Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith () oracle com> writes: https://www.runsybil.com/blog/cpython-0-day-vulnerabilities-threaten-the-ai-supply-chain reports on a sandbox escape it found in CPython: The bug we discovered abuses CPython's handling of generic types to accomplish a breakout. We exploited it using objects that sandboxes make available in every template, even in empty sandbox contexts. (See the above URL for full details.)

They were not successful in reporting it as a security vulnerability: CPython’s stance on our memory bugs is documented, and was reiterated to us: > CPython does not support sandboxing untrusted Python code as a security > boundary, so escapes from such a sandbox are not vulnerabilities in > Python and should be reported to the sandbox’s developers instead. The maintainers of Jinja provided a response at odds with CPython’s guidance: > Report this to cpython. It's problem with cpython, not with Jinja. https://lwn.net/Articles/574215/ Instead they submitted a fix as https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/155761 but note that upstream is not backporting it to security releases. sam

https://www.runsybil.com/blog/cpython-0-day-vulnerabilities-threaten-the-ai-supply-chain reports on a sandbox escape it found in CPython: The bug we discovered abuses CPython's handling of generic types to accomplish a breakout. We exploited it using objects that sandboxes make available in every template, even in empty sandbox contexts. (See the above URL for full details.)

They were not successful in reporting it as a security vulnerability: CPython’s stance on our memory bugs is documented, and was reiterated to us:

> CPython does not support sandboxing untrusted Python code as a security > boundary, so escapes from such a sandbox are not vulnerabilities in > Python and should be reported to the sandbox’s developers instead.

The maintainers of Jinja provided a response at odds with CPython’s guidance:

> Report this to cpython. It's problem with cpython, not with Jinja. Instead they submitted a fix as https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/155761 but note that upstream is not backporting it to security releases.

-- -Alan Coopersmith- alan.coopersmith () oracle com Oracle Solaris Engineering - https://blogs.oracle.com/solaris

socket.getaddrinfo() previously accepted null bytes within host and port parameters which can cause the values to be silently truncated.

Distrust compromised intermediate certificates in ssl module

https://discuss.python.org/t/python-3-15-1-3-14-9-and-3-13-17-are-out/109595 announces: Here are expedited security releases of Python 3.15 and 3.14, and a special security release of 3.13.

Python 3.15.1 Python 3.14.9 Python 3.13.17

They all upgrade the bundled pip to version 26.2.2, which includes certifi 2026.10.19 to address the eMudhra / emSign CA certificate security incident.

We don’t normally update pip for security releases like Python 3.13 because of backward compatibility concerns, but since 3.13 only just entered security-only mode, doing a special release with installers seemed prudent.

See the Discourse announcement for more information.

For all existing virtual environments on your system, please upgrade pip and uv to the latest versions.

To upgrade pip securely within a virtualenv:

python -m pip install "pip @ https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/3f/06/3e4420302363fbb71be3c7f35ce042f54bfca330e3e66b3a2e3c4cca579f/pip-26.2.2-py3-none-any.whl#sha256=fd7f4dfa8190e014013b9f08f3e973f4e4c26ffd179a204895533a7254813a70";

If you cannot immediately upgrade to this release, you can upgrade certificates for a Python 3.15 macOS installation and pip itself via:

/Library/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.15/bin/python3.15 -m pip install "pip @ https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/3f/06/3e4420302363fbb71be3c7f35ce042f54bfca330e3e66b3a2e3c4cca579f/pip-26.2.2-py3-none-any.whl#sha256=fd7f4dfa8190e014013b9f08f3e973f4e4c26ffd179a204895533a7254813a70"; /Library/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.15/bin/python3.15 -m pip install --upgrade certifi /Library/Frameworks/PythonT.framework/Versions/3.15/bin/python3.15t -m pip install "pip @ https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/3f/06/3e4420302363fbb71be3c7f35ce042f54bfca330e3e66b3a2e3c4cca579f/pip-26.2.2-py3-none-any.whl#sha256=fd7f4dfa8190e014013b9f08f3e973f4e4c26ffd179a204895533a7254813a70";

For 3.14:

/Library/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/bin/python3.14 -m pip install "pip @ https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/3f/06/3e4420302363fbb71be3c7f35ce042f54bfca330e3e66b3a2e3c4cca579f/pip-26.2.2-py3-none-any.whl#sha256=fd7f4dfa8190e014013b9f08f3e973f4e4c26ffd179a204895533a7254813a70"; /Library/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/bin/python3.14 -m pip install --upgrade certifi /Library/Frameworks/PythonT.framework/Versions/3.14/bin/python3.14t -m pip install "pip @ https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/3f/06/3e4420302363fbb71be3c7f35ce042f54bfca330e3e66b3a2e3c4cca579f/pip-26.2.2-py3-none-any.whl#sha256=fd7f4dfa8190e014013b9f08f3e973f4e4c26ffd179a204895533a7254813a70";

For 3.13:

/Library/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.13/bin/python3.13 -m pip install "pip @ https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/3f/06/3e4420302363fbb71be3c7f35ce042f54bfca330e3e66b3a2e3c4cca579f/pip-26.2.2-py3-none-any.whl#sha256=fd7f4dfa8190e014013b9f08f3e973f4e4c26ffd179a204895533a7254813a70"; /Library/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.13/bin/python3.13 -m pip install --upgrade certifi /Library/Frameworks/PythonT.framework/Versions/3.13/bin/python3.13t -m pip install "pip @ https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/3f/06/3e4420302363fbb71be3c7f35ce042f54bfca330e3e66b3a2e3c4cca579f/pip-26.2.2-py3-none-any.whl#sha256=fd7f4dfa8190e014013b9f08f3e973f4e4c26ffd179a204895533a7254813a70";

macOS 27.0 IDLE and tkinter

Additionally, the macOS installer for this release is built with a pre-release of Tk, fixing a possible hang on macOS 27.0 in applications using tkinter, like IDLE, in older releases.

Enjoy the new release

Thanks to all of the many volunteers who help make Python development and these releases possible! Please consider supporting our efforts by volunteering yourself or through organisation contributions to the Python Software Foundation.

Your certified release team, Hugo van Kemenade Thomas Wouters Ned Deily Steve Dower

tar filter allows writing outside destination via empty-named symlink

End of life: 10/31/2031, End of support: 10/9/2028, Latest version: 3.15.2

-------- Forwarded Message -------- Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2026 16:10:08 +0000 From: Seth Larson <seth () python org> Reply-To: security-sig () python org To: security-announce () python org

There is a CRITICAL severity vulnerability affecting CPython.

Please see the linked CVE ID for the latest information on affected versions:

https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-19445 https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/158504

Security-announce mailing list -- security-announce () python org https://mail.python.org/mailman3//lists/security-announce.python.org

-------- Forwarded Message -------- Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2026 16:08:09 +0000 From: Seth Larson <seth () python org> Reply-To: security-sig () python org To: security-announce () python org

There is a HIGH severity vulnerability affecting CPython.

Please see the linked CVE ID for the latest information on affected versions:

https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-19553 https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/158503 Security-announce mailing list -- security-announce () python org https://mail.python.org/mailman3//lists/security-announce.python.org

A remote, unauthenticated TLS client can make a server crash or call through a freed pointer if its snicallback assigns a different context to SSLSocket.context (the documented way to select a certificate per server name) and nothing else keeps the original ssl.SSLContext alive. Typical cases are servers that create an SSLContext per connection or replace it while connections are open; servers that wrap their listening socket with it are not affected.

Mitigation: keep a reference to every SSLContext that sets snicallback for the lifetime of the server. TLS clients are not affected.

ssl.SSLContext.wrapbio() didn't require the serverhostname argument to not be None if ssl.SSLContext.checkhostname was set. Due to a missing parameter check in SSLObject, if the serverhostname argument isn't supplied then hostname verification would be silently skipped.

This defect could lead to programs where certificate hostname verification appeared to be succeeding with SSLContext.checkhostname = True and no ValueError being raised due to misconfiguration.

If the program passes a serverhostname value that isn't an empty string or None to any of these APIs then certificate hostname verification proceeds as expected and the program is not affected by this vulnerability.

Mitigating this vulnerability doesn't require updating Python or applying the patch. To mitigate, pass a valid non-None and non-empty serverhostname value to SSLContext.wrapbio(), asyncio.createconnection(), or asyncio.loop.starttls() and certificate hostname verification will proceed as expected. Upgrading to the latest version of Python or applying the patch only changes the behavior from silently skipping hostname verification to raising a ValueError, similar to SSLContext.wrapsocket(), when serverhostname isn't supplied.

ssl.SSLContext.wrapbio() didn't require the serverhostname argument to not be None if ssl.SSLContext.checkhostname was set. Due to a missing parameter check in SSLObject, if the serverhostname argument isn't supplied then hostname verification would be silently skipped.

