create an SSLContext per connection or replace it while connections are open; servers that wrap their listening socket with it are not affected.

Mitigation: keep a reference to every SSLContext that sets snicallback for the lifetime of the server. TLS clients are not affected.

bz2.BZ2Decompressor objects could be reused after a decompression error. If an application caught the resulting OSError and retried with the same decompressor, crafted input could cause the decompressor to resume from an invalid internal state and perform out-of-bounds writes to a stack buffer. This could crash the process when processing untrusted data.

bz2.BZ2Decompressor objects could be reused after a decompression error. If an application caught the resulting OSError and retried with the same decompressor, crafted input could cause the decompressor to resume from an invalid internal state and perform out-of-bounds writes to a stack buffer. This could crash the process when processing untrusted data.

bz2.BZ2Decompressor objects could be reused after a decompression error. If an application caught the resulting OSError and retried with the same decompressor, crafted input could cause the decompressor to resume from an invalid internal state and perform out-of-bounds writes to a stack buffer. This could crash the process when processing untrusted data.

bz2.BZ2Decompressor objects could be reused after a decompression error. If an application caught the resulting OSError and retried with the same decompressor, crafted input could cause the decompressor to resume from an invalid internal state and perform out-of-bounds writes to a stack buffer. This could crash the process when processing untrusted data.

bz2.BZ2Decompressor objects could be reused after a decompression error. If an application caught the resulting OSError and retried with the same decompressor, crafted input could cause the decompressor to resume from an invalid internal state and perform out-of-bounds writes to a stack buffer. This could crash the process when processing untrusted data.

In CPython 3.13 and earlier, the tarfile module's data and tar extraction filters are vulnerable to crafted archives containing a hard link to a symbolic link. Such archives may cause extraction to modify the permissions or modification time of a file outside the destination directory, or expose the contents of that file within the extracted tree.

In CPython 3.13 and earlier, the tarfile module's data and tar extraction filters are vulnerable to crafted archives containing a hard link to a symbolic link. Such archives may cause extraction to modify the permissions or modification time of a file outside the destination directory, or expose the contents of that file within the extracted tree.

In CPython 3.13 and earlier, the tarfile module's data and tar extraction filters are vulnerable to crafted archives containing a hard link to a symbolic link. Such archives may cause extraction to modify the permissions or modification time of a file outside the destination directory, or expose the contents of that file within the extracted tree.

In CPython 3.13 and earlier, the tarfile module's data and tar extraction filters are vulnerable to crafted archives containing a hard link to a symbolic link. Such archives may cause extraction to modify the permissions or modification time of a file outside the destination directory, or expose the contents of that file within the extracted tree.

xml.parsers.expat and xml.etree.ElementTree use insufficient entropy for Expat hash-flooding protection, which allows a crafted XML document to trigger hash flooding.\r\n\r\nFully mitigating this vulnerability requires both updating libexpat to 2.8.0 or later and applying this patch.