In OpenStack keystonemiddleware before 13.0.2, by supplying a custom X-Service-Token header in a request, anyone in possession of an access-restricted application credential may bypass those restrictions resulting in elevation of privileges.

RT's automatic link creation for URLs in HTML ticket content does not HTML-escape the URL it places in the link. A URL crafted to break out of the link's address can add a script that runs when the ticket history is displayed, with no further action by the viewer. Anyone who can add HTML content to a ticket can plant it. That includes an unauthenticated sender of HTML email to any queue that grants CreateTicket or ReplyToTicket to Everyone, which is routine for a queue that accepts mail from the public. The script runs in the session of any user who views the ticket, and can act in RT with that user's authority.

This issue was fixed in version 5.0.11 and 6.0.4

Missing Authorization vulnerability in Liquid Web / StellarWP The Events Calendar the-events-calendar allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects The Events Calendar: from n/a through 6.18.2.

Missing Authorization vulnerability in Crocoblock JetFormBuilder jetformbuilder allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects JetFormBuilder: from n/a through 3.6.7.1.

Collabora Online is a collaborative online office suite based on LibreOffice technology. Prior to 24.04.18 and 25.04.11, several document operations delegated to LibreOfficeKit in the per-document kit process fail to enforce a session's read-only state. A read-only user, such as a viewer-role WOPI user, can send crafted WebSocket messages to execute document-mutating UNO commands and dialog operations despite the read-only interface. The changes can mislead co-viewers within the live session, or an authorized editor sharing the session can unknowingly save the modifications. The read-only attacker cannot save the document directly, and changes are discarded when the kit session ends unless an authorized editor saves them. This issue is fixed in versions 24.04.18 and 25.04.11.

Collabora Online is a collaborative online office suite based on LibreOffice technology. Prior to 24.04.18 and 25.04.11, the hostsessionid query/form parameter is substituted into the cool.html editor page without HTML encoding, unlike parameters passed through the existing variable-encoding mechanism. An attacker who induces a victim to load a crafted URL can inject HTML and, in the absence of an effective Content Security Policy, execute scripts in the Collabora Online iframe's origin, exposing the session authentication token and page contents. A reverse proxy that preserves the Content Security Policy header sent by coolwsd mitigates the script-execution scenario. This issue is fixed in versions 24.04.18 and 25.04.11.

A Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in the SubWorkflow task in Google Cloud Application Integration versions prior to 2026-09-11 on Google Cloud Platform allows an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code using a maliciously crafted serialized object.

This vulnerability was patched on 11 September 2026, and no customer action is needed.

Last updated 24 September 2026

Summary

Soft Serve cached repository records in memory with no expiry, and trusted the cached record for every access check. SetPrivate cleared the cached record before it saved the new visibility, and not afterwards.

A request that arrived between the two read the old, public record from the database and cached it after the change was saved. From then on every access check used that stale record, so a repository the operator had just made private stayed readable by unauthenticated users over HTTP, SSH, and git:// until the server restarted.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can keep reading a repository after it is made private, including everything pushed to it afterwards. The attacker needs no account and no timing knowledge: a client polling GET /<repo>.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack, which the default anon-access: read-only allows, will eventually land in the window when the operator changes the visibility.

The stale record lasts until the server restarts or the entry is evicted, and the operator gets no sign of it. repo private <name> reads the database directly and reports true, and the visibilitychange webhook is not sent, because its check reads the same stale record.

Write access is not gained. Because the repository was public until the change, an attacker able to win the race could already read its contents up to that point. What this adds is continued access to everything pushed after the operator made it private.

Deployments that run several Soft Serve processes against one shared database were affected more broadly. Each process kept its own cache, so a visibility change made through one process never reached the others, with no race required.

Reachable over HTTP, SSH, and git:// (AV:N). Success depends on a visibility change made by the operator, which the attacker does not control (AC:H). No privileges are required under the default anonymous read access (PR:N), and the attacker interacts with no one, since the operator's change is already captured by AC:H (UI:N). Continued read access to a repository its owner has made private is a high confidentiality impact (C:H), with no integrity or availability impact (I:N, A:N).

Root Cause

The cache was the source of truth for access checks, and clearing it was treated as a step before the write rather than after it.

Backend.Repository in pkg/backend/repo.go returned the cached record when present, and on a miss read the database and stored the result. The cache was a plain LRU of 1000 entries with no expiry (pkg/backend/cache.go), and AccessLevelForUser read the private flag from that record.