This defect could lead to programs where certificate hostname verification appeared to be succeeding with SSLContext.checkhostname = True and no ValueError being raised due to misconfiguration.

If the program passes a serverhostname value that isn't an empty string or None to any of these APIs then certificate hostname verification proceeds as expected and the program is not affected by this vulnerability.

Mitigating this vulnerability doesn't require updating Python or applying the patch. To mitigate, pass a valid non-None and non-empty serverhostname value to SSLContext.wrapbio(), asyncio.createconnection(), or asyncio.loop.starttls() and certificate hostname verification will proceed as expected. Upgrading to the latest version of Python or applying the patch only changes the behavior from silently skipping hostname verification to raising a ValueError, similar to SSLContext.wrapsocket(), when serverhostname isn't supplied.

ssl.SSLContext.wrapbio() didn't require the serverhostname argument to not be None if ssl.SSLContext.checkhostname was set. Due to a missing parameter check in SSLObject, if the serverhostname argument isn't supplied then hostname verification would be silently skipped.

This defect could lead to programs where certificate hostname verification appeared to be succeeding with SSLContext.checkhostname = True and no ValueError being raised due to misconfiguration.

If the program passes a serverhostname value that isn't an empty string or None to any of these APIs then certificate hostname verification proceeds as expected and the program is not affected by this vulnerability.

Mitigating this vulnerability doesn't require updating Python or applying the patch. To mitigate, pass a valid non-None and non-empty serverhostname value to SSLContext.wrapbio(), asyncio.createconnection(), or asyncio.loop.starttls() and certificate hostname verification will proceed as expected. Upgrading to the latest version of Python or applying the patch only changes the behavior from silently skipping hostname verification to raising a ValueError, similar to SSLContext.wrapsocket(), when serverhostname isn't supplied.

ssl.SSLContext.wrapbio() didn't require the serverhostname argument to not be None if ssl.SSLContext.checkhostname was set. Due to a missing parameter check in SSLObject, if the serverhostname argument isn't supplied then hostname verification would be silently skipped.

This defect could lead to programs where certificate hostname verification appeared to be succeeding with SSLContext.checkhostname = True and no ValueError being raised due to misconfiguration.

If the program passes a serverhostname value that isn't an empty string or None to any of these APIs then certificate hostname verification proceeds as expected and the program is not affected by this vulnerability.

Mitigating this vulnerability doesn't require updating Python or applying the patch. To mitigate, pass a valid non-None and non-empty serverhostname value to SSLContext.wrapbio(), asyncio.createconnection(), or asyncio.loop.starttls() and certificate hostname verification will proceed as expected. Upgrading to the latest version of Python or applying the patch only changes the behavior from silently skipping hostname verification to raising a ValueError, similar to SSLContext.wrapsocket(), when serverhostname isn't supplied.

ssl.SSLContext.wrapbio() didn't require the serverhostname argument to not be None if ssl.SSLContext.checkhostname was set. Due to a missing parameter check in SSLObject, if the serverhostname argument isn't supplied then hostname verification would be silently skipped.

This defect could lead to programs where certificate hostname verification appeared to be succeeding with SSLContext.checkhostname = True and no ValueError being raised due to misconfiguration.

If the program passes a serverhostname value that isn't an empty string or None to any of these APIs then certificate hostname verification proceeds as expected and the program is not affected by this vulnerability.

Mitigating this vulnerability doesn't require updating Python or applying the patch. To mitigate, pass a valid non-None and non-empty serverhostname value to SSLContext.wrapbio(), asyncio.createconnection(), or asyncio.loop.starttls() and certificate hostname verification will proceed as expected. Upgrading to the latest version of Python or applying the patch only changes the behavior from silently skipping hostname verification to raising a ValueError, similar to SSLContext.wrapsocket(), when serverhostname isn't supplied.

ssl.SSLContext.wrapbio() didn't require the serverhostname argument to not be None if ssl.SSLContext.checkhostname was set. Due to a missing parameter check in SSLObject, if the serverhostname argument isn't supplied then hostname verification would be silently skipped.

This defect could lead to programs where certificate hostname verification appeared to be succeeding with SSLContext.checkhostname = True and no ValueError being raised due to misconfiguration.

If the program passes a serverhostname value that isn't an empty string or None to any of these APIs then certificate hostname verification proceeds as expected and the program is not affected by this vulnerability.

Mitigating this vulnerability doesn't require updating Python or applying the patch. To mitigate, pass a valid non-None and non-empty serverhostname value to SSLContext.wrapbio(), asyncio.createconnection(), or asyncio.loop.starttls() and certificate hostname verification will proceed as expected. Upgrading to the latest version of Python or applying the patch only changes the behavior from silently skipping hostname verification to raising a ValueError, similar to SSLContext.wrapsocket(), when serverhostname isn't supplied.

A remote, unauthenticated TLS client can make a server crash or call through a freed pointer if its snicallback assigns a different context to SSLSocket.context (the documented way to select a certificate per server name) and nothing else keeps the original ssl.SSLContext alive. Typical cases are servers that create an SSLContext per connection or replace it while connections are open; servers that wrap their listening socket with it are not affected.

Mitigation: keep a reference to every SSLContext that sets snicallback for the lifetime of the server. TLS clients are not affected.

A remote, unauthenticated TLS client can make a server crash or call through a freed pointer if its snicallback assigns a different context to SSLSocket.context (the documented way to select a certificate per server name) and nothing else keeps the original ssl.SSLContext alive. Typical cases are servers that create an SSLContext per connection or replace it while connections are open; servers that wrap their listening socket with it are not affected.

Mitigation: keep a reference to every SSLContext that sets snicallback for the lifetime of the server. TLS clients are not affected.

A remote, unauthenticated TLS client can make a server crash or call through a freed pointer if its snicallback assigns a different context to SSLSocket.context (the documented way to select a certificate per server name) and nothing else keeps the original ssl.SSLContext alive. Typical cases are servers that create an SSLContext per connection or replace it while connections are open; servers that wrap their listening socket with it are not affected.

Mitigation: keep a reference to every SSLContext that sets snicallback for the lifetime of the server. TLS clients are not affected.

A remote, unauthenticated TLS client can make a server crash or call through a freed pointer if its snicallback assigns a different context to SSLSocket.context (the documented way to select a certificate per server name) and nothing else keeps the original ssl.SSLContext alive. Typical cases are servers that create an SSLContext per connection or replace it while connections are open; servers that wrap their listening socket with it are not affected.

Mitigation: keep a reference to every SSLContext that sets snicallback for the lifetime of the server. TLS clients are not affected.

A remote, unauthenticated TLS client can make a server crash or call through a freed pointer if its snicallback assigns a different context to SSLSocket.context (the documented way to select a certificate per server name) and nothing else keeps the original ssl.SSLContext alive. Typical cases are servers that create an SSLContext per connection or replace it while connections are open; servers that wrap their listening socket with it are not affected.

Mitigation: keep a reference to every SSLContext that sets snicallback for the lifetime of the server. TLS clients are not affected.

The cleanup of tempfile.TemporaryDirectory is vulnerable to a race condition. An attacker who can modify the tree during cleanup can replace a directory with a symbolic link, causing files outside of the temporary directory to be deleted or have their permissions and file flags reset, with the privileges of the process performing the cleanup. Note that platforms where shutil.rmtree.avoidssymlinkattacks is false, remain affected, and file flags may still be reset outside of the tree on all platforms.

Race condition in tempfile.TemporaryDirectory cleanup allows deleting files outside the temporary directory

In CPython 3.13 and earlier, the tarfile module's data and tar extraction filters are vulnerable to crafted archives containing a hard link to a symbolic link. Such archives may cause extraction to modify the permissions or modification time of a file outside the destination directory, or expose the contents of that file within the extracted tree.

In CPython 3.13 and earlier, the tarfile module's data and tar extraction filters are vulnerable to crafted archives containing a hard link to a symbolic link. Such archives may cause extraction to modify the permissions or modification time of a file outside the destination directory, or expose the contents of that file within the extracted tree.

In CPython 3.13 and earlier, the tarfile module's data and tar extraction filters are vulnerable to crafted archives containing a hard link to a symbolic link. Such archives may cause extraction to modify the permissions or modification time of a file outside the destination directory, or expose the contents of that file within the extracted tree.

In CPython 3.13 and earlier, the tarfile module's data and tar extraction filters are vulnerable to crafted archives containing a hard link to a symbolic link. Such archives may cause extraction to modify the permissions or modification time of a file outside the destination directory, or expose the contents of that file within the extracted tree.

When decompressing crafted zip files using the bzip/LZMA/Zstandard

compressions, Python could use an attacker-controlled size to

pre-allocate memory, possibly resulting in memory exhaustion.