SetPrivate ran in this order:

go d.cache.Delete(name) ... d.db.TransactionContext(ctx, func(tx db.Tx) error { ... writes or removes git-daemon-export-ok ... return d.store.SetRepoIsPrivateByName(ctx, tx, name, private) })

A reader that missed the cache after the Delete but read the database before the commit got the old row, and stored it after the commit. Nothing ever cleared it again.

SetHidden, SetMirror, SetDescription, and SetProjectName cleared the cache in the same place. DeleteRepository and RenameRepository deferred the clear inside the transaction function, which also runs before the commit.

Moving the clear to after the commit would not have been enough on its own. A reader that read the old row before the commit could still store it after the clear.

Affected Versions

v0.6.0 through v0.12.2. The repository cache and this ordering arrived with the database-backed backend in commit e398b4d (refactor: implement database module and abstract backend, #337), first released in v0.6.0. Versions v0.5.x used a different backend and were not assessed.

Patches

Fixed in v0.12.3.

The repository cache is removed. Every lookup now reads the database, so an access check always sees the visibility most recently saved, whether by this process or any other sharing the database.

Removing the cache was preferred over making it race-free. A database lookup costs tens of microseconds on SQLite, which is small next to the Git work behind each request, while keeping the cache correct needed a versioning scheme around every write and still left multi-process deployments stale. Without the cache, the whole class of stale-authorization bugs goes away rather than this one instance.

The visibilitychange webhook is also fixed in the same release. It now compares against the visibility saved before the change, so it fires when visibility actually changes and only then.

Workarounds

It is recommended to upgrade to the patched release.

No configuration closes the race. Restarting the server clears a stale record and restores correct access checks until the next visibility change. Operators who cannot upgrade immediately should create repositories as private from the start (repo create -p) rather than making public ones private, and avoid changing visibility while the server is serving traffic.

Last updated 24 September 2026

SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.77, the Velociraptor Sigma exclusion-management endpoints in backend/app/incidents/routes/incidentalert.py omit role and tenant authorization, and POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma/exclusion does not validate credentials. Its returnusernameforlogging dependency in backend/app/auth/utils.py calls decodetoken, which returns ordinary Invalid token or Expired signature strings on failure, and the dependency passes these strings through instead of rejecting the request. A Bearer header is required, but an arbitrary invalid, expired or forged value can create a suppression rule without a valid account. The collection GET at /create/velo-sigma/exclusion lists exclusions; the read, update and delete routes under /create/velo-sigma/exclusion/{exclusionid}, and the /velo-sigma/exclusion/{exclusionid}/toggle route, use getcurrentuser without role checks, permitting any authenticated customeruser to manage every exclusion. In backend/app/incidents/services/velosigma.py, processsigmaalert calls checkexclusions and drops matching enabled alerts before incident creation. A null customercode applies a rule across all tenants. Attackers can suppress detections platform-wide through channel, title or field matching, while low-privilege accounts can enumerate detection-tuning data and modify, disable or delete legitimate exclusions. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.77.

Summary

Soft Serve answers Go's ?go-get=1 requests by walking up the requested path until it finds a repository, then rendering that repository's name and clone URL into a go-import meta tag. The walk checked that each candidate repository existed, but never that the caller could read it.

A request for a path inside a private repository, such as GET /secret/anything?go-get=1, therefore returned 200 naming secret and its clone URL, even though GET /secret?go-get=1 correctly returned 404. The same ?go-get=1 exception in the HTTP access middleware also let requests reach the LFS and dumb-HTTP routes with the repository existence check skipped, where two LFS handlers dereferenced the missing repository and panicked.

The same disclosure appears without ?go-get=1. The Git and LFS routes answered a repository the caller could not read differently depending on whether it existed: an anonymous clone of a private repository got 401 while a missing one got 404, and a signed-in user without access got the reverse pattern. Either way, one request confirms whether a guessed name is a private repository. This was found while fixing the go-get issue and is included here because it has the same impact and is fixed in the same release.

Impact

A remote client can learn, with one request per candidate name, which private repositories exist, their exact names, and their clone URLs. Under the shipped default of anon-access: read-only no account is needed, and an authenticated user without access to the repository gets the same answer. Project names in private deployments are often sensitive (internal codenames, unreleased products, customer names), and this turns them into an enumerable namespace.

The Git and LFS routes give the same confirmation for any guessed name, to anonymous and authenticated callers alike, and an invalid Authorization: Bearer header does the same even where credentials are otherwise required.

Repository contents, refs, commits, and collaborators are not exposed, and no write path is reachable. The LFS panic is caught by the recovery middleware and returns a 500; the server stays up. Hidden repositories are not affected beyond what direct access already allows, since hiding a repository removes it from listings but does not restrict reading it by name.

Reachable over the HTTP interface, which is enabled by default (AV:N), with one ordinary GET request per name (AC:L). No privileges are required under the default anonymous read access (PR:N), and no victim interaction is needed (UI:N). Only repository names and clone URLs are disclosed, which is a low confidentiality impact (C:L), with no integrity or availability impact (I:N, A:N), since the panic is recovered per request.

Root Cause

Two pieces of code each assumed the other had checked access.

withAccess in pkg/web/git.go computed the access level for the requested path and then let go-get requests through ahead of the guard meant to hide repositories:

go case r.URL.Query().Get("go-get") == "1" && accessLevel >= access.ReadOnlyAccess: // Allow go-get requests to passthrough. break case repo == nil, accessLevel < access.ReadOnlyAccess: // Don't hint that the repo exists if the user doesn't have access renderNotFound(w, r) return

For a path that is not itself a repository, AccessLevelForUser returns the anonymous access level to anonymous callers and read-write to any authenticated user, since that is what allows a push to create a new repository. The go-get case therefore always matched for a sub-path, and the "don't hint that the repo exists" guard below it never ran.

GoGetHandler in pkg/web/goget.go then trimmed path segments with path.Dir until be.Repository succeeded, and rendered the first repository it found. It never asked whether the caller could read that repository. The access level the middleware had computed was for a different path.

Because the exception lived in the middleware shared by every Git route rather than on the go-get route, it also applied to the dumb-HTTP and LFS routes. There it skipped the repo == nil guard, and serviceLfsBasicDownload and serviceLfsBasicUpload dereferenced a nil repository from the request context. The sibling LFS handlers already checked for nil, which is why only those two panicked.

The Git and LFS routes behind withAccess had the opposite problem: each branch chose its own response for a caller who could not read the repository, and the choice depended on which condition failed first. On the smart HTTP routes a missing repository was checked before credentials, so it returned 404, while a private one fell through to the credential prompt and returned 401. On the LFS write routes the write-access check ran before the read check, so a signed-in user got 403 for a private repository and 404 for a missing one. And parseJWT in pkg/web/auth.go rejected a token for a missing repository with a "missing repository" error, which the caller treated as anonymous, while a token for an existing repository failed as invalid and got 403.

Affected Versions

v0.5.0 through v0.12.2. The go-get walk-up without an access check was introduced in commit 3dfecd9 (fix(http): go-get requests), and private repositories arrived in the same v0.5.0 release. The middleware exception that also reached the LFS and dumb-HTTP routes was added in v0.6.0, together with the HTTP LFS routes, and the differing responses on the Git and LFS routes date from the same middleware.

Patches

Fixed in v0.12.3.

The go-get route no longer goes through the per-repository access middleware. It authenticates the caller and nothing more, and GoGetHandler checks read access on each repository it considers during the walk-up. A repository the caller cannot read is skipped exactly as if it did not exist, so an unreadable repository and a missing one produce the same 404, and a readable repository nested under an unreadable one still resolves.

The go-get exception is removed from withAccess entirely. Every Git, dumb-HTTP, and LFS route now enforces the repository existence and access checks regardless of the query string. The two LFS basic handlers also check for a missing repository, as their siblings did, so a future routing mistake returns a 404 rather than a panic.

AccessLevelForUser used to prefer the repository attached to the request over the name it was asked about. During the walk-up those differ, so the access check now always looks the repository up by the name it is given.

Bad credentials on a go-get request now return 403, the same as on the Git routes. Previously they were treated as anonymous for paths that were not themselves repositories.

On the Git and LFS routes, any repository the caller cannot read now gets one answer, decided in one place: 403 when the credentials are wrong, 401 with a credential prompt when the caller is anonymous, and 404 when they are signed in. This matches how GitHub responds. The LFS write checks now run after the read check, and a JWT presented for a missing repository is rejected as an invalid token like any other.

Two behaviours change as a result. An anonymous clone of a mistyped repository name now prompts for credentials instead of reporting that the repository does not exist, and a signed-in user without access to a private repository now gets "not found" instead of a credential prompt.

Pushing over HTTP to a name that does not exist still creates the repository, so a user allowed to create repositories can still tell a taken name from a free one by trying to push. That is inherent to push-to-create and is not changed here.

Workarounds

None. Upgrade to the patched release.

Disabling the HTTP server (http.enabled: false) removes the exposure, at the cost of HTTP Git access. Setting anon-access to no-access limits the disclosure to authenticated users.

SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.77, POST /api/scoutsuite/generate-gcp-report in backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/routes/scoutsuite.py admits admin and analyst users and validates the uploaded content as GCPScoutSuiteJSON, but passes raw file.filename from the multipart header to savefiletodirectory in backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/services/scoutsuite.py. The writer combines this filename with scoutsuite-report using os.path.join without sanitization or a resolved-path containment check. A traversal filename therefore writes the supplied JSON outside the intended report directory. In the reported root-running backend, the researcher demonstrated root-owned writes outside that directory and into the application source directory. This permits host-file overwrite subject to the accepted JSON-content constraint and can disrupt application operation; the demonstrated primitive does not establish unrestricted executable contents or unconditional cross-tenant confidentiality loss. Version 0.1.77 removes caller-controlled filenames from the affected route; unrestricted-content and direct-code-execution claims require separate curator reconciliation.

An out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the Qt Framework assimp scene import plugin of the Qt3D module.

An improper access control vulnerability exists in the multi-factor authentication (MFA) functionality of ManageEngine SharePoint Manager Plus (SPMP). A low-privileged authenticated user can bypass authorization checks to read and modify MFA configuration settings, enable or disable MFA for the application, enumerate MFA-enrolled users, and delete MFA-enrolled accounts. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to weaken authentication protections or cause a denial of service by configuring invalid MFA settings, potentially locking legitimate users out of the application. This vulnerability was fixed in build 4507. The reproduction explicitly uses build 4506.

Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to version 1.0.8.7, authenticated IDOR on admin/auth-token endpoint allows any administrator to read and overwrite another administrator's API tokens. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.8.7.

Vvveb is a powerful and easy to use CMS with page builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to version 1.0.8.7, the password reset functionality is vulnerable to an Authentication Bypass due to insufficient validation of the user and token GET parameters. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.8.7.

Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.

Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.

WHartTest 2.2.0 through 2.8.1 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in ScheduledTaskViewSet and TaskExecutionViewSet that allows authenticated users to access other projects' tasks. Attackers can set projectpk to another project's sequential ID to modify, delete, or trigger scheduled tasks via run-now and read execution logs.

Tamery (formerly Conar) 0.26.1 before 0.99.0 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the cloud sync API chatsMessages.update handler, which leaves the client-supplied chatId writable. Authenticated Pro subscribers who know another user's chat ID can move messages with arbitrary parts and metadata into the victim's AI chat history.

Tamery (formerly Conar) 0.32.0 before 0.99.0 contains a broken authorization vulnerability in the cloud sync API connectionsResources.create handler that allows authenticated users to attach resources to other users' connections. Attackers owning one connection can include a victim's connectionId in a batch request to insert attacker-named resource rows listed by the victim's client.

Songloft 2.9.0 before 2.13.6 contains a hardcoded credentials vulnerability that allows adjacent network attackers to authenticate as administrator using the fixed admin/admin pair. Attackers on the same network can log in via the /api/v1/auth/login endpoint to modify library and configuration settings and install JavaScript plugins running in QuickJS.

MuseBot before 2.0.0 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to forge admin sessions by using the hard-coded default sessionkey 'musebotsessionkey'. Attackers can sign a MuseBot-session cookie carrying a userid to gain full administrative access, reading password hashes, chat records, and bot configuration, and stopping bots.

ShowDoc through 3.9.5 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the api/paramDescLib/deleteEntries endpoint that checks edit permission only for the first supplied entry id. Authenticated attackers can place their own entry id first and append other users' entry ids to permanently delete those parameter-description entries.

Blossom through 1.17.1 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability that allows authenticated users to access other users' folders because FolderService queries filter only on folder id. Attackers can supply another user's folder id to /folder/info, /folder/upd, /folder/open or /folder/del to read storage paths, rename, toggle visibility, or delete folders.

FilePress through 3.0.1 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in dzz/pichome/library that allows authenticated users to manage other libraries' folders because checkuserpermbyuid only checks membership of any library. Attackers who know another library's appid or folder id can invoke folder.php operations like deletefolder and rename, or rightdata.php getfolderdata, to delete, modify, or read foreign folders.

PowerDNS-Admin through 2026.08.1 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability that allows authenticated User-role accounts to refresh secondary zones they cannot access by supplying a different 'domain' field in the JSON body. Attackers authorized for any one zone can force axfr-retrieve transfers of other users' secondary zones and infer zone existence from differing responses.

CoreShop by CoreUnion through 1.5.5 contains an unauthenticated sql injection vulnerability in the api/Agent/GetGoodsPageList endpoint via the order parameter appended to an ORDER BY clause. Anonymous attackers can inject subqueries that bypass SqlSugar's field check to extract member accounts and orders through boolean-based or time-based blind techniques